

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Presidential Spokesman Ignatenko Briefs Media

Views Gulf Situation

LD3010140290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1319 GMT 30 Oct 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Leonid Timofeyev from the USSR Foreign Ministry press center]

[Text] Moscow, 30 Oct—On 26 and 29 October, 270 Soviet citizens arrived in Moscow from Baghdad on two flights. Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, reported this at a briefing today.

He also informed journalists that 1,184 out of the 1,500 Soviet specialists who had been scheduled to leave Iraq over the course of a month had already returned home. Now the Soviet community in Iraq, including staff at the embassy, trade mission, and other institutions, numbers 4,008 people.

Commenting on the new UN Security Council resolution adopted in connection with the crisis in the Persian Gulf, the diplomat noted that the Soviet Union not only voted for its adoption, but was also among the co-authors of the document. The USSR considers it important, he stressed, that the resolution contains detailed proposals addressed to the UN secretary general and to all states to undertake diplomatic efforts toward a peaceful solution to the crisis. "This corresponds to our policy for the maximum use of peaceful opportunities in order to implement the resolutions of the Security Council," he stated.

Assessing the prospects of development in the Persian Gulf situation, Gennadiy Gerasimov stressed: "We think the political and diplomatic efforts ought to be continued in order to force Iraq, with the help of sanctions and pressure, to fulfil the resolutions of the Security Council." He expressed the opinion that war in the Persian Gulf was impermissible, since "that would be a catastrophe both for the region and for the world economy."

No Gorbachev Visit to FRG 'This Week'

LD3010154190 Moscow TASS in English 1523 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Excerpts] Soviet presidential spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko today described Mikhail Gorbachev's trip to Spain and France, which ended on Monday, as "an event of immense importance in international relations". [passage omitted]

On Soviet presidential envoy Yevgeniy Primakov's talks in several Middle Eastern countries, Ignatenko said that this trip by a member of the USSR Presidential Council "should be viewed as part of our joint efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement to the Gulf conflict".

In the quest for a peaceful solution, the USSR "ties everything together—efforts by the Foreign Ministry, the United Nations, by countries sharing a common border with Iraq and Kuwait and, certainly, efforts by European countries which are interested in having the entire conflict settled by political means".

Asked about Gorbachev's visit to Germany, Ignatenko only said that "it will not take place this week".

Recaps Gorbachev Trip to Spain, France

LD3010175190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Statement by presidential spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko at the Foreign Ministry in Moscow on 30 October—recorded]

[Text] In the opinion of USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the visit to Spain was of big scope, a great visit. Its results will have a positive influence on the development of cooperation between our two countries. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev expressed the opinion that what was done in the course of the visit is needed by other peoples too, both Europeans and the entire world community. The documents signed during the visit bring relations between Spain and the Soviet Union to a new phase of cooperation. They broadly open up doors for the development of relations including political, economic cooperation, exchanges, consultations, and so on. In Madrid stress was placed on the degree of agreement, the coincidence of assessments of the world situation, in analysis of world processes taking place of late in Europe and throughout the world.

During the visit it was noted in particular that Soviet people are very interested in the experience of Spain, which traveled a unique road after 1975, having made a momentous, peaceful transition from one way of life to another within a democratic framework.

The visit to France, as you know, lasted less than 24 hours. But each minute of it was used with maximum effect. You know that a number of extremely substantial agreements were signed but among them there stands out the treaty on agreement and cooperation. The sides made headway very quickly and quite seriously in very important fields. In the opinion of President Mitterrand, this marks a new stage of relations between the Soviet Union and France, a stage whose significance, whose level, and whose prospects for the future are very heartening.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stressed that the USSR and France approached such a major document logically and relations themselves brought us to such a document. This was a result of the new level of cooperation and mutual understanding between our countries.

In France there was discussion of the major problems of the present, those global changes which have brought a very high level of requirements to world politics and to the politicians themselves. At he same time, the Soviet-French dialogue has always had an independent significance, and I would especially like to stress that the experience of cooperation, the intellectual political level at which this dialogue has been going in the past few

years, enables one to hope that today the Soviet-French factor will play an important role in European and world politics.

The heads of the two countries discussed in detail the problems of Europe. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev appraised the coming Paris meeting of states participating in the Helsinki process as a major event.

No Slight to Catalan Government Intended

LD3110101790 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 0900 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Text] [Announcer] The spokesman for and personal adviser to the president of the Soviet Union has just denied that during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Barcelona there was discriminatory treatment of the president of the Generalitat [Catalan autonomous government] Jordi Pujol. Ana Dionis reports from Barcelona:

[Dionis] Mikhail Gorbachev's press spokesman and personal adviser, Vitaliy Ignatenko, has denied to Madrid Radio that the cancellation of the meeting between the Soviet president and Jordi Pujol last Sunday [28 October] was due to (?intervention) from the government in Madrid.

Nobody is responsible for the meeting not having taken place, Ignatenko said. During the whole time we were talking and eating. A private meeting was impossible because of the time factor. There was no premeditation.

Yesterday the Generalitat issued an official note calling the treatment that the autonomous government received during Gorbachev's private visit to Barcelona last Sunday humiliating and blaming the central government for this.

Foreign Ministry Briefs Media on Current Events

Gerasimov Welcomes EC Aid

LD3010141190 Moscow TASS in English 1323 GMT 30 Oct 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—The Soviet Union welcomes the desire of the 12-nation European Community to help bring Soviet political and economic reforms to a successful completion, a Soviet spokesman told a briefing in Moscow today.

Gennadiy Gerasimov commented on the results of an extraordinary summit meeting of the European Council in Rome on Sunday. He said the final document stressed the need for close cooperation between the European Communities, international organisations and various countries which would like to assist the Soviet leadership's efforts.

According to Gerasimov, the USSR paid special attention to the statement by Italian Premier Giulio Andreotti, the current president of the Council, that "the necessary aid may be provided to the Soviet Union already in mid-December".

Gerasimov Views Czechoslovak Cooperation

LD3010141790 Moscow TASS in English 1345 GMT 30 Oct 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—Czechoslovak Prime Minister Marian Calfa, who arrived in Moscow today on a working visit, will hold talks with Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov to review Soviet- Czechoslovak cooperation and development trends in Eastern Europe and the world as a whole, a Soviet spokesman told a briefing here today.

The visit by the Czechoslovak prime minister will "see an exchange of views on the pace of reform in our countries and difficulties and problems that arise on its way," Gennadiy Gerasimov said. "Soviet-Czechoslovak relations will be considered against this background."

The USSR "regards with understanding the anxiety of the Czechoslovak leadership over Soviet oil supplies to Czechoslovakia," he said. "We don't cease seeking ways to solve this issue."

Plans To Replace CEMA Discussed

LD3010150790 Moscow TASS in English 1418 GMT 30 Oct 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—"A new organisation will be created to replace the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)," Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

He said the council's transformation had been discussed by a working group of specialists from CMEA member-countries. They met in Czechoslovakia between October 23-25.

Gerasimov said the new organisation's task would be to "hold consultations, analyse and forecast cooperation". Documents prepared by the group aim to implement agreements between the CMEA member-countries' heads of government to "switch cooperation to market relations, base it on mutual benefit and use freely convertible currency and current world prices in mutual payments," Gerasimov said.

Describing the changes as "radical", Gerasimov noted that participants in the conference confirmed the intention of all the nine CMEA member-countries to become members of the new organisation and sign its charter.

He said the drafts to reform the CMEA, prepared by the group, had been submitted for the consideration of a

special commission and the council's Executive Committee. They will hold meetings in Moscow between November 13-15.

Gorbachev Approach to Diplomacy Viewed

91UF0070A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 40, 14-21 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by Andrei Kortunov: "New Dogma of the 'New Think'"]

[Text] Drawing historical analogies is always a risky business. But I can't help thinking of Gorbachev's first visit to France in the fall of 1985 now he is all set to pay a return visit. It was the first trip the new Soviet leader made to a Western country, the first application of his personal style of diplomacy, so different from the style of former Soviet leaders.

Today, five years later, most details of the visit are forgotten—it seems to belong to remote history and is overshadowed by the much more dramatic and important events of the current turbulent times. But this first step was indeed hard to make. Gorbachev was nervous as he answered questions from French television on the verge of the visit: conservative political analysts in the West were taking pains to try and prove that Gorbachev couldn't really be any different from Chernenko.

We have come far in the last five years. It is not a novice in international politics but a most popular world leader who is now off to Paris. The dilemma of whether the "new think" is Moscow's tactical ploy or a sweeping turn of policy has long been resolved, both by the conservatives in the West and the liberals in the East.

But does this mean that Gorbachev is going to find his coming visit to Paris easier than the one five years ago? I don't think so.

It is not so much a case of internal problems restricting freedom of manoeuvre in foreign politics. Neither is it really the fact that the democratization of foreign policy decision making also binds the President's hands in many respects. The main cause seems to be the following: during the last five years the powerful impulse of the new philosophical approaches and political concepts which have changed the image of Soviet diplomacy and brought Gorbachev to the fore among the leaders of world politics has gradually used up its potential and lost its ability for development, ossifying into new dogma.

The main content of these approaches and concepts was revolutionary destruction—destruction of the old mechanism of confrontation, as well as the institutions and structures of the cold war and ideological myth and dogma.

Today, despite our inheritance from the past and the inertia of the remaining traditional approaches, we have practically achieved our main objectives for dismantling the old world order. The USSR leadership no longer has to make supreme efforts, take risky steps and stake its political reputation in order to put an end to the cold war—this task will be completed by the logical development of the historical process. The world will never be the same as in October 1985, there have been irreversible changes.

However, the Soviet Union's new, positive role in international politics hasn't yet become a practicality. Inevitably this will be far less effective and far more painstaking and complicated than the dismantling of the old system. It will require new instruments, a new style and a new system of priorities. Perfectly calculated political programmes will be needed to replace the slogans which sufficed in the past. Cautious and prudent steps are needed in place of radical, sweeping proposals. Subtle diplomatic manoeuvres between different "centres of force" are necessary instead of appeals to the whole of mankind.

In my opinion, the need for the shift of accent was unfortunately not recognized by Moscow in time. As a result, Soviet foreign policy, which kept ahead of events and largely determined the international situation in the past, is now beginning to fall in the wake of international developments. For me, the breaking point was marked by Gorbachev's speech to the UN in December 1988: the stupendous edifice of the new world order was outlined in detail, but—alas—there was no proper place for the USSR in it.

From then on the country's foreign policy started to look more like a reaction to events, to changes in Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany and the Persian Gulf crisis. Improvisions were more or less successful, but they couldn't conceal the absence of strategy and the absence of the concept of national interests.

Meanwhile, fine words and global gestures began to be felt ever more clearly in Soviet policy. Dogmatism has demonstrated enviable tenacity and is posing under new disguises. Whereas former leaders reduced every issue to "class struggle in international politics," the current leaders harp on about "the priority of the interests of humanity." Whereas in the past the idea was to reach universal harmony through mankind's transition to the socialist mode of development, today harmony is seen in a "non-nuclear, non-violent world."

I think that in order to restore dynamism to his foreign policy the President has to solve at least as difficult a task as the one he embarked upon five years ago. The slogans of the "new think" must again be coordinated with real world problems and the country's capabilities, while the good of mankind has to be dovetailed with national interests. Political idealism has to be replaced by sober realism.

The coming visit to Paris will offer the Kremlin one of its last chances to remain at the helm of foreign and military policy. Gorbachev must prove that his measures correspond to the practical everyday needs of each individual Soviet Republic or region, aside from the interests of mankind in general. If this is not done today, then tomorrow the emerging diplomacy of the Republics will oppose USSR diplomacy rather than complement it.

Black Sea Antipollution Convention Drafted

LD3010202790 Moscow TASS in English 1731 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—Experts from the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, who met at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, have completed the drafting of a convention on the protection of the Black Sea from pollution.

They have also drafted three protocols providing for measures to combat spills of oil and other harmful substances, prevent the pollution of the sea from land, and regulate the dumping of waste and other materials in the sea.

The sides agreed in principle that a diplomatic conference should be convened early in 1991 to adopt the convention and the protocol.

United States & Canada

TASS Notes Planned Baker, Shevardnadze Meeting

LD3010220490 Moscow TASS in English 2149 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Washington October 31 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker will meet Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze during his planned trip to the Gulf and a number of European countries, Department of State spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler announced today.

Baker and Shevardnadze are expected to discuss matters relating to the critical situation in the Gulf region and arms control. The meeting is scheduled for November 9 during Baker's last stop-over on his week-long itinerary. The place of the meeting has not yet been identified.

According to the schedule for Baker's tour prepared by the U.S. State Department, the U.S. secretary of state will meet the leaders of Bahrain on Sunday, the emir of Kuwait in Saudi Arabia on Monday. He will hold talks in Egypt and Turkey on Tuesday and in France on Wednesday. After a stop-over in Britain on Thursday, Baker will spend Friday and Saturday in some other European countries talking with his Soviet counterpart.

The schedule is subejct to changes, Tutwiler cautioned.

Cheney Cited on Changed U.S.-USSR Relations

PM3010085190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Secretary Happy"]

[Text] Over the past few years the nature of the dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States has undergone major change, U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney stated Wednesday.

Summing up the results of his recent visit to the USSR in a speech to members of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he noted that regular contacts are now maintained not only between our countries' presidents and foreign ministers, but also between the top leaders of military departments. Until recently we had no such regular military exchanges, R. Cheney said. During his visit to the USSR, he continued, "I was struck from the military point of view by the level of change in the dialogue, the agenda" of bilateral relations, and the overall atmosphere at the talks. These changes, as the secretary put it, are largely explained by the profound transformations that are under way in the Soviet Union.

The positive changes in the international arena and the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations are producing far-reaching changes to U.S. military strategy, the Pentagon military budget, and armed forces structure, R. Cheney stated, stressing that this was the "main message" he took to Moscow.

Increased U.S. 'Pressure' on Iraq Noted

PM2610200490 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Oct 90 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Further Escalation"]

[Text] Washington 26 Oct—Washington has decided to step up the military-psychological pressure on Iraq. U.S. President Bush today gave the order to send some 100,000 more American servicemen to Saudi Arabia.

At the moment the Pentagon has more than 210,000 servicemen in the Arabian desert. Speaking in Washington today, U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney stated that the buildup of American military might in the Persian Gulf region has by no means reached its limit and that the sending of troops and arms to the region will continue. There is talk of sending another tank division there in the first instance.

The question now on everyone's lips is obvious—what is the reason for the further increase in the American contingent in Saudi Arabia? Cheney answered: "Saddam Husayn is continuing to concentrate his forces in Kuwait. The number of Iraqi servicemen there is already in excess of 400,000, they are digging in, and there is no evidence that Baghdad is considering withdrawing from Kuwait. We must be sure that we have sufficient forces in the event of extreme circumstances."

Pentagon spokesmen claim that no decision has been made on a military operation to liberate Kuwait. They say that the administration's policy remains unchanged—to secure Iraq's withdrawal from occupied Kuwaiti territory by means of economic sanctions.

However, despite the fact that the international embargo has in effect hermetically "sealed" Iraq, it is having no effect on that country's armed forces, CIA Director Webster stated today. Webster also noted that even if the embargo forces Saddam Husayn to withdraw from Kuwait, the danger that his regime represents to stability in the region will not be eliminated. In other words, the armed forces of the United States and its allies will either have to remain there indefinitely or eventually strike a blow against Iraq.

U.S. Public Opinions on Gulf Solution Contrasted

LD2810125290 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 28 Oct 90

["Weekly Commentary" by Valentin Zorin]

[Text] The Soviet Union's and the United States' common stand on the act of aggression committed by Iraq against Kuwait is an event of major importance. Joint action of the two superpowers at the United Nations Organization aimed at working out measures to deal with the consequences of the aggression indicate how far the improvement of Soviet-American relations has gone.

As for the attitude of the public to that aggression, it differs in our two countries. It seems that demonstrations of protest against the sending of American troops to the Persian Gulf held in New York, San Francisco, and other American cities recently do not express the sentiments of the majority. This majority seems to favor a showdown of strength, and this is where the differences lie between the views of the Soviet and American public.

There are no two opinions here as to how Iraq's aggression against Kuwait should be assessed. People here are unanimous in believing that if this action remains unpunished, the world will be thrown back and will allow the law of the jungle to rule again. But when the question arises about how to force Baghdad to respect international law and the United Nations decisions, most Soviet people display a more than cautious attitude to the idea of using force. This cautious attitude can be explained by several reasons; one is the immediate proximity of the conflict area to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet people are fully aware of the danger of a large-scale military conflict in the region, where impressive Armed Forces are amassed having nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare means at their disposal. The public here realizes, at the same time, that the Middle East is not that Gordion knot that can be cut at one go. I would say it would be much simpler to launch military operations in the Middle East than to end them. So the widespread opinion here is that preference should be given to political means. No military force should be used until all political means are exhausted.

By the way, reports from Baghdad saying that Saddam Husayn's dream in which the Prophet Muhammad advised him to withdraw troops from Kuwait should be applied more to real politics rather than fantasies. It is not hard to understand why the Iraqi Government circles decided to circulate the story about the dream.

The economic embargo on Iraq and Iraq's international isolation are beginning to show that what is needed today is restraint, composure, and a sober mind. The cowboy habit to use the gun in every dispute is not the best way to act on the threshold of the 21st century.

Now the mechanism for closing conflicts developed in the United Nations charter is really being put to the test. The public here believes that there is a need to fully use the opportunities provided by these mechanism and resolve the crisis peacefully.

U.S. 'Desert Shield' Operations, Goals Examined

91UF0097A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 43, 24 Oct 90 p 15

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent Sergey Medvedko: "A Shield or a Lance? Report From U.S. Troop Deployment Locations in Saudi Arabia"]

[Excerpts] Jubail-Dahran—We were a group of journalists in the deployment location of one of the United States Marine units not far from the Kuwaiti border, almost on the coast of the Persian Gulf. The scenery was more than depressing—black-brown desert, faded sky. Having just arrived at the troop location, I noticed how carefully everything here was camouflaged—equipment, storehouses, tents—everything under camouflage netting that blended in perfectly with the terrain.

[passage omitted] "Those are our helicopters working on combat procedures," an infantryman sitting next to me explained. "And over there, closer to the horizon, you see a fighter wing. Night training is a regular thing for all of us. First of all, it's not hot. Second, no one sees us. And third, we believe combat actions at night are the most effective. Remember my words when we go to war. The main attacks and deployments will be carried out at night. This is our strong point, and we think our enemy's weak point. Here we are! Now we'll service the equipment. Here, have a look so you can orient yourself." Something like binoculars were put into my hands. "This is a night vision device."

I raised it to my eyes and saw what was going on in the vicinity in a green light, somewhat like a television screen. It turns out our column included service vehicles that had stopped in pairs. An armored personnel carrier with equipment, machine guns, and antennas protruding like bristles moved between them, and was being refueled on the left side, while at the same time being filled with fresh water from special tanks on the right. I pointed my "binoculars" to the side and gasped, just now seeing a whole line of armored vehicles that had come here to be refueled from somewhere in the desert.

"These are our most modern, the 'Bradley' armored fighting vehicle," a captain told me (I was able to make out his rank insignia, also using the device). "These vehicles can see just as well in the darkness as during the day. This is why we can rely on the night..."

But the Americans are not putting their trust only in the night.

One major, who asked me not to disclose his name, acknowledged that Operation "Desert Shield" had long ago gone beyond the realm of its defensive designation.

"To defend Saudi Arabia," he stated, "we do not need more than 200,000 troops, 500 aircraft, and about 60 ships. When forces of this kind are concentrated, conflict with the enemy is inevitable. That's a law. We are being prepared for offensive operations that, I am certain, will not be limited to the liberation of Kuwait. We can begin the war right now. And that would be even better. Most of us think it is unavoidable—Saddam is not withdrawing. So why wait? The sooner we begin, the sooner we return home. It will be a short war—we do not doubt our superiority."

"But over 90 percent of the American soldiers are unseasoned, while the Iraqis have the experience of an eight-year war," I observed.

"A war with Iran. That's something completely different. We don't intend to send people to slaughter, like the Iraqis. Air power will undertake the main function of destroying enemy personnel and equipment. But our strength lies not in the equipment, but in the morale and spirit of our soldiers."

[passage omitted] I got acquainted with a 24-year old sergeant from South Carolina named Corintha at the King 'Abd al-'Aziz Air Base. Corintha arrived here with the 82d Airborne Division along with her fiance a month and a half ago. It turns out she already has experience, having been in the Panama campaign.

"I got settled in all right," she says, pointing to the huge air- conditioned tent in which her platoon is billeted. "My job is to greet new arrivals. See over there—a plane has arrived with new people. They're mine. You know it seems to me somehow that all of them will return home alive—there will be no war. We are on the eve of Saddam's departure from Kuwait."

And so I heard that kind of opinion, too. But most people in the Army have long stopped discussing the probability of war—the only discussion now is about when it will flare up. The view most widely held: "We will deal with it before Christmas." [passage omitted]

Effect of Cut in U.S. SDI Program Noted

PM3010153190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by TASS correspondent P. Vanichkin: "Does 'Star Wars' Have a Future?"]

[Text] Washington, 26 Oct—The reduction in appropriations for the "Star Wars" program proposed by Congress will postpone for at least two years a decision by the U.S. Administration on creating an ABM shield and placing it in space. H. Cooper, director of the SDI Organization, has announced this.

President G. Bush originally requested $4.6 billion from Congress for SDI in fiscal 1991. However, wishing to reduce the huge U.S. budget deficit, the Senate agreed to provide $3.7 billion for the "Star Wars" program, and the House of Representatives agreed to $2.3 billion. A compromise—$2.9 billion—was reached in the congressional conference committee.

According to the SDI Organization spokesman, the proposed reduction in the organization's funds will mean the abandonment of a number of its most ambitious projects.

Leningrad Mayor Meets With Baker, Scowcroft

LD3110132190 Moscow TASS in English 1239 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Text] Washington October 31 TASS—Visiting Leningrad Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak was received by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on Tuesday [31 October]. Sobchak also met National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Senate Democratic majority leader George Mitchell.

Speaking to American journalists, Sobchak emphasised that raising funds to finance Leningrad's revival was one of the main goals of his visit. He stressed the importance of guarantees from the U.S. Administration for American investments in the USSR.

Sobchak is in the U.S. at the invitation of a college in Saint Petersburg, Florida. A college spokesman said Sobchak's visit was financed by American companies. He stressed that the Leningrad mayor's wishes in the field of economic aid have become "the subject of study but not action".

U.S. Aid for Soviet Oil Industry Viewed

PM3010145790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[PRAVDA-TASS report under general heading: "From Flow of News"]

[Text] The committee for U.S.-Soviet relations has come out in favor of setting up lasting cooperation between the United States and the USSR in the field of power engineering. The committee's bulletin distributed Sunday discusses the consolidation of business ties with the Soviet side by U.S. companies engaged in the extraction of oil and gas. The document's authors believe that the United States could, on a compensatory basis, provide the Soviet Union substantial aid in expanding the extraction of these natural minerals and processing them. For the Soviet side, the bulletin points out, this would mean increasing in the very near future the currency revenue essential to finance economic reform in the country.

Northeast Asia

Japanese Trade Talks Open in Moscow

OW3110133490 Tokyo KYODO in English 1226 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow, Oct. 31 KYODO—Japan and the Soviet Union opened trade talks in Moscow on Wednesday, focusing on the conclusion of a new bilateral trade and payment agreement.

The Soviet delegation said at the opening session of the two-day meeting that Moscow wants to discuss conclusion of a new agreement covering the 1991-95 period, Japanese sources said.

The Japanese representatives proposed a frank exchange of views on Soviet economic reform.

Japan also wants to take up Moscow's delay in settling its trade debt to Japanese firms, which amounted to about 500 million dollars at the end of July, the sources said.

The Japanese plan to assist Moscow's perestroyka, or economic restructuring, may also be discussed, they said.

The Japanese Foreign Ministry has sought budgetary appropriations in the next fiscal year for aid to improve productivity in the Soviet Union and to help train Soviet experts in Japan.

Popov Calls for Solving Kuril Island Issue

LD2910143690 Moscow TASS in English 1417 GMT 29 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Vladimir Kuchko and Vladimir Solntsev]

[Text] Tokyo October 29 TASS—The so-called northern territories issue is a serious problem in relations between the Soviet Union and Japan, which should be solved, visiting Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov told a press conference here today.

He said "certain circumstances" should be taken into account in solving the problem.

The main circumstances is the conviction of a considerable number of Soviet people that the four Kuril islands, to which Japan lays claims, belong to the Soviet Union, Popov pointed out.

He said this conviction had been confirmed by repeated public opinion polls.

He opposed linking the northern territories problem to Japanese aid to the Soviet Union.

"The matter at issue is the results of the Second World War, which should be discussed independently, irrespective of Japan's economic aid to the Soviet Union," Popov said.

Article Notes DPRK Ignoral of Soviet Assistance

PM3010101990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Oct 90 Union Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent V. Lukashin: "What General Choe Kwang Ignored..."]

[Text] Pyongyang—On 25 October, hundreds of grateful residents of Pyongyang came to the friendship monument erected in honor of the military feat of the Chinese people's volunteers during the years of the Fatherland War (1950-1953). Numerous wreaths were laid at the base of the stela containing lists of the servicemen who died. As is known, the Chinese units suffered approximately 1 million casualties. A party and government delegation from China headed by Li Tieying, member of the CPC Central Committee Politburo and PRC state councillor, a war veterans delegation headed by Colonel General Zhang Zhen, and other guests arrived in Pyongyang to honor the memory of their compatriots.

A ceremonial meeting devoted to the 40th anniversary of the entry of the Chinese people's volunteer army into the Fatherland War was held the previous day. In his report Army General Choe Kwang, member of the Workers Party of Korea Central Committee Politburo and chief of the Korean People's Army General Staff, rated highly the Chinese people's fraternal assistance and dwelt in detail on present-day Korean-Chinese relations. A Korean-Chinese friendship week has been devoted to the portentous date. A special exhibition in honor of combat fraternity has been established in the Museum of Victory in the Fatherland Liberation War. In short, much has been done in Pyongyang to pay tribute to the Chinese brothers. This cannot fail to arouse a feeling of profound respect. And yet what is happening leaves a somewhat bitter taste...

The thing is that our country also extended the hand of assistance to the Korean people. During all three years, right up to the conclusion of the armistice in Panmunjom, the Soviet Union provided them tremendous military and economic assistance. This was just five years after the end of the Great Patriotic War. Things were hard for us, but we shared with our friends everything that we had ourselves. For long years it was not customary to speak of this. The Soviet Union supplied the Korean People's Army and also, incidentally, the Chinese people's volunteers with the most modern weapons and ammunition for those times and much else besides. At the request of the DPRK Government, our command transferred several air divisions to northeast China. Soviet airmen downed dozens of U.S. aircraft in Korea's skies. Our pilots reliably covered the rear of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese volunteers from the air. Numerous groups of Soviet military advisers—airmen, seamen, tankmen, artillerymen—were on Korean soil during those days. Many of them died a brave death.

Unfortunately, Army General Choe Kwang did not even mention them in his report. Nor is there a single line about the Soviet Union's assistance in the Victory Museum exhibition. It is as though nothing happened.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Commentary Views Burmese Crackdown on Monks

BK2610132590 Moscow in Burmese to Burma 1030 GMT 26 Oct 90

[Commentary by observer (Viktor Alyuvyev)]

[Text] News agency reports from Rangoon are giving prominent coverage to the current Burmese military government's unprecedented actions against the Buddhist Sangha [order of monks]. Government troops were reported to have entered and searched 139 monasteries and arrested many monks. Moscow Radio observer, (Viktor Alyuvyev) comments on these reports as follows:

According to explanations by the military authorities, the measures were taken against the monks to contain the activities of antigovernment organizations operating among the monks. The State Law and Order Restoration

Council [SLORC] alleged that members of the Sangha are distributing antigovernment literature, having contact with underground political organizations, and colluding with the National League for Democracy [NLD]—the major opposition party in Burma. The latest reports on Burma note that there have been raids on NLD offices. Despite these charges, it is clear that the major reason for using force against senior monks and monks was the religious boycott of the monks against the military personnel and their dependents.

The boycott was called following the death of at least two monks during the disturbances in Mandalay last August. According to the explanation given by observers on Burma, the rejection of the Defense Services by Sasana [Buddhist religion] organizations is especially demoralizing for ordinary soldiers and junior military officers in Burma's Defense Services to the extent that the military leaders were concerned about the loyalty of the soldiers toward the military government.

In a deeply devout Buddhist country such as Burma, the institution of Sangha, which is independent from the state, has always posed a problem to the military government. All can recall how in the sixties U Ne Win's government attempted to keep the strength of Sangha organizations and their activities under tight control and scrutiny. However, thanks to Burmese culture and tradition, Burmese monks have been able to maintain closer contacts with the people than the government. That was why the monks were in the vanguard together with the students in the prodemocracy mass movement which was crushed in 1988 through the use of force.

After the military government had arrested almost the entire leadership of the NLD which won the May general elections, the monks constitute the only force which could speak in defense of the opposition. Observers in Rangoon and Bangkok say the military government has decided to remove the monks who constitute the last protection for dissent.

There was immediate reaction to such use of force against the Buddhist monks in Burma. For instance, the U.S. State Department has said in a statement that the raid on monasteries is another proof of the SLORC's disregard for human rights. Earlier, members of the Japanese parliament had sent a letter to the secretary general of the United Nations urging him to take measures to implement the results of the May general elections during which the opposition won the decisive victory. Many observers are pointing out the significance of Japanese parliamentarians joining the U.S. and the European Community member states in their appeal. The Moscow Radio observer concludes by saying that observers believe that the Tokyo government is capable of influencing circles close to the current military regime in Burma.

Continuing Tension in Western Cambodia Noted

LD3010183190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Report by Yevgeniy Kochanov from Phnom Penh; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Answer] the west situation continues to prevail in western regions of Cambodia adjoining the border with Thailand. [illegible] Kochanov reports from Phnom Penh.

[Kochanov] The situation is not entirely normal. After all, during the preceding years the opposition practically ended its attempts to gain the upper hand over the government army during the rainy season, and there was a buildup of forces for intensive military operations during the dry season—on one side as on the other.

Recently, opposition groups, whose strike force consists of Pol Pot units, have again attempted to break through to the center of the country, into Kompong Thom province. They were routed to a man in the region of the district center of (Stoeng), leaving on the battlefield dead and wounded, and an enormous amount of weaponry and ammunition.

The Pol Pot men assert that the means for conducting war, stockpiled at secret forest depots, should suffice for another seven or eight years of combat. Well, it appears that even now, these reserves are being put to use. The weapons are predominantly of Chinese manufacture, based, incidentally, on old Soviet models. But there is more than a little from the United States as well as the FRG, Singapore, and other countries.

Who, in fact, is not making their contribution to this bloody slaughter which has been continuing for two decades already? And note that, in words, practically the entire world community is now expressing an interest in a speedy setlement of the Cambodian conflict.

Trade Mission Denies Cut in Oil to Vietnam

PM2610120190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Oct 90 p 3

[Report by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent A. Kabannikov: "Few Lines"]

[Text] Representatives of the USSR's trading mission in Vietnam have officially denied a Hanoi press report saying that the rise in prices of gasoline and kerosene in this country is due to shortfalls in petroleum shipments from the USSR and payment in hard currency in line with world market conditions. It was stated that over the last nine months Vietnam has received 75 percent of the agreed annual fuel shipments. Moreover Vietnam has paid for it at stable prices in convertible rubles. The petroleum difficulties are partially due to the long times taken to unload our tankers in Vietnamese ports.

Near East & South Asia

Falin Labels Primakov's Baghdad Trip 'Useful'

LD3110131690 Moscow TASS in English 1300 GMT 31 Oct 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Konstantin Voitsekhovich and Boris Zverev]

[Text] Moscow October 31 TASS—Speaking at a news conference in Moscow today, a senior Communist Party official described as "useful" the recent visit to Baghdad by Soviet presidential envoy Yevgeniy Primakov. Valentin Falin disagreed with suggestions that the mission was inconclusive.

The trip "was useful because it gave both sides additional things to think about," Falin said. "We learned more about the motives and analysis that determine the Iraqi leadership's actions, while Iraq found out that the USSR would insist on the complete implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions."

Speaking about the possible ways out of the Gulf crisis, he stressed that initially it was necessary to "exhaust all chances of political settlement" before considering any other measures.

Assessing the world community's actions in countering the aggressor, Falin noted that the Gulf crisis "produced a degree of cooperation that was never observed before" among its members.

In considering ways out of the current crisis, one should primarily base oneself on the long-term interests of ensuring peace and security in the region, he said, describing a military settlement as "the worst option."

Falin expressed the view that the current conflict should be solved so that an end would be put not only to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait but also to prospect of aggression in the region.

He also called on Arab countries to play a more active role in a search for a Gulf settlement.

Akhromeyev Views Developments in Gulf Conflict

PM3010141690 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE in English 5 Oct 90

[Report on interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev by Novosti parliamentary correspondent Vladimir Ostrovskiy: "Gulf: Where's Way Out?"—place and date not given; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev, an adviser to the Soviet President, believes the threat of war in the Gulf is not ruled out. But he has faith in reason and political options to settle the conflict.

"I think the danger of war in the Gulf exists," said Marshal Akhromeyev, when interviewed by a Novosti parliamentary correspondent. "Firstly, it was a direct and naked act of aggression by Iraq against Kuwait. As a result, large numbers of Iraqi troops are massed there. They are all equipped and trained, and readily respond to control. There are also large military contingents of the United States, its NATO allies and some Arab countries.

"The US land, air and naval forces in the area exceed 160,000 men (with over 1,000 warplanes and some 100 warships). That is a strong grouping. Extensive material resources, including ammunition, and military equipment reserves, have been delivered from the US. A control structure is in place."

"The political positions of the sides are diametrically opposite," continued Akhromeyev. "The Iraqi leadership claims that the Kuwaiti issue is no more, that it has been resolved once and for all. The United States, however, together with world public opinion, says that Iraq must leave Kuwait and a former government be restored there. With large troop numbers concentrated and confronting each other, and the sides having incompatible political positions, the threat of an armed conflict is apparent."

It is another thing, believes the Marshal, that one who unleashes the war will not only reap its consequences, but bear full responsibility for such a dangerous and highly risky step. "I think it is difficult for the United States to decide on such a step, and even more difficult for Iraq to pursue its aggression."

True, over the past few days, noted the Marshal, some options for a political settlement came up. At any rate, the Soviet Union, France and some other countries have from the beginning been for a political solution to this highly sensitive issue. It was no accident that President Mitterrand of France visited the area recently, and Yevgeniy Primakov, a personal envoy of the Soviet President, is now there.

"I presume there is some encouraging likelihood of a political settlement of the conflict. But for such settlement to get off the ground some mutual concessions are needed. let us wait and see the development of events."

"Of course, in assessing the situation it is necessary to remember that the Americans have not come there of their own free will. Saudi Arabia invited them to its territory to safeguard itself against Iraq's possible aggression. On the other hand, there are Arab shrines here, which is affecting Arab religious feelings. For that reason alone, the stay of American army units is resented by the Arab people. There are also other equally significant reasons making the presence of US troops in the region a destabilising factor. That cannot be dismissed, especially by the Americans themselves."

"I may remind you that it was to defend its interests overseas that the United States created special troops and their joint central command. These troops number over 200,000 men at present. They comprise naval units,

Marines, air force formations and ground forces. I do not blame or exonerate the Americans. Simply they use what they have built up before. Nevertheless the USSR cannot remain indifferent when a large US military grouping has appeared not far from the Soviet southern frontiers. That affects our interests and causes a certain concern. Our wish is to see the dramatic issue threatening a flare-up settled politically and foreign troops go home.

"Military people tend to guide themselves by facts. At any rate, I think there is no point in giving far-reaching evaluations and predicting the course of events beyond what I have said. I personally place hopes on the common sense and responsibility of political leaders. I wish to believe that they will prevail in this sharp conflict," concluded Marshal Akhromeyev.

Soviet View of Possible Gulf War Assessed

LD3010202990 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 30 Oct 90

["Forecast" by commentator Mikhail Mayorov]

[Text] A resolution just passed by the UN Security Council urges Iraq to implement all the earlier decisions of the world community about the Gulf crisis otherwise the Security Council will have to take further measures in keeping with the UN Charter.

If we proceed from the assumption that a war in the Gulf is inevitable, how will the USSR act in such a situation? Many people in this country are presumably giving thought to this question. A forecast by our commentator Mikhail Mayorov:

Iraq must pull out from Kuwait. It is absolutely clear that this accent in the Soviet policy remains unchanged. It is impossible to suppose that the USSR has stopped following the resolutions adopted so far by the UN Security Council against Baghdad. But it is one thing to apply peaceful sanctions against Iraq and quite another a war.

Moscow's decisions will hardly run counter to the sentiments in the Soviet Parliament. The MP's had a chance to air their views on the matter when they heard recently a report by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. On the whole, Moscow's stand has support though there have also been misgivings whether the Soviet policy is sovereign when the solidarity with the world community may result in a situation that the USSR will be drawn into the hostilities in the Gulf. The foreign minister made the assurance that Moscow retains a right of choice. First it may vote for or against in the debates on the possible military actions against Iraq in the UN Security Council, and second, not a single Soviet soldier will be found in the conflict zone without the approval of the Soviet Parliament.

That is apparently the limit for the involvement in the Gulf events. A limit Moscow may reach.

After the war in Afghanistan that was so tragic for the Soviet Union, it is short-sighted to count on its parliament agreeing about the dispatch of a Soviet armed contingent to another hotspot. The president of the government in general will hardly risk to put this question before the MP's. And it is quite unreal that the Soviet Union may give military support to any action by the United States and other western countries in the Gulf—action that may be taken without the proper decisions of the United Nations.

Can the Soviet policy be regarded as limited in this sense? The limit does not cancel out what Moscow has already done in opposing the aggression and in looking for a settlement. All Soviet military supplies to Bahgdad have been stopped. The entire range of Soviet-Iraqi economic ties have been frozen. Having sent a special envoy of the Soviet president first to the Gulf countries and then to some Western European capitals and to Washington and finally again to the Mideast and southwest Asia, Moscow has made an unprecedented attempt in its policy to act as the middle man in this regional conflict that is of a global scale. The main thing is the spirit of interaction and cooperation that has begun to determine the international affairs in view of the Soviet Union's support to the world community's opinion.

Treatment of Soviets Specialists in Iraq Noted

PM2810192990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Oct 90 p 1

[Unattributed report incorporating letter from Moscow reader M. Petrenko: "Is Everything Quiet in Baghdad?"]

[Text] Not too long ago I read that the body of a specialist of ours who worked in Iraq had been brought back to the USSR. He died under unexplained circumstances. Was there an investigation into the cause of death? What in general is the situation with regard to Soviet people in Iraq? Are their lives in danger?

[Signed] M. Petrenko, Moscow

As we were informed at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is no reason to suppose that Bagdasarov, the person in question, died a violent death. It was an ordinary accident. "To date there have been no provocations against Soviet specialists in Iraq," ministry spokesman M. Tsvigun assured us. "Moreover, the Foreign Ministry is receiving hundreds of letters from them asking us to try to exert at least some influence on journalists who, in their view, are often guilty of disinformation and exaggeration. The result is that the near and dear ones of people working a long way from home are literally going out of their minds."

"In our country you are still regarded as friends," we were assured at the Iraqi Embassy in the USSR, where there is perplexity that the view of Western news agencies on events around the Persian Gulf predominates in the Soviet press and there is little coverage of Iraq's viewpoint on events. "We are not asking you to take our

side," we were told by Iraqi Embassy information adviser Doctor Ghalib al-Tamimi. "We merely ask you to print the truth and try to be objective."

OK, let us have objectivity, then. The KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editorial collegium invites Iraqi President Saddam Husayn to spell out in our newspaper his view of the causes of the conflict and ways to settle it. Furthermore, our special correspondents S. Zavorotnyy and I. Chernyak are flying out to Iraq today on the 1410 Aeroflot flight from Moscow to Baghdad. Read their reports in our next few editions.

'International Situation' Program on Gulf, Israel

LD2610233590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 26 Oct 90

["International Situation: Questions and Answers" program featuring foreign political commentator Valentin Gubernatorov, Leningrad CHAS PIK reporter Igor Sidorov, Near East specialist Igor Olegouich Surguchev, commentator Konstantin Patsyuk, international affairs reporter Igor Penchenko, and Dmitriy Morozov]

[Text] [Gubernatorov] Igor Olegovich, letters express astonishment and even indignation over the fact that the United States and other countries are reluctant to press Israel into ending its occupation of Arab lands while at the same time they hold a resolute stance against Iraq. This is mentioned, specifically, in the letters written by Mikhail Mikhaylovich Savelyev from Leningrad, and Lyubov Nikolayevna Petrova from Stolbovaya station, Moscow Oblast. The latter writes: Any aggression is always disgusting, but one should have tackled Israel long ago by comprehensively boycotting and blockading it. Then, perhaps, the Kuwait case might not have taken place. What can you say to that?

[Surguchev] In principle, I agree with the views of these comrades. Indeed, if Israel had been stopped in its tracks, Kuwait might have been spared its fate. No doubt, the serious reproaches addressed to the United Nations, and even more so to the United States in its role as Israel's ally and patron in relation with the continuing occupation by Israel of Arab territories and its cruel suppression of the Palestinian unarmed revolt, are fully justified. The fact that today we, together with the U.S. or, to be more precise, with the whole world community, condemn Iraq, does not mean that we have to slacken our criticism of Washington's pro-Israeli policies, or give up supporting the Arabs' just cause in their conflict with Israel. I believe that with a blockade, boycott, or some other measures the United Nations must force Tel Aviv to withdraw from the occupied territories and to recognize the Palestinians' right to state independence. But the thing is that there is no concord on this account in the world organizations, primarily in the Security Council.

[Gubernatorov] I think that is why the introduction of any international sanctions against Israel seems hardly feasible now. Such is the situation, alas. But, it can change for the better for the Arabs, evenutally, if the international community succeeds in curbing Iraqi expansionism. Settlement of the crisis provoked by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has now moved into the forefront because there is unprecedented international unanimity regarding this crisis.

[Surguchev] Precisely, this makes it possible to effectively pressure Iraq into leaving Kuwait. I do not understand the positions of those who think that one should not bring pressure to bear upon Baghdad, as long as there is no similar pressure on Tel Aviv. Certain people profess a strange logic: if one failed to do something in one case—I mean, against Israel—then it should not be done in the other case, either, that is, in relation to Iraq. On these grounds they speak about an allegedly unjust attitude to Baghdad. Such a premise is faulty, in my view. I think one cannot equate Iraq and Israel, proceeding alone from the fact that both countries are playing the roles of occupiers, and ignoring the difference in the natures of the Iraq-Kuwait and Arab-Israeli conflicts.

[Gubernatorov] So you think there is a difference? How significant is it?

[Surguchev] You see, Iraq has committed a purely unprovoked aggression against a small and harmless relative country. This cannot be said about the 1967 Israeli aggression, which led to Israel's occupation of Arab lands, which it still keeps. I will note the following point, which has been hushed up in our country. Israel was prompted toward war by the actions of Egypt, which in May 1967 insisted on the withdrawal of the United Nations forces from the Sinai peninsula, brought its troops there, and closed the narrow Tiran Straits to Israeli ships, thereby blocking Elat, Israel's only port on the Red Sea. Israel saw that as a hostile act and evidence of preparations for an attack against it. Therefore, the Israelis took upon themselves the initiative of starting a war simulteneously aginst Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. I give these facts here not to justify Tel Aviv's old and new policy, but to clarify the questions that worry our listeners.

Report Describes Situation in Baghdad

PM3010224590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Oct 90 Union Edition p 5

[Second in a series of reports by special correspondents Yevg. Bay and V. Litovkin under the general heading "Iraq: 10 Days in October": "Hostages and Volunteers"]

[Excerpt] Baghdad-Moscow—[passage omitted] According to information from foreign diplomats, as of 20 October there were 104 U.S. citizens, 139 Japanese citizens, 70 French citizens, 240 British citizens, and 80 FRG citizens held hostage in Iraq. In total there are around 2,000 foreigners, excluding Soviets. Following our return to Moscow, news agencies reported that the Iraqi authorities had released 14 Americans, five Finns, and 33 Britons. A special flight had taken more than 260 Frenchmen home, and the number of foreigners who had

been assured that they would leave Iraq shortly stood at more than 1,000. Commentaries are noting that the unexpected softening of Saddam Husayn's position toward the hostages has met with a cool reception from the United States, which sees it as an attempt by Baghdad to split the anti-Iraq bloc.

We were told this the other day by Joseph Wilson, U.S. charge d'affaires in Iraq and current head of the U.S. diplomatic mission in that country. He had agreed to give the IZVESTIYA correspondents an interview at his Baghdad residence.

It is a question, he noted, above all of freeing those Western citizens who are not hostages in the literal sense of the word. These are mainly people who are not being detained by anyone but have not been issued with exit visas. The hostages are mainly foreigners who were moved from Kuwait and are currently being held at strategic sites inside Iraq. There are 36 of these sites.

The first groups of U.S. hostages were moved from Kuwait 7 August. They were followed by new batches brought in 15-16 August. They were all housed in the Rashid Hotel in Baghdad, and for a certain period the U.S. consul had access to them. On 10 September they disappeared from the Rashid and their whereabouts are still unknown. For a month, the U.S. diplomat said, we have been sending our representatives to various hotels in the city in the hope that we might chance upon Americans there. In early October it was established that the transshipment point for the "guests of the Iraqi people" was the Al-Mansur Maliyah Hotel. They are taken there for a few days (or sometimes hours) from sites around the country. There they are grouped together, mixed up, and then sent off again to different sites. Sometimes there are only a few hours in which to see the hostages and arrange meetings with the consul. But most often these night-time movements of detainees remain secret, and it is only the severely ill who remain at the Al-Mansur Meliya for any length of time.

We were also able to obtain information on the hostages' condition from a Japanese Embassy representative who has managed to meet several times with detained Japanese citizens. Here is what he said:

"Initially the hostages were held under acceptable conditions. They were regularly given food and water where they were detained. Some were even supplied with short-wave radios. However, over the past month their situation has deteriorated sharply. Some have been directly moved to sites where they are housed alongside tanks of liquefied gas. In the event of an attack they would be blown sky-high if even a small piece of shrapnel penetrated the tank or if it were overturned by a shock wave. Others are housed alongside power stations where there are engines working all the time and lots of mosquitoes. It is cold at night and unbearably hot during the daytime. They are not allowed to take a shower or go to the bathroom more than three times a day. We are doing everything in our power to get the authorities to agree to allow our consular officials and doctors to visit them."

The hostage problem, of course, is just one aspect of a highly acute global issue which for the first time is facing several states at once. The most important thing is to elaborate a collective position to resolve the crisis. In conversation with foreign diplomats in Baghdad, including heads of diplomatic missions who have been in the country for many years, we heard an opinion that contrasts sharply with the scathing statements made by U.S. President G. Bush and British Prime Minister M. Thatcher. Any military action, even if approved by the UN Security Council, will result in a worldwide catastrophe, we were told by those currently working in Baghdad. It is not just that the Iraqi authorities could use chemical and bacteriological weapons in response to the large-scale use of multinational armed forces, or kill all the Western hostages within the first few hours. In the event of a direct attack on its territory Iraq could carry out its old threat and set the huge oilfields in the south of the country and Kuwait on fire. The world underestimates the consequences that would ensue from this catastrophe. Millions of tonnes of oil would burn, spreading flames and toxic substances over hundreds of kilometers. It would be a terrible tragedy for all mankind, the consequences of which are hard to predict. Some 20-30 percent of total world oil reserves would be destroyed in the space of two or three weeks.

In the opinion of most foreign representatives working in Iraq and able to "gauge" the regime from the inside, the only sensible course is to continue collective economic sanctions. But it is also necessary to constantly "take the temperature" of the cauldron, to allow it to "let off steam," and to prevent the cornered regime from daring to embark on suicidal actions.

Saddam Husayn is calculating his every step, we were told by a ranking representative of the Yemeni Embassy who has worked in Iraq for 25 years. His explosive character should not be overestimated. He is a man who loves comfort and the good things of life, and he is unlikely to risk losing them lightly. No, he could not have imagined that the Soviet Union would react the way it did, but now, under these changed circumstances, he may possibly behave more cautiously. The main thing is to firmly aim at a political settlement while continuing collective sanctions. We need to be patient and always leave the door quite wide open for Saddam Husayn. But on one condition—the unconditional withdrawal of all troops from occupied Kuwait.

While the crisis continues, embassies are exchanging information and jointly resolving purely domestic matters. The plane we took to Baghdad was to have brought in a consignment of food for the Soviet Embassy—around seven tonnes. The cargo did not arrive, and our ambassador phoned his colleague in India to ask for help. Such support is an everyday reality in Baghdad.

After all, rationing is the same for everyone, locals and foreigners alike—six kilos of flour per person per month, one kilo of sugar....

The Iraqi authorities are finding it hard to get used to the fact that they are facing a united front of states. Front-page banner headlines in the newspapers immediately report various demonstrations of solidarity with Iraq held in Amman, Washington, or any other capital. As for the number of Soviet and U.S. joint statements, our Iraqi interlocutors voiced confusion, bafflement, and... resentment when they talked about them.

The person who invited us—Latif Nusayyif Jasim, Iraqi minister of information and culture—was simple and straightforward in peasant fashion (he himself is from fellahin stock). Why are you tagging along with the Americans? he asked. After all, the friendship between the Soviet Union and Iraq is like an old oak that has weathered all manner of storms. Last February President Saddam Husayn called on businessmen throughout the Arab world to invest in the Soviet economy. That is an example of solidarity and assistance for you. Iraq is a grateful country and one which can pay its bills. Unlike certain other countries of the Arab East on which you once wanted to rely. And what will you get out of the Americans? Isn't it obvious that, having gotten their hands on all Near East oil, they will just turn their backs on you?

The minister was virtually saying: Why have you ganged up on us just because of Kuwait?...

Nadi al-Khadija, director general of the information administration, was more subtle. A member of a distinguished family, it is no surprise that he holds the post of chief of the administration, whose ambit covers contacts with the foreign writing fraternity. He spent an hour and a half telling us about the historical bonds between Iraq and Kuwait, which had once been a single state but had later been artificially separated by the colonialists. He also told us how in recent years the Kuwaiti authorities had acted as paid agents for the Americans and Israelis, quietly pumping oil away from Iraq's flanks, and encouraging the smuggling of all kinds of goods into Iraq so as to reduce the buying power of the Iraqi dinar.

Just think, the director general said, a few years ago one Iraqi dinar was worth one Kuwaiti dinar, whereas on the eve of "reunification" one Kuwaiti dinar was worth 12 Iraqi dinars. We fought against Iran, defending not just ourselves but Kuwait too, and during that period its venal emirs were gambling whole fortunes away in the casinos of Monaco.

Our notebooks recorded a phrase oft-repeated by Nadzh al-Khaditi: "Try and understand: We had no other option."

In our talks with ranking Iraqis there was another refrain too—the conflict over Iraq's actions in Kuwait is part of the Near East crisis. Under U.S. pressure the Security Council is adopting tough resolutions condemning Iraq and calling for the immediate withdrawal of its troops, but at the very same time Washington is not even attempting to obtain fulfillment of the corresponding resolutions on Israel, which continues to occupy the Arab territory of Palestine. Incidentally, they added, we have many supporters around the world, and in your country too.

A delegation from the "Rossiya" organization headed by V. Ganichev, chief editor of ROMAN-GAZETA, was in Iraq at the same time as us. That organization's task is to strengthen contacts with countrymen living abroad. However, in Iraq the delegation was carrying out a different function. As the government newspaper AL-THAWRAH wrote, five Soviet volunteers had followed a call of the heart to Iraq in order to demonstrate Soviet people's solidarity with the courageous Iraqi people opposing the aggression of U.S. imperialism and world Zionism.

Perhaps this was wishful thinking on the part of the local press? But we can clearly remember how I. Volkov, leader of a group of our specialists building the "Yusifiya" [name as transliterated] heat and electric power station (we went there the day after the "Rossiya" delegation had paid a visit), inquired immediately after welcoming us: Just what is your political position, you guys? And one of the counselors at the Soviet Embassy—whom a "Rossiya" delegate called a "Zionist" to his face during the meeting with the collective—bluntly told us that such visits essentially justify the aggression and delay a settlement of the crisis.

The five-man delegation arrived in Baghdad with clear aims. Their position briefly boiled down to the following: Saddam Husayn is one of the few friends we have in the world. It is criminal to take part in a blockade of food and medicines to Iraq. All our specialists are eager to work hard on their projects, and it is exclusively the mass media (as well as Foreign Ministry leaders, who seem to be deliberately stoking the conflict) that are to blame for forcing them to leave.

Maybe we did not quite understand everything? Or, conversely, maybe we have understood and are exaggerating? An article by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA political observer E. Volodin, who was a member of the delegation, could serve as the manifesto of the "Rossiya" platform (it was published 23 October in the Russian Federation Communists' newspaper under the headline "Arab Knot").

It contains enthusiastic lines about a million-strong parade of volunteer irregulars which he had seen in Baghdad, after which the "young boys began to go home, joking and singing, some carrying submachine guns, some grenade launchers..." Yes, we too saw such a parade in Baghdad. It started with a procession by a women's battalion and ended with a march-past by prisoners clothed in black. It has to be said that it was not a spectacle to wax lyrical about. The same goes for the official figures stating that, out of Baghdad's population

of 4 million, some 800,000 people have already registered with volunteer brigades to fight imperialism. Elementary calculations show that, if this is really true, only old men and children have escaped mobilization.

The observer's "subjective impressions and thoughts" also contain direct criticism of the embargo on shipments of foodstuffs and medicines to Iraq, without indicating, of course, who was to blame for the blockade in the first place. And it is quite blasphemous, in our view, to compare Iraq to the blockade of Leningrad.

Finally, the article mentions "specific coverage of events in Iraq by our press and TV" and claims that "statements by our foreign policy figures are giving rise here (referring to the group of Soviet specialists) to specific comments, which I shall omit."

It is common knowledge that a number of statements by Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze condemning the Iraqi aggression and seizure of Kuwait, as well as his statements at the United Nations have been a target for legislators from the "Union" group. Just as forces in the legislature and society have been divided on a number of fundamental positions adopted by the Foreign Ministry and our government in general. This is obviously a normal phenomenon. However, when these differences are carefully drawn to the attention of the leaders and population of a country whose aggressive policy is opposed by the entire world community, it indeed merely exacerbates the crisis and delays a resolution of it.

Even during our 10 days in Iraq we managed to sense how alarming the situation in the country is and how fragile is the current equilibrium, which could be upset at any moment, tipping the entire Near East region into the abyss of a war with unpredictable consequences. Under these circumstances visits of the type undertaken by the V. Ganichev delegation create an illusion of support for Saddam Husayn's actions and give him a certain amount of hope that there may be a split in his enemies' camp. The only indirect result from this will be a continuation of the hard-line stance and intolerance of any compromise whatsoever.

This, however, does not, in our opinion, mean that we should stop talking with the Iraqi regime altogether. The invasion of Kuwait has reduced the framework of cooperation between our countries in all spheres. Deliveries of combat hardware and exchanges of intelligence have ceased. However, there will still be more than 3,000 Soviet people in Iraq by early November, and the two countries are bound by political, economic, and trade agreements.

The many unknown quantities of the equation geared to the post-blockade, post-crisis period will have to be resolved in the very near future.

Iran's Stance on Persian Gulf Crisis Examined

NC3010132190 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 27 Oct 90

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary from "The World Today" feature]

[Text] A few days ago, Iranian spiritual leader Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i said in a speech to a group of people from various parts of the country that Tehran is following the trend of events in the Persian Gulf intensively.

Iran is following a wise policy of neutrality toward the Persian Gulf crisis. Such a policy enables Tehran to reap the maximum benefits from the situation in the region. On the one hand, Iran categorically condemned Iraq's annexation of Kuwait and supported the UN embargo against Iraq. Iranian President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani said: This battle was for the purpose of appropriating wealth and for this reason, Iraq's aggression is the worst of actions.

On the other hand, Iran has completely normalized its relations with Baghdad. This contradiction is evidence that the crisis in the Persian Gulf provided a sudden windfall for the Islamic Government of Iran in the form of success in its foreign policy. In circumstances of extreme international isolation, Saddam officially recognized the 1975 Algiers Accord, and accepted all the peace conditions put forth by Iran.

The trend of reconciling with former enemies was accelerated. Diplomatic relations between the two countries have been revived completely. Thus, in a short period of time the Iranian side has achieved results that would have taken many years. Simultaneously, the Iranian leadership's stance has gained strength in the region. As a result of the conflict in the Persian Gulf, Iran has bolstered its relations with Turkey, which has adopted an anti-Iraqi stand, to a great extent.

In the past few months, contacts between the Iranian and Syrian leaderships have increased greatly. It appears that Damascus, which is constantly at loggerheads with the Iraqi regime, has emerged as a major ally of Iran in the Near East.

In conclusion, the Kuwaiti crisis gave Iran the opportunity to improve its ties with the West. The restoration of Tehran-London diplomatic ties at the end of September is obvious proof of this claim. There is no doubt that the confrontation in the Persian Gulf has debilitated Iraq economically and militarily. It is clear that this benefits Iran geopolitically. In any case, facts and figures indicate that Tehran does not want Iraq completely defeated and is trying to maintain a definite stability in the Near East. It is not coincidental that the stances of Tehran and Baghdad on the departure of the multinational forces from the Persian Gulf are identical.

On numerous occasions, the Iranian leaders have vehemently condemned the military presence in the region.

Under conditions of the tightening sanctions against Iraq, Iran has repeatedly asserted that only Tehran can ensure the security of the Persian Gulf region. Iran feels that a flexible policy based on its advantages is preferable to all other policies and can ensure the interests of the country.

Palestinian Leader Comments on Gulf Situation

LD3010172990 Moscow TASS in English 1657 GMT 30 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Vyacheslav Akimov and Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—The Middle East will continue to be gripped by political and economic crisis until the Palestinian problem is solved, Nayif Hawatimah, general secretary of the Democratic Front of the Liberation of Palestine, said here today.

He arrived in Moscow on Monday at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.

Commenting on the situation in the Gulf, Hawatimah said that "despite the threat of an armed clash, there are possibilities for a political compromise."

"After my meetings with Iraqi leaders I have an impression that (Iraqi president) Saddam Husayn is ready for a peaceful solution of the problem," he said.

He noted that two conditions are necessary to settle the conflict—an Arab solution of the problem and a U.S. pledge not to use force against Iraq.

Hawatimah said the tough U.S. stand on the Gulf crisis stood in the way of a peaceful settlement.

He noted that the Soviet Union and France could prevent an armed confrontation in the Gulf. "Moscow and Paris could become an obstacle to war," he said.

Commenting on a recent visit by Soviet presidential spokesman Yevgeniy Primakov to Iraq, Hawatimah welcomed the Soviet Union's efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement, saying these efforts would bring "tangible positive results."

Hawatimah called for a single stand of the Palestine Liberation Organisation on the settlement of the Gulf crisis.

TASS Analyst Views U.S.-Israeli 'Rift'

LD2610233390 Moscow TASS in English 1912 GMT 26 Oct 90

[By TASS political news analyst Yuriy Tysovskiy]

[Text] Moscow October 26 TASS—The Israeli leadership has once again ignored a U.N. Security Council's resolution, this time Resolution 673. The resolution states that Tel Aviv is responsible for events in Jerusalem, where Israeli police killed almost two dozen Palestinians.

As is known, the Shamir government refused to admit into Israel...representatives, who were to investigate the tragedy. Tel Aviv confirmed that it has not changed its position. Not even a letter from the U.S. president to the Israeli prime minister helped.

The Shamir administration is now resorting to various propaganda gimmicks. Authorities have conducted an "investigation", which concluded that police officers are to blame for what happened at the Temple Mount. According to information that was deliberately leaked, two of them will have to resign. The scapegoats have been found. Meanwhile Israel alleges that the United Nations anti- Israeli resolutions "play into the hands of Saddam Husayn and Palestinians".

It is clear to everyone except the Tel Aviv leaders that Israel's recalcitrant policy in the Middle East plays into the hands of the Iraqis. Even Washington is concerned about the unsavoury conduct of its "strategic ally" during the crisis in the Gulf.

Within the past week the United States voted twice in favour of U.N. Security Council resolutions that criticise Tel Aviv. Political observers now talk about a "rift" between the United States and Israel. They add, however, that "the falling out of lovers brings a renewal of love". There is a grain of truth in this. Can you imagine any other country, for example Egypt, behaving in this way? The U.S. legislators would hardly have written off Cairo's debt of seven billion dollars, and might even have imposed some sanctions. As regards Israel, the congress has appropriated another three billion dollars in military aid to it.

So it is not surprising that Israeli politicians are unconcerned and are tiding over international indignation over "two dozen Palestinians being killed".

Journalist Reports on Situation in Jalalabad

LD3010212390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Report by correspondent Shkirando from Afghanistan; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] A group of Soviet journalists recently arrived in Afghanistan at the invitation of President Najibullah. Watch the report by our correspondent.

[Shkirando] In ancient times, the Afghans called Jalalabad the eastern gates of their country. Recently, reports from various news agencies mention this city as one of the main centers of combat operations in Afghanistan.

The situation around Jalalabad remains very complicated. But what we were able to see on arriving here in no way compares with the events that took place last March

and April, when in 24 hours more than 20,000 shells and rocket missiles fell on the completely surrounded city. It was not easy to break through by air, either. On 7 April, approaching Jalalabad by air, the helicopter carrying our film crew was hit, and miraculously made it to the outskirts of the city. One bullet hit the video camera.

At that time the government troops' security zone was confined directly to the city limits. Now the rebels have been repulsed from the city to a respectable distance.

This is one of the new posts won from the extremists by an Afghan division a few hours before our arrival [video shows tank entrenchment]. In the view of the military leadership, the enemy suffered a crushing defeat in this province. However, military circles in Pakistan, taking account of the important strategic significance of this city, are pushing the opposition to renew attacks.

Beyond a barrier, the path to our armored personnel carrier was closed: The mujahideen are in charge there along the Jalalabad-Torkham road. But in the city itself, heavily scarred by the war, civilian life is getting under way. But the people of Jalalabad are not rushing to clear away their shelters and sandbags. There is still a long way to go to complete normalization of the situation in this province bordering Pakistan, although even now it can be said that the plans of the opposition to seize its administrative center are doomed to failure.

East Europe

CSFR Premier Calfa Holds Talks With Ryzhkov

Arrives in Moscow

LD3010083690 Moscow TASS in English 0829 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—Czechoslovak Prime Minister Marian Calfa arrived in Moscow today on a brief working visit.

At the airport Calfa was welcomed by Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov and other officials.

Ryzhkov and Calfa will hold talks in the Kremlin, after which Calfa will return home.

'Vremya' Reports Talks

LD3010222390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 30 Oct 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] Czechoslovak Prime Minister Marian Calfa was in our country on a working visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government. In the course of negotiations, Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov and Marian Calfa discussed questions of Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperation under the new conditions of development in East Europe and the world. Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov briefed the guest on the Soviet Government's work on the stabilization of the national economy, the transition to a market economy, and the Union treaty's preparation. Marian Calfa shared his thoughts about the practice and difficulties of building a democratic system in the CSFR and bringing economic reform to life. During the course of negotiations, satisfaction was expressed about the cooperation between both sides on the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from CSFR territory. The need to facilitate work on deciding legal property matters connected with this issue was noted.

Marian Calfa departed for home on 30 October. At the airport he was seen off by Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov and other officials. The head of the CSFR Government answered journalists' questions before his departure. [passage omitted]

Talks Called 'Constructive,' 'Frank'

LD3110005190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1836 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow, 30 Oct (TASS)—Marian Calfa, chairman of the Czechoslovak Government, was in the USSR on 30 October on a working visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

During the talks, Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Marian Calfa discussed a range of issues on Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperation under the new and developing conditions in Eastern Europe and the world as a whole. It was stressed that the USSR and the CSFR are building bilateral relations on the principles of equal rights and complete mutual respect for state sovereignty, as affirmed in the declaration on relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia on 26 February 1990.

Ryzhkov informed the guest of the Soviet Government's activity in stabilizing the national economy, the transition to a market economy, the preparation of a Union treaty the aim of which will be to build the USSR on a qualitatively new basis as a union of federal states, an integral multinational formation.

Calfa shared his views on the practice and difficulties of building a democratic system in the CSFR, and the complexities of the processes of restructuring the country's national economy and the implementation of economic reform.

In considering a range of issues on bilateral trade and economic relations, the Czechoslovak side expressed concern with respect to the volume of oil supplies from the USSR. An understanding was reached that the sides will continue a joint search for a mutually acceptable solution to this matter.

The sides noted the importance of doing everything within their power to assist the development of economic relations, not only at a central level but also at a regional level, as well as at the level of associations and enterprises. This fully accords with both countries' efforts to switch to a market economy. It was stressed

that this work should be combined with moves to preserve and deepen mutually beneficial joint production relations, along with scientific, technological, and production cooperation.

During the talks, satisfaction was expressed at bilateral interaction in matters of withdrawing Soviet troops from the CSFR territory. The need to speed up work to resolve legal and property issues connected with this was noted.

The talks confirmed the mutual desire of both sides to maintain a regular dialogue at state level and to lend greater dynamism in all areas of Soviet-Czechoslovak interaction.

The talks were held in a spirit of mutual understanding and were of a constructive and frank nature.

Prague Says Stands 'Divergent'

LD3010132690 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1200 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Czechoslovak Prime Minister Marian Calfa and Soviet Prine Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov concluded this morning's session of their talks in Moscow. They focused on key problems of Soviet- Czechoslovak economic relations. Attention was concentrated on the deliveries of crude oil and other raw materials both this year and in the future, the mutual clearing of accounts, and the possible lists of goods for mutual trade next year.

According to Zbynek Fiala, the Czechoslovak Government's spokesman, the standpoints of both sides are at present divergent. The talks will continue this afternoon.

Ends Visit After 'Difficult' Talks

LD3010164790 Moscow TASS in English 1607 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—Czechoslovak Prime Minister Marian Calfa left Moscow for home today after six hours of talks with his Soviet counterpart Nikolay Ryzhkov.

At the airport, Calfa was seen off by Ryzhkov and other officials.

Before Calfa's departure, the two leaders answered reporters' questions.

Calfa said that his talks with Ryzhkov were "difficult" but that they found mutually acceptable solutions.

He said the talks focused on Soviet oil supplies to Czechoslovakia next year. The sides agreed that these supplies would reach 13 million tonnes.

Czechoslovakia will pay for the oil with oil equipment and consumer goods, to be chosen in advance by Soviet oilmen. Part of the supplies will be paid for in hard currency.

Ryzhkov described the talks as "fruitful" and said that a "good foundation" has been created for resolving issues of bilateral economic cooperation for 1991 "in the near future".

Yazov Congratulates Romanian Defense Minister

PM2910110990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[Letter signed by Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov, defense minister: "Yazov Sends Message to Romanian Counterpart"]

[Text] To Colonel General Victor Stanculescu, Romanian national defense minister,

On behalf of the USSR Armed Forces and myself I congratulate you on the 46th anniversary of the Romanian Army.

Soviet servicemen are firmly convinced that the relations of friendship, good-neighborliness, and all-around cooperation between our countries and armies will continue to develop successfully in the interests of peace and security in Europe.

On this noteworthy day I wish Romanian Army personnel new successes in improving combat skill and strengthening the country's defense capability.

[Signed] Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov, USSR Defense Minister.

Paper Says Published Polish Communique 'Abridged'

PM3010120190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Oct 90 Evening Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA announcement: "Clarification"]

[Text] When publishing the "Soviet-Polish Communique" (IZVESTIYA No. 289) the editorial office did not indicate that it was doing so in abridged form. As a result, passages were omitted on: the creation of a special working group headed by deputy foreign ministers, specifically on the question of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid between the Soviet Union and Poland; an agreement to hold talks regarding the simplification of contacts between people, and also on drafting a new treaty on cooperation and youth exchanges between the two countries; extending ties between the USSR's Kaliningrad Oblast and the Polish provinces adjacent to it; Soviet-Polish cooperation in the protection of the environment; examination of the whole range of Soviet-Polish economic relations at the next sitting of the Soviet-Polish Intergovernmental Commission for Economic and Scientific and Technical Cooperation; the importance of the effective work of the commission for cultural and historical heritage and the importance of practical steps to develop the activities of cultural and educational societies and information centers; the special attention that was devoted to the all-European process in all its dimensions; satisfaction at

the surmounting of the split in Europe, the solution of the German question in accordance with the interests of the German people and other peoples, and the practical steps toward disarmament, strengthening security, and confidence-building measures.

Shlyaga's Visit to SFRY 22-25 Oct Summarized

PM3010152990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report under the general headline: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, was in the SFRY 22-25 October at the invitation of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

Col. Gen. N.I. Shlyaga was received by Army General V. Kadijevic, SFRY federal secretary for national defense.

During conversations with Colonel General M. Cusic, under secretary at the Federal Secretariat for National Defense, and Colonel General A. Spirkovski, commander of the Yugoslav People's Army First Military District, and also in the Federal Secretariat for National Defense Political Directorate an exchange of experience took place on topical questions of political work in the USSR Armed Forces and the Yugoslav People's Army.

Col. Gen. N.I. Shlyaga and the persons accompanying him visited a military unit, the Yugoslav People's Army Higher Military-Political School, and historic sites in Yugoslavia and had meetings with generals, officers, and personnel of the Yugoslav People's Army. The meetings were held in a spirit of traditional friendship.

Col. Gen. N.I. Shlyaga and the persons accompanying him returned to Moscow 25 October.

Petrov Comments on Albania, CSCE Process

LD2510214490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1050 GMT 25 Oct 90

[By TASS political observer Gennadiy Petrov]

[Text] Moscow, 25 Oct (TASS)—After a lengthy period of self-isolation, Albania is more and more actively emerging into the international arena. This seem to be a result not only of the reforms taking place in Albanian society, but also a consequence of the radical improvement in the situation in Europe and the steady development of pan-European cooperation.

This is also indicated by the Tirana meeting of the foreign ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Not only the problems of intraregional cooperation, but also the prospects for the development of relations with other European countries, are being discussed at it.

The desire of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania [PSRA] to expand along the lines of the CSCE process its economic, scientific, technical, and cultural links with the outside world, not just with its neighbors, has become more and more noticeable recently. "The newspaper ZERI I POPULLIT noted a few days ago that 'Albania intends to effect its relations with participant-states in keeping with the norms of the CSCE.'"

Having received the status of observer at the conference, the PSRA is striving to participate in the forthcoming Paris conference of the CSCE in November, already in the capacity of a full member of this important process. Undoubtedly, this participant, patently missed by the CSCE, could make its contribution to achieving the most important aims declared by the Helsinki process. The main aims are seen as: overcoming the barriers raised during the years of the "cold war" between the Western and the Eastern parts of the European Continent, lowering the level of military confrontation, and expanding interaction in such fields as the economy, environmental protection, and the humanitarian and cultural sphere.

Visa-Free Agreement With Romania Initialled

LD3010193790 Moscow TASS in English 1608 GMT 30 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Dmitriy Dyakov]

[Text] Bucharest October 30 TASS—The Soviet Union and Romania today initialled an intergovernmental agreement of visa-free travel. Under the agreement, the two countries' citizens may entry, exit, travel through and stay on the territory of the USSR and Romania without visas.

A decision to cancel the visa requirement was made during Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's working visit to Romania last January.

The agreement is expected to be signed before the end of November. It will go into effect 30 days after signature.

West Europe

Shevardnadze Views Paris Talks' Significance

PM3010165990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Oct 90 Union Edition p 5

[Dispatch by Yu. Kovalenko, own special correspondent in Paris: "Paris Allocates Credit for Perestroyka"]

[Text] At the same time as the meeting between the French and Soviet presidents was taking place at the Elysee Palace Eduard Shevardnadze, in the Foreign Ministry building on the Quai d'Orsay, was patiently answering the questions of four Soviet correspondents interested in the first results of the visit.

According to the minister, the present talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and Francois Mitterrand are of great significance in several respects. Along with the signing of a number of major documents, questions concerning the preparation of the CSCE forum in Paris are being

examined at top level. This meeting of the heads of state is a major event in the development of the European process, in fashioning the security structures and new relations between the military-political alliances, and marks a very important step in building the new Europe.

As far as the crisis in the Persian Gulf region is concerned, the minister went on, the two countries advocate an immediate halt to aggression and are trying to coordinate their efforts to find a solution to this problem and prevent armed confrontation.

And last, France and perestroyka. We have never—since M.S. Gorbachev's first visit to France, in October 1985—doubted France's readiness to offer us assistance, the minister noted, and the French leadership has always actively supported the reforms we have started. Paris has granted us credits (more on this later—Yu.K.). Another question—the allocation of major appropriations within the EC framework, which would help us carry out our perestroyka-related plans—is also being discussed.

...Indeed France is paying special attention to the dramatic course of events in our country. And this is no idle attention. In this interdependent world the future of the Soviet Union is closely entwined with the future of Europe.

Gorbachev has to accomplish back home exploits worthy of Hercules, the Paris newspaper, LE JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE writes, to resolve 12 very important tasks, including the economic chaos, social inequality, the problems of creating a Union on a new basis, the situation in the party and the army, crime, and the environment. Paris, commentators stress, is interested in Gorbachev's retaining a strong position at home and pins its hopes for the implementation of reforms and the country's emergence from crisis upon him. Real assistance must be given to the Soviet Union, both the ruling circles of France and the opposition stress today.

Paris does not intend to play the role of a detached observer and wait to see how events develop in the Soviet Union, Elysee spokesman Hubert Vedrine stated at a meeting with the press. France is ready, he stressed, to help the implementation of the enormous changes in the USSR by every possible means. The considerable difficulties with which the country is contending, Vedrine went on to say, in no way mean that we are calling into question our close and multifaceted cooperation. On the contrary, cooperation should, in Paris' opinion, be expanded and extended.

Now for the opposition's view. Jacques Chirac, mayor of Paris and president of the largest right-wing party, the Rally for the Republic, stated: "Gorbachev, in my view, is a patriot above all. A Communist who has understood that much must be sacrificed, including various dogmas, to preserve that which is most important—the great Russian nation. I would like Gorbachev to succeed in restoring to the people a sense of intiative, desire for work, and understanding of certain values of our European civilization, values which, as Solzhenitsyn has stressed, are consonant with the soul and traditions of Russian people... Your people must in these conditions show positive forbearance."

In the present talks France is demonstrating readiness to come to our aid and give support. That is why trade and economic relations between our two countries are being accorded paramount importance during Gorbachev's visit. Just a little over 1 hour after the Soviet delegation arrived in Paris a series of documents were signed at the Foreign Ministry which envisage the expansion of bilateral economic, scientific, and technical cooperation and cooperation among enterprises of the two countries and between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the French National Scientific Research Center... An agreement on cooperation in the sphere of labor relations, employment, and vocational training was also signed. As French Labor Minister J.P. Soisson explained to us, France will take part in setting up an international center for social and labor problems in Moscow and his department will accept 2,000 trainees to study relations between the state, enterprise leaders, and trade unions in the country.

Finally, an agreement granting the USSR credits worth 5 billion francs [Fr] was concluded in Paris. "We will use these credits to purchase food, grain, and also products essential to ensure the steady operation of a number of our industries—chemicals, ferrous metallurgy, and others," L.A. Voronin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, told us. "Part of the sum will go to clear our debts, which, according to French estimates, come to around Fr1.5 billion. It is possible that other credits will be granted too, but that question will be resolved later."

This should to some extent alleviate the concerns of business circles regarding our creditworthiness. Yet, until recently, many French companies agreed to invest resources in the Soviet economy only if firm state guarantees were provided. I would remind people that some French firms suspended contacts with us after Soviet republics declared that they would henceforth dispose of their own resources. For example, the Pechiney concern pulled out of a very large project to build a plant in Armenia.

...At midday Monday, after the completion of their second conversation, held at the Chateau de Rambouillet (the French president's country residence), Mikhail Gorbachev and Francois Mitterrand signed a Treaty on Concord and Cooperation between the two countries. In Paris' opinion, this is an unprecedented document in the history of bilateral relations, which will be supplemented by an exchange of letters on priority areas of Soviet-French cooperation. Its most important aspect, from the standpoint of French jurists, is that the USSR and France henceforth regard each other as friendly states and found their relations upon the basis of trust, solidarity, and cooperation. (Specialists attach special significance to the concept of solidarity—a new concept in bilateral relations). This is a new generation

of treaty which is designed to enshrine the positive trends in international relations reflected in several all-European documents.

Praises Bilateral Agreement

LD2910225790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Interview with USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze by correspondent Igor Fesunenko at Orly Airport in Paris on 29 October; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Fesunenko] The central event of the second day of the Soviet-French meeting was the signing of an agreement on understanding and cooperation between the USSR and France. Alongside Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Francois Mitterrand, the treaty was also signed, on the Soviet side, by Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, and on the French side, by Prime Minister Michel Rocard and Foreign Minister Roland Dumas. The Foreign Ministry leaders, Eduard Shevardnadze and Roland Dumas, also signed letters on priority areas in Soviet-French cooperation.

[Shevardnadze] The agreement is really unprecedented and unique, and it reflects very well the nature of cooperation between the USSR and France.

[Fesunenko] In the past you have said that the task of Soviet foreign policy is to economically assure perestroyka. How will this agreement which you signed today with France tackle this task?

[Shevardnadze] The agreement which was signed today does not relate to specific areas; rather, the agreement proposes a list of those areas which are supported in principle by the leaders of our countries. These are all promising major areas for cooperation in economics, science, technology, culture, and so on. But this is not the main thing. The main thing is that the agreement provides political encouragement and stimulus for economic cooperation between our countries and between our people.

[Fesunenko] Are there political foundations for future cooperation?

[Shevardnadze] Without a doubt. These foundations have been laid.

'Unprecedented' Treaty With France Hailed

PM3110114090 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 31 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

[Dispatch by V. Onuchko, IAN and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent: "New-Generation Treaty. Regarding Results of Soviet-French Summit in Paris"]

[Excerpt] Paris—It has become traditional for the USSR and France to regularly compare positions on the most important aspects of international politics and to hold consultations, both at the level of foreign ministers and at summit level. Now this tradition has been enshrined by an official document—the Treaty on Concord and Cooperation Between the USSR and the French Republic signed in Rambouillet outside Paris by Presidents M. Gorbachev and F. Mitterrand. Stressing the importance of the document, French Foreign Minister R. Dumas recalled that his country had not concluded bilateral treaties for 27 years now.

In the corridors of the meeting an adviser on our side described it as a "new-generation treaty," and I repeatedly heard the French describe it as a "forward-looking treaty." These assessments are prompted by the fact that the sides coordinated their principles with those of European politics and call on other states to be guided by them. In particular, the treaty includes provisions already enshrined in the Helsinki act, but these have now become the foundation of bilateral agreements. At the same time certain international principles that will be discussed at the upcoming conference on security and cooperation in Europe in Paris are already enshrined in the bilateral document signed in Rambouillet. But the main thing that gave many participants in the two-day Soviet-French talks grounds for describing the treaty on concord and cooperation as unprecedented is the principle of solidarity enshrined in documentary form for the first time by the USSR and France, which thus regard each other as friendly states. The treaty is broad in its interpretation of this solidarity: from collaboration in resolving major international problems to specific mutual assistance.

This solidarity, in its various forms, has already made itself felt during the Soviet president's present brief visit to France. It was displayed in its most global form in the consultations on the problem of the Persian Gulf crisis. These consultations took place both at the presidential level and at the foreign ministerial level. It is difficult to judge the details now, but it is perfectly clear that coincidence of views on the main directions was reaffirmed: the impermissibility of the annexation of Kuwait and the need to seek a political solution of the problem. The presidents of the USSR and France stated this at the joint news conference.

For Soviet people today another form of solidarity is obviously far more important: An agreement on a 5 billion franc loan for the USSR was signed at the French Foreign Ministry Sunday. As L.A. Voronin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, told Soviet journalists, the loan is on advantageous terms and will be used to purchase food, chemical products, metallurgical goods, and other output.

During one of the rare breaks in this businesslike and very intensive meeting I and my colleagues from our central newspapers managed to talk with USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze. The minister told us, in particular, that the question of Western aid to the USSR within the framework of foreign communities was also being discussed. [passage omitted]

Moiseyev Comments on Cooperation With NATO

PM3010155790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Oct 90 Second Edition p 6

[Special correspondents A. Gorokhov and V. Peresada dispatch under "Repercussions" rubric: "Changes on Western Front?"]

[Text] Brussels—Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and first deputy defense minister, has been to Brussels, where the NATO headquarters is located.

In the course of a three-day visit the Soviet military chief met with the top leading personnel of Belgium's Armed Forces, NATO Secretary General M. Woerner, the leaders of that organization's international secretariat, and Gen. J. Galvin, supreme commander in chief, NATO Allied Armed Forces Europe; he participated in the work of the concluding stage of the NATO Military Committee session at the level of chiefs of staffs of the NATO countries' Armed Forces, and addressed the gathering.

At a final news conference Army General M. Moiseyev described those meetings as important and useful and noted the constructive nature of the discussions on problems of European security. Replying to our question about the prospects for possible cooperation between the USSR and NATO, he said:

"We did not directly discuss cooperation and its forms. This was our first meeting. Naturally, we are still studying each other and pondering how to build relations in the future. In some areas our approaches are already close. For example, with regard to establishing a direct telephone link between the NATO Allied Armed Forces command center and the central command post of the Soviet General Staff. This would enable us at any moment, if an emergency were to arise, to react promptly to it. Second, the phase of implementing verification and confidence-building measures will follow the signing of the agreement on conventional arms reduction in Europe. In this connection it would be possible to create small groups in our General Staff and in NATO for an exchange of information. I believe that other areas of cooperation could also become apparent in the long term..."

Calls NATO Talks 'Constructive'

LD2710105690 Moscow TASS in English 1034 GMT 27 Oct 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow October 27 TASS—General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of Soviet General Staff, said his recent talks with Belgian and NATO leaders in Brussels were "useful and constructive."

Moiseyev, who returned from his three-day trip to Belgium on Friday night, told TASS today that the positions of the sides during the talks did not coincide on all issues. He noted, however, that the sides' views on "fundamental security issues in the main coincided".

Moiseyev said that during his meetings with Belgian Defence Minister Guy Coeme, NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner and other NATO leaders it was reiterated that the cold war is over.

The sides in the talks pointed out that relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact were beginning to be built on new principles.

"Permanent official contacts between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are being established," Moiseyev said. "Military contacts between the East and the West are being extended. All this is a serious step towards the strengthening of mutual confidence and cooperation.

"The current changes on the continent convince us that the new conditions offer much more possibilities for ensuring security by political means and reducing the level of military confrontation."

Moiseyev said the "most important of the current changes is the prevailing tendency of overcoming the unnatural division of the continent. We see Europe without military blocs and confrontation."

He said the East and the West "are actually moving in this directon. The Warsaw Pact is being transformed into a predominantly political union. The North Atlantic Alliance has also felt these changes and is now trying to adapt itself to the new situation.

"In the near future, we will see a historic event—the signing of a treaty on reductions in conventional forces in Europe. This will eliminate the main cause of the conflict—military confrontation, and ensure peace and security in Europe. "We are deeply convinced that the time is coming to build security together, security based not on confrontation between the two competing blocs, but on collective measures to protect the interests of all countries participating in the Helsinki process," Moiseyev said.

Primakov Stops Over in Cyprus; Meets Vassilou

LD3010185590 Moscow TASS in English 1840 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Nicosia October 30 TASS—Soviet presidential envoy Yevgeniy Primakov today stopped off in Cyprus on his way home.

He was received by President Georgious Vassiliou whom Primakov told about the results of his tour of several Arab states.

Vassiliou spoke highly about the Soviet Union's efforts to settle the Gulf crisis.

Departs Cyprus for Moscow

LD3110121490 Moscow TASS in English 1137 GMT 31 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Mashkov]

[Text] Nicosia October 31 TASS—Special presidential envoy Yevgeniy Primakov left for Moscow today after a brief stopover in Cyprus. Primakov was received by President Yedryios Vasiliou of Cyprus.

The envoy briefed the Cypriot leadership on developments in the Gulf and results of his talks in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

In a statement for the press, Vasiliou stressed the importance of peacefully settling the Gulf crisis, following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

The president said that Cyprus can become an ideal venue for meetings to settle contentious issues.

Cypriot President Vasiliou Interviewed

PM3010111590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with Cypriot President Yeoryios Vasiliou by TASS special correspondents V. Korochantsev, I. Uvarov under the rubric: "World in Events": "The 'Forgotten' Aggression"; place and date not given—first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[Excerpt] Nicosia, Moscow—Lately the Cypriot problem has fallen into the category of undeservedly "forgotten" problems. And yet it needs resolving no less than does the crisis in the Persian Gulf region or the Cambodian situation. At SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's request TASS special correspondents met with Republic of Cyprus President Yeoryios Vasiliou and asked him several questions.

[TASS] Mr. President, what, in your opinion, are the means and conditions for solving the Cypriot problem?

[Vasiliou] The crux of the problem is that one sovereign state was invaded by another. Sixteen years ago Turkey established control over almost a third of the island and, despite repeated UN calls for it to leave, it still remains on Cyprus.

Settlement of the problem lies within the framework of the two summit agreements reached in 1977 and 1979 which envisage the creation of a demilitarized united Cyprus on federative principles. The Greek Cypriot side advanced the proposals leading to this federative solution which would guarantee the aspirations and interests of both the island's communities.

The Cypriot Government, despite the fact that it has constantly had to contend with the Turkish side's intractability, will continue the search for peace and for a just and long-term settlement of the problem.

The results of the meeting between Presidents Gorbachev and Bush in Helsinki give us hope. The resolve of both superpowers' leaders not to accept the invasion as a fait accompli is in itself an important event. However, their agreement to cooperate after the Persian Gulf crisis ends, in the name of establishing a system of peace and security in this region, is even more important. [passage omitted]

TASS on Swedish Protest Over Nuclear Test

LD2610105890 Moscow TASS in English 1026 GMT 26 Oct 90

[Text] Stockholm October 26 TASS—Sweden has expressed its regret over the Soviet resumption of underground nuclear tests after a year-long moratorium, according to Foreign Minister Sten Andersson.

The Soviet Union exploded an underground nuclear device on a test site in the area of Novaya Zemlya archipelago on October 24.

Sweden knew about the resumption but hoped Moscow would refrain, Andersson said in a statement issued on Thursday night.

This year Sweden and other northern countries raised the issue in contacts with the Soviet side, he said.

Sweden demands that all nuclear weapons states end tests and has worked for decades for a complete ban of such explosions, Andersson said. The Swedish Foreign Ministry also circulated a memo about the Swedish position on nuclear tests.

The Soviet Parliament is now discussing whether to move tests to Novaya Zemlya, but has yet to take a decision.

Apparently, this did not prevent (the Soviet Union) from holding Wednesday's explosion on Novaya Zemlya, the memo said.

Nordic Envoys Hear Reasons for Nuclear Test

LD2910195490 Moscow TASS in English 1901 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 29 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov today received the ambassadors of Nordic countries: Carl Otto Oerjan Berner of Sweden, Dagfin Stenseth of Norway, Vagn Egebjerg of Denmark, Olafur Egilsson of Iceland and envoy-counsellor Y. Karinen of Finland.

The envoys heard an explanation of the Soviet Union's approach to a nuclear test ban. It was noted that the Soviet Union favours the prompt termination of all nuclear testing. However, as other nuclear weapons powers continue to test their nuclear weapons, the Soviet unilateral moratorium begins to affect the country's security. This is why the Soviet Union was compelled to conduct an underground nuclear test on Wednesday, October 24.

Responding to the expression of concern over the possible ecological consequences of the recent Soviet nuclear test, the Soviet official stressed that all measures had been taken to prevent damage to Arctic nature and close-lying residential areas from the only Soviet nuclear explosion this year.

Karpov expressed hope that the governments of the Nordic countries will understand the Soviet Union's need to stage the test and reiterated the country's readiness to cooperate with the Nordic countries on a broad basis in order to promptly reach an agreement on a full nuclear test ban.

German PDS Money Transfers Investigated

Search Termed 'Provocation'

91UF0017A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by IAN and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent Yu. Chervakov: "The Lesson of 'Democracy'"]

[Text] Berlin—On Friday night a house in the eastern part of Berlin known as "Karl Liebknecht Haus" was again surrounded by a dense ring of police, as it never was at any time during the eighties. About 150 armed police in bulletproof vests, probably anticipating return fire from machine guns, and bureaucrats in civilian clothes blocked the building where Ernst Telman lived 60 years ago and which now houses the board of the Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS]. The unceremonious behavior of the police operating in the presence of representatives of the Berlin procuracy automatically brought to mind the fact that the GDR did not join the FRG voluntarily, as people imply, but was simply taken over.

"It is enough," declared one of the policemen who, incidentally, wanted to remain nameless, "that we have displayed restraint for 50 years."

As they say, you cannot put it more plainly than that.

Without presenting a search warrant, referring only to the "danger of procrastination," several dozen police officers and representatives of the procuracy at 1800 literally occupied the building in order to conduct a careful search of all of its premises. As the procuracy was to announce later, it had suspicions that the Party of Democratic Socialism and its leaders were mixed up in stealing about 100 million marks, which occurred during the currency unification. During the process of the search of the building they did not pass over rooms 315 and 317 which belong to Gregor Gysi and Hans Modrow, respectively, who, as we know, are deputies of the Bundestag and have legislative immunity. So the police, having crossed the threshold of these premises, violated the law in effect in Germany concerning the personal immunity of a deputy. In spite of all the "efforts," during the course of the night operation they did not find the proof they were looking for that would implicate the Party of Democratic Socialism in the actions of the conspirators. After the search, the procuracy officially announced to journalists that it could not accuse the Party of Democratic Socialism of stealing and hiding the money.

But the night operation reminds one more of a police provocation directed against the Party of Democratic Socialism on the eve of the forthcoming elections to the German Bundestag.

Only two weeks after the elaborate festivities on the occasion of the unification of Germany, its citizens are getting their first clear lesson in "effective democracy." The reaction of certain parties, including the Free Democrats and the Greens, was sharply negative. As the chairman of the Free Democratic Party, Otto Lambsdorf, declared, "the procuracy has no business with the boards of political parties." The Greens demanded a thorough investigation of this provocation, and if the procuracy was involved in it, they demand that the FRG procurator general resign. The Party of Democratic Socialism is now weighing responsible steps not to draw the attention of the country's public to the illegal actions of the police but at the same time to achieve a thorough investigation and punishment of the guilty parties. In particular, the party board intends to send a letter to the chairperson of the Bundestag, Rita Sussmuth, with a request for a parliamentary investigation. Moreover, the party intends to demand the retirement of the senator for internal affairs, Erich Petholdt, the person who gave permission for the police action to be conducted. G. Gysi, speaking to journalists during the day, did not rule out the possibility that what happened on that Friday night was only a first step directed toward discrediting his party and discrediting the entire left-wing movement in Germany.

CPSU Issues Statement

LD2610141690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 26 Oct 90

[Text] As was reported by the media, a police action took place at the Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS] headquarters in Berlin early in the morning of 19 October. The reason for this action was the suspicion that illegal financial operations had been carried out on behalf of the PDS. It follows from documents, which dealt with those operations, that it was allegedly a matter of paying off a multi-million debt owed to the CPSU by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED]

The Soviet-Venezuela joint venture "Putnik" has played the role of the recipient of the money that has been transferred abroad.

The CPSU Central Committee Press Center has been authorized to announce that within the framework of bilateral and international projects, which have been carried out in the last years with the CPSU and SED participance, both parties have also had some financial relations. Commitments were undertaken on the basis of

trust, as a rule, in the form of verbal agreements. But, nevertheless, they were observed extremely meticulously.

One of the side effects of the processes, first latent and then obvious, which have taken shape in the SED and in GDR on the whole, were defaults in payments with respect to previously undertaken commitments that was reflected in the appropriate protocol of the Presidium of the SED-PDS leadership in January 1990.

With regard to the involvement of the joint Soviet-Venezuelan venture "Putnik," which as of April 1990 became a Soviet-Cypriot venture, in settling claims that have accumulated, it is necessary to state most definitely the following: No CPSU bodies have required "Putnik" or persons acting on its behalf to carry out any financial or other operations in the interests of the party.

TV Reports 'Scandal'

LD2810104990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2246 GMT 27 Oct 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Today one of the main topics in the FRG is the scandal around the Party for Democratic Socialism [PDS] and its leader Gysi. The party leadership is being accused of appropriating money which they supposedly transferred to the CPSU.

[Correspondent Kondratyev] It was pitiful to watch Gregor Gysi giving a decisive news conference on the scandal concerning his party's funds. The brilliant orator, who has already successfully shown his worth in the Bundestag, literally squeezed each word out one after another.

Two of his colleagues who have already been arrested said that they had not informed Gysi himself. But the party chief has also assumed responsibility. He has decisively refuted suspicions of forgery.

But after his lightening visit to Moscow on Thursday, after the meeting with Vladimir Ivashko, and after the official CPSU declaration that it knows nothing about his credit transfer, the PDS position has collapsed like a house of cards.

The scandal has only just started to unfold properly. Here, everyone is amazed at where the mysterious Pudnik farm has appeared from. For a long time it was sought in Moscow and finally it was found in a half-derelict building on a backyard.

Even Ostap Bender's [word indistinct] found themselves in better circumstances. The Pudnik cooperative holds 25 percent of the capital. Fifty percent belongs to a branch of the Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development, and the remaining shares belong to the Rostik International ministry firm, which has extracted itself from unfortunate cooperation [words indistinct].

KGB Denies Connection

LD2910192490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1747 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow, 29 Oct (TASS)—The Public Liaison Center of the USSR KGB officially announced the following today:

In the FRG, the mass media continue the campaign of political discreditation of the Party for Democratic Socialism in connection with a case of illicit financial operations. After unsuccessful attempts to cast aspersions on the CPSU, reports have appeard that the KGB had a hand in this. In particular, it is claimed that one Karl-Heinz Kaufmann, a key figure in this story, is connected to the KGB.

The Public Liaison Center of the USSR KGB is authorized to state that Karl-Heinz Kaufmann has not and never has had any connection with the KGB.

Former GDR Shipyard's Appeal Reported

PM2910144190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Oct 90 Union Edition p 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Lapskiy: "Do We Need 'Atlantiks?'"]

[Text] Berlin—A letter arrived at the IZVESTIYA correspondent's center in Berlin from Stralsund, a Baltic city in the north of the former GDR. The collective of the "Volks-werft" joint stock shipbuilding company appeals through our newspaper to the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry. I shall cite extracts from the letter.

From the first day of its existence, they write from Stralsund, Volks-werft has been the main supplier of ships for the Soviet fishing industry. Some 1,323 ships have been built for the USSR here, that is one-third of the tonnage of the Soviet fishing flotillas was built at the Stralsund shipyard.

A contract for 10 ships of the "Atlantik-488" type was signed for 1990. For 1991-1992 there is a contract for the delivery of 15 of these ships. The shipyard's designers are developing a new generation of fishing and fish processing ships which will meet all requirements of international fishing of the nineties.

To ensure that the contracts do not remain on paper only it is essential in the very near future to resolve financing questions. The first important step in this direction was the inclusion of deliveries of ships on the priority list of trade turnover for 1991 between the USSR and Germany. The shipyard is prepared to supply ships on a credit basis, but for that the relevant government decisions will be needed.

Before passing on the letter from the "Volks-werft" collective to the editorial office I showed it to B.E. Saul, leader of the Berlin department of the USSR trade mission in the FRG. Many East German firms and enterprises with established economic ties with us would

like to retain them in the future, Bruno Eduardovich says. But not everything is as simple as it may appear at first glance. Now that we are moving toward a market economy, such requests and proposals should be made not to the ministries, in this case the Ministry of the Fish Industry, but directly to customers. I recommend that the "Volks-werft" joint stock company appeal directly to our fishing associations.

Of course, we need ships of the type built in Stralsund, especially on credit, B.E. Saul concludes. "It is still not too late to start talks but we should not delay—everyone needs clarity."

Yazov Receives Visiting German Army Official

PM2610153390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Meeting at USSR Defense Ministry"]

[Text] Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR defense minister, met with Lieutenant General H. von Ondarza, inspector of the FRG Army who is paying an official visit to our country, on 23 October.

During their conversation they discussed questions connected with the disarmament process in Europe as well as the state of and prospects for Soviet-German military contacts.

Taking part in the conversation on the Soviet side was Army General V.I. Varennikov, commander in chief of Ground Forces and USSR deputy defense minister, and on the German side K. Blech, FRG ambassador to the USSR.

German Army Inspector Interviewed

PM2610160790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Oct 90 Union Edition p 4

[Interview with Lieutenant General H. von Ondarza, inspector of the German Army, by IZVESTIYA correspondent Ye. Bovkun: "On the Benefits of Building Bridges"; place and date not given]

[Text] In anticipation of the visit to the Soviet Union by Inspector of the Army Lieutenant General H. von Ondarza, one of the top people in the Bundeswehr, the FRG Defense Ministry kindly granted me the opportunity to talk with him.

[Bovkun] The world outlook of the soldier of today is in many respects the mood of society tomorrow, since a significant part of the population undergoes military service. To what extent have the soldiers of East and West managed to overcome the "enemy images"?

[Von Ondarza] I am pretty optimistic. I think it is time we stopped using the expression. I was not in the war myself. I became a soldier in 1956, and the "enemy image," which haunted the local media was never a decisive professional motive, as far as I was concerned, in my military activity. I am sure that we will converse quite frankly on this topic as well, in the interests of cooperation.

[Bovkun] What kind of cooperation would this be? According to my information, you intend to visit army training establishments. Is an exchange of experience possible in this sphere?

[Von Ondarza] I do not think the exchange of experience of tactical training (what our soldiers are taught and what yours are taught) is the paramount issue. It is more a matter of strengthening trust. After all, we want to work together in the creation of the new European architecture. The course toward a unified Europe, as our governments' political concept, meets the military's interests. All aspects of the Helsinki process—cooperation in the economy, culture, and sport—play an important role for soldiers as well.

[Bovkun] Will it be possible to take advantage of the planned brief presence of Soviet forces in Germany in order to strengthen military partnership, or will this historically unique situation remain unexploited?

[Von Ondarza] This could be the chief point in our meeting program. We could well exploit the opportunities presented by the new situation for the benefit of both sides. We are beginning to establish new structures in various garrisons in the eastern part of Germany. There are Soviet servicemen in the neighborhood: They could be the first participants in a dialogue between partners, the promoters of the ideas of new European structures in the security sphere. When they go home they will talk about what they have seen and learned. Their mission is much more important than it appears at first glance. There are problems, of course. The language barrier, for example. But they are surmountable.

[Bovkun] Are you expecting help from former servicemen of the GDR National People's Army?

[Von Ondarza] I admit I have heard that Soviet soldiers did not associate a great deal with their German colleagues. There were practically no permanent contacts. But I think that knowledge of Soviet Army ways, the mentality of Soviet servicemen, and the Russian language could be very useful in the development of contacts. Our soldiers and NCO's in the former GDR want dialogue with Soviet soldiers. I support their wish, and I would like to hear the opinion of my colleagues in Moscow and to discuss this important topic with them.

[Bovkun] Obviously, it is important to involve civilians as well as servicemen in the dialogue....

[Von Ondarza] I agree. Soldiers may spend the night in barracks, but they do not live on an island. Every year 200,000 recruits arrive for service and a similar number leaves. And when you consider that our common aim is to build a new Europe, then it is necessary to extend the dialogue to the civilian population.

[Bovkun comment] Dialogue is necessary. No one doubts the benefit of it. However, in the interests of objectivity we should say that some people react differently to the temporary presence of Soviet forces in Germany. German nationalists are demanding that the forces be withdrawn immediately. People who prefer to burn bridges behind them will not appreciate why others want to build bridges.

Finnish Military Chief Pays Official Visit

LD2910143190 Moscow TASS in English 1223 GMT 29 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow October 29 TASS—Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces Jan Klenberg arrived in the Soviet Union today on a four-day official visit.

At the airport, Klenberg was welcomed by Chief of the Soviet General Staff Mikhail Moyseyev and other officials. Finnish Ambassador to the USSR Heikki Talvitie was also present.

In an interview with TASS at the airport, Klenberg said that he was glad to meet and talk with Soviet military leaders.

"There is nothing unusual about this visit," he stressed. "Our countries have long-standing good-neighbourly relations, including contacts between military leaders.

"I hope that the present visit will be as successful as all previous ones for the past few years."

From the airport, the guest went to his residence situated in the Lenin hills, one of the most picturesque places in Moscow. Then he visited the tomb of the unknown soldier by the Kremlin wall, where he laid a wreath.

In the afternoon, Klenberg will meet Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov and Chief of the Soviet General Staff Mikhail Moiseyev.

The sides are expected to discuss prospects for the development of Soviet-Finnish relations in the military sphere.

It is planned that Moyseyev will give a dinner in honour of Klenberg in the evening.

Visits Moscow, Leningrad Bases

LD3010164690 Moscow TASS in English 1131 GMT 30 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—Commander-in-chief of Finland's Defence Forces Admiral Jan Klenberg, currently on an official visit here, was hosted today by cadets of the Vystrel higher officers' courses, located on Lake Senezh, in a picturesque spot of Moscow region. Soviet officers receive advanced training and are taught to handle new types of weapons there.

Klenberg was shown the latest hardware used by Soviet ground forces. He attended motorised company tactical exercises and shooting practice. The Finnish guest praised the performance of motorised infantrymen.

Klenberg visited the General Staff Military Academy this afternoon. It is the country's oldest military educational establishment intended for senior commanders. All Soviet military leaders have taken two-year courses or gone through brief academic upgrading at the academy. The Finnish guest familiarised himself with the tuition process and academy laboratories.

On Wednesday Klenberg will start his tour of the Soviet Union. He will visit the northern Russian cities of Murmansk and Leningrad, where he will be familiarised with the life and training of northern navymen. He will also visit the Kronstadt fortress near Leningrad and the Naval Academy.

Comments on Visit

LD3110094490 Moscow TASS in English 0848 GMT 31 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Mosocw October 31 TASS—"My talks with Soviet military leaders were extremely useful and fruitful," Finnish Defence Chief Jan Klenberg, on an official visit to the Soviet Union, told TASS.

Early today Klenberg left Moscow for a tour of the Soviet Union. He will visit the northern Russian cities of Murmansk and Leningrad to get acquainted with the life and training of navymen of the northern fleet, the Kronshtadt fortress near Leningrad, and the Naval Academy.

Klenberg said he had very useful talks and meetings and saw many interesting things. "We saw the best of Russian hospitality," he said.

"We should seek new forms of contacts," Klenberg said, commenting on ways to develop traditional Soviet-Finnish military cooperation.

He called for broader ties between army sportsmen and more personnel exchanges.

Lukyanov Meets European Council Official

LD2610230690 Moscow TASS in English 1648 GMT 26 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 26 TASS—Chairman of the Soviet parliament Anatoliy Lukyanov today received Peter Sager, head of the committee of the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe for liaisons with countries, that are not members of the Council of Europe.

They discussed the current situation in Europe which, in their opinion, is characterised by the transition from an era of rivalry to the formation of permanent security and

cooperation structures. The Paris summit of members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is sure to give a strong impetus to this process.

Sager and Lukyanov went on record in favour of further development of the parliamentary aspect of the all-European process. The Soviet side expressed support for efforts by the Council of Europe aimed at creating the assembly of Europe—a permanent parliamentary authority of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

They also discussed topical issues dealing with relations between the Soviet Union and the Council of Europe in the parliamentary sphere, as well as various aspects of Soviet parliamentary participation in the activities of the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe.

On the same day Sager was received by Ivan Laptev, chairman of the Council of the Union of the Soviet parliament.

Agreement Signed With France on Postal Venture

LD3010215990 Moscow TASS in English 2108 GMT 30 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Lyubov Dunayeva]

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—An agreement to set up the Soviet-French Garantpost venture to speed up international mail was signed at the Soviet Communications Ministry on Monday.

The venture's founders include the Soviet Mezhdunarodnaya Pochta, the Central International Civil Aviation department, the Commercial Orbita Bank and the French Sophiepost firm.

Soviet Communications Minister Erlen Pervyshin told TASS that the country's transition to market relations demands rapid correspondence, accelerated transfer of goods samples and confidential documents.

Such an accelerated international mail was organised by the Soviet Communications Ministry. But weak material base and the absence of necessary technical equipment complicated the work of the international post office and hampered its attempts to meet the growing demands of users, he said.

The ministry decided then to launch a joint venture to process international accelerated mail processing, Pervyshin said.

The technology, developed by Sophiepost, will help increase postal services more than 20-fold. Venture employees will be specially trained by the French firm, he said.

The firm's charter capital amounts to 1.770 million rubles. It will begin its work on January 1, 1991.

French Police Seek Greater Cooperation With USSR

PM2910171190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report by B. Vasilyev, staffer of the USSR MVD Press Service, under the rubric "In the USSR MVD": "What Is It Like Over There?"]

[Text] Two Soviet citizens who had left the USSR were detained on the border with France. Counterfeit dollars and forged driver's licenses were confiscated from them. This fact was cited by Joseph le Bruhec, deputy chief of the French Ministry of the Interior Central Judicial Police Directorate, at a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists at the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].

The delegation he heads is in the Soviet Union to familiarize itself with the MVD's activity to combat organized crime and prepare proposals for deepening cooperation. During their stay in Moscow the delegation's members familiarized themselves with the activity of the ministry's administration to combat organized crime and the work experience of the Moscow Oblast Soviet Executive Committee Main Internal Affairs Administration. Problems of combating crime were discussed.

Answering journalists' questions, the participants in the news conference noted: The total level of crime in the USSR is considerably lower than in France. Concern was expressed, however, given the active development of contacts between our countries, it is not impossible that French criminals may appear in the USSR and Soviet criminals in France.

The strengthening of cooperation between the French police and the Soviet militia, it was said at the news conference, will help to prevent and stop such phenomena and also to step up Soviet-French contacts in the sphere of combating terrorism.

Natural Gas Venture Set Up With FRG Firm

PM3010141990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Oct 90 First Edition p 2

[I. Mosin report under the "Business Is Business" column: "Base for Gas"]

[Text] The "Zarubezhgaz" trade association, which is part of the Soviet "Gazprom" concern, has concluded an agreement with "Wintershall AG," a subsidiary of the BASF AG concern, which envisages the biggest participation so far by Soviet entrepreneurs in Western economic projects.

These partners have established two joint ventures with equal shared participation. The headquarters is in Berlin. The purpose of the joint ventures is, on the one hand, to sell Soviet natural gas on the German market via the firm "Wintershall Erdgaz-Handelshaus GmBH," starting with 8 billion cubic meters per year and then

increasing the amount. It is also planned to deliver gas to other West European countries.

The second joint venture, the "Stegal GmBH" firm, will begin its activity by immediately constructing and operating new gas pipelines. This new type of Soviet-German cooperation can be regarded as a direct result of perestroyka. The former system of distributing gas via Ruhrgaz AG now has a rival in the shape of the new joint ventures. Ruhrgaz' monopoly has ended.

For us the two joint ventures mark a further intensification of German-Soviet trade relations. For the German side and especially the BASF concern, which is one of the biggest consumers of natural gas in the FRG with an annual requirement of around 2 billion cubic meters, the alliance with "Gazprom" means a still stronger guarantee of supplies of raw materials.

We also learned from Mr. Huelter, head of the BASF office in the USSR, that his concern, whose turnover in 1989 was DM47.6 billion and which employs 137,000 people, attaches strategic significance to the new links with "Gazprom" in that this has established a possible base for future joint projects in the sphere of refining natural gas, this time in the USSR. The Soviet Union has always been a market of prime importance for BASF, with its 125-year history. For the Soviet Union BASF, with its annual commodity turnover of DM1 billion, is its biggest German trade partner in the sphere of the chemical industry.

Supreme Soviet

Resolution Adopted on Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Test

LD3110113290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1010 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Report from the Kremlin by TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov, Vladimir Bachenkov, and Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow, 31 Oct (TASS)—The Soviet legislature adopted a resolution today "On the situation which has come about in connection with the staging of an underground nuclear explosion on Novaya Zemlya on 24 October 1990." This results from the hearings which took place on Monday.

It states, in particular, that the relevant authorities—the USSR Supreme Soviet committees on defense and state security matters and on ecology and the rational utilization of natural resources, and the USSR State Committee for Protection of the Environment—were not informed in good time about this nuclear test. "The nuclear explosion which was carried out has also hampered the development of cooperation between the USSR and the countries of northern Europe in the field of joint steps to improve the ecological situation in the north", the document says.

The resolution indicates to the government the impermissibility in the future of failing to notify the authorities in good time of the preparation and staging of nuclear tests. The USSR Council of Ministers is also instructed within a two-month period to complete the elaboration and to submit to the legislative committees on defense and state security matters and on ecology proposals on a nuclear test program for 1991, and also on a comprehensive program of nuclear tests.

The Supreme Soviet requested that the government speed up the preparation of a report on matters relating to the influence of subterranean nuclear tests in the Novoya Zemlya archipelago on the surrounding regions of the extreme north, and also to analyze the consequences of previous nuclear tests on the health of the population in the adjoining regions.

The prohibition of all forms of nuclear tests is one of the more important areas both of the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Soviet initiatives in this sphere, however, are not meeting with support from the United States, the resolution stresses.

Deputies Debate Trade Union Law at 30 Oct Session

LD3010205990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1840 GMT on 30 October carries its scheduled 80-minute "At the USSR Supreme Soviet Session" program, consisting of recorded highlights of the 30 October USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin in Moscow.

The announcer reads an account of the morning session, at which the country's unpreparedness for winter was considered and a resolution on this issue was adopted. The announcer says that Pivovarov also spoke at the session. Gritsenko, chairman of the Soviet of the Union Committee for Labor, Prices, and Social Policy is shown presenting a revised draft law on trade unions and the rights and guarantees of their activities in a market and their role in defending the social protection of their members. There was a meeting between the commissions discussing this issue and trade union representatives on 25 October. Gritsenko outlines some of the main considerations of the draft concerning, among other things, the provision of rights to defend the interests of trade unions, and the rights of employers to form their own unions. There is also an article on the registration of trade unions without this registration being linked to any kind of supervisory function on the part of the registering bodies.

Vladimir Pavlovich Shcherbakov, chairman of the new USSR General Confederation of Labor, then comments on the draft, proposing amendments, in particular with regard to the right of trade unions not to implement illegal administrative decisions, and the right of trade union committees to sign collective agreements with managements.

Vladimir Ivanovich Shcherbakov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor then speaks, recalling the former quasistate role of trade unions and the need for their role to be understood differently. He recalls that trade union membership figures may change radically if, henceforth, individuals, as distinct from organizations, are accepted into membership. He points out some of the administrative headaches this may entail in terms of social insurance, and the provision of trade union holiday vouchers, for example. He speaks about the draft clause concerning the possibility of trade union bodies to be set up in the army and points to a certain inconsistency of unions having the right to rescind orders in this sphere. He continues to comment on specific articles in the draft, noting other areas where the trade unions appear to wish to usurp the bodies of powers.

Deputies then ask for questions from the floor. (Bubushin), a trade union delegate at the 19th congress of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions then speaks from the rostrum, describing himself as "an ordinary worker" who occupies no official trade union functions. He says that a law on trade unions is necessary on account of the lack of social protection at the grassroots level. He appeals to the people's deputies to think very carefully about the need to provide rights for trade unions "down below" in order to avert conflict situations.

The video shows other deputies speaking at the session. The first vote was taken without result. After an interval, Gritsenko presented deputies with a new formulation of

a draft decision elaborated by a conciliation commission [soglasitelnaya komissiya] which was adopted by a majority.

Laptev, chairman of the Soviet of the Union, is then shown speaking at the evening session of the Supreme Soviet on the subject of the committee of Soviet soldiers' mothers and appeals to deputies to heed the calls and petitions from these people. He was supported by many deputies and it was decided to charge deputy Yarin with the formation of a parliamentary commission to investigate criminal acts in the Army.

Then Serov, chairman of the USSR State Construction Committee, presented a draft law on the principles of investment activity in the USSR. Deputy Komarov gave a report on the draft law. Both speakers commented on the novel approach to investment policy and its active influence on the development of the market.

The studio announcer says the debate on the draft law will be continued on 31 October.

Deputies Approve Trade Union Law at First Reading

LD3010172290 Moscow TASS in English 1629 GMT 30 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents]

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—The Soviet parliament today approved the first reading of a bill on trade unions.

Parliamentary committees and commissions, together with the government and trade unions, were told to examine once more the alternative drafts of the most controversial articles of the bill. The revised draft should be submitted for its second reading in December.

Deputies also began discussing the first reading of the bill on investment activities in the USSR. Presenting the document, chairman of the State Committee for Construction Valeriy Serov said that the aim of the bill was "to introduce market-based investment relations, to give a boost to entrepreneurship".

Serov said special attention was paid to the protection of investment activity which took account of the norms and practice of international law. For the first time, Serov stressed, provisions have been made for reimbursing losses to participants in investment activity, including lost profits if government agencies pass acts that violate their rights.

Discussion of the bill on investment activity will continue on Wednesday.

In addition, it is planned to consider on Wednesday the second reading of the bill on enhancing responsibility for abuses in trade and speculation and the first reading of the currency regulation bill.

Parliament set up an independent parliamentary commission to examine cases of the death of Soviet soldiers in peacetime. This was done in response to a demand of the committee of soldiers' mothers. Member of the USSR Presidential Council Veniamin Yarin was appointed chairman of the commission.

Deputies Approve Bill on Investment Activities

LD3110113990 Moscow TASS in English 1038 GMT 31 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Ivan Ivanov, Vladimir Isachenkov, and Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow October 31 TASS—Soviet parliament today approved the first reading of the bill on investment activities in the USSR. The goal of the bill is to introduce market-type investment relations and to intensify entrepreneurship.

The bill lays down general guidelines for investment policies to be used by republics to draft detailed legal acts taking account of local specifics.

During the discussion it was stressed that the bill must help normalise the situation in the investment field—one of the "weak points" of the Soviet economy. At present the annual volume of investment into the development of the national economy exceeds one third of the national income, while in developed countries this index is no more than seven to ten per cent.

The rate of investment turnaround in the USSR is four to five time slower than is required in a modern economy. As a result, large volumes of unfinished construction prove a heavy burden for the state budget, contributing to the growing deficit and inflation.

The bill is based on the need to decentralise investment activity, which is no longer the right of state structures alone. It gives equal rights to all investors, irrespective of the forms of ownership, as well as to individuals. Much importance is attached to the guarantees and protection of investments. In particular, provisions have been made to reimburse participants in investment activity for losses, including lost profits, if government agencies take decisions violating their rights.

Having supported the main principles of the bill, deputies made many proposals on perfecting it. For example, deputy from Voronezh Vladimir Kirillov proposed enhancing the anti-monopoly thrust of the bill, by adding an article on the special examination of all major projects.

The bill is expected to have a second reading in November.

Comparison of Report on 26 Oct Presidium Session

PM2910130990

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 27 October 1990 carries in its Second Edition on page one a TASS report on the 26 October USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium session. The PRAVDA item, entitled "USSR Supreme

Soviet Presidium Session," has been compared with the translation of the Moscow Television Russian version published on page 48 of the 29 October edition of the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT under the headline "Lukyanov Chairs Supreme Soviet Presidium Session" revealing the following variation:

Page 48, column one, paragraph two, only sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...budget for 1991. Attention was drawn to the need to make a comprehensive and profound study of these documents with a view to stringently saving material and financial resources, thoroughly evaluate the projected proportions and priorities, and ensure the maximum utilization of all available potential to satisfy the requirements of social development and Soviet people's interests and needs.

The rules of.... (picking up paragraph three, adding sentence)

Political & Social

Abalkin Announces Government Reorganization

LD3110113390 Berlin ADN International Service in German 0727 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Excerpts] Moscow (ADN)—Deputy Premier Leonid Abalkin has announced an extensive reorganization of the Soviet Government in line with the requirements of the market economy. He told the Soviet news agency NOVOSTI that, for example, the State Supply Committee [Gossnab] is to be scrapped and a contractual system developed in its place. In place of today's planning authority, Gosplan, and several other offices there will be an economics ministry. Several industry ministries will be abolished. The new government structure will include an administration for state property and an antimonopoly committee. Also intended is the founding of a committee for national questions under the chairmanship of a deputy premier.

In Abalkin's view the new government will not only have to have young, well educated, and respected people but also representatives of the various social movements and if possible of the parties. [passage omitted]

Abalkin did not give a date for this reorganization of the government.

Moscow Reports Abalkin's Comments

LD3110130690 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Excerpt] In an interview with the NOVOSTI news agency, Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin has announced the structure and composition of the national government must be changed to meet the requirements of a market economy. The deputy premier believes various public organizations and possibly parties must be represented in the new cabinet. Today's Council of Ministers is made up of Communist Party members, with only one unaffiliated member. [passage omitted]

Spanish Daily Interviews Abalkin on Reforms

PM3010142290 Madrid ABC in Spanish 28 Oct 90 p 44

[Interview with Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Leonid Abalkin by Alberto Sotillo; place and date not given]

[Text] On the occasion of President Gorbachev's visit to Spain, academician Leonid Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and a front-ranking economist, answered questions from ABC. From his answers we can deduce what the immediate future of the USSR will be like, with regard to perestroyka and relations with other countries at a time of international tension resulting from the Gulf crisis.

[ABC] What impact you believe the Gulf crisis will have on the Soviet economy?

[Abalkin] On the one hand, there has been a rise in the price of crude, which benefits the USSR as an exporting country. On the other hand, we will not obtain any direct benefit, because the economic imbalances in the USSR are affecting the oil sector and oil extraction is falling, thus also reducing our exporting capacity. We are meeting part of our oil export commitments to other countries—Bulgaria, for instance—with oil from Kuwait.

Market Economy

[ABC] What is your opinion regarding the plan for the transition to a market economy approved by the Soviet Parliament?

[Abalkin] The plan is far from perfect, of course. Nevertheless, it does have a very major advantage: It grants extensive freedom of action both to the president and to the executive authorities and the federal republics, which will be able to carry out their own programs, proceeding from common principles.

[ABC] How willing are the Soviet authorities to allow enterprises with entirely foreign capital?

[Abalkin] In principle, this question was resolved in spring last year, when the law on ownership was promulgated. One of the officially recognized forms of ownership is ownership by foreign private individuals or corporate bodies.

[ABC] For the country's population, the implementation of the economic reform signifies the need to make certain sacrifices. In view of this, do you not believe that the elimination of all privileges could have a major impact on public opinion?

[Abalkin] I believe in national public opinion, and perhaps Westerners has a very exaggerated view of the privileges that exist in the USSR. We have made a comparative analysis with respect to the West, and in

particular the United States, and have managed to show (though without having managed to alter public opinion substantially) that our administrative apparatus is small and poorly paid.

When a strong tide of antigovernment actions began to emerge in Poland 10 years ago the Solidarity trade union took its first steps by demanding the elimination of privileges in the hope of being able to improve the population's lives at the expense of the state and party apparatus. All the privileges were indeed eliminated, but in relation to the number of the country's inhabitants, the saving achieved was so small that it did not permit the introduction of any improvements.

[ABC] Do you believe that a radical economic reform transcending the limits established by the government could cause famine and mass unemployment in the economically more backward regions?

[Abalkin] We have forecast the development of these processes and we believe that if they become uncontrollable such consequences will be entirely possible. You must keep in mind that at present 25 percent of the population are below the minimum subsistence level. This being so, any lowering of living standards would be unacceptable for moral and political reasons.

[ABC] Will the present composition and form of the government be maintained?

[Abalkin] Come what may, both the structure and the composition of the government must be changed. Structural readjustment must take account of the realities of a market economy. For instance, Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] must be replaced by a contractual system and Gosplan [State Planning Committee] by an Economy Ministry, as it is usually called. Then new bodies must be created, such as a fund for the administration of state property, an antimonopoly committee—that is, structures closer to the market economy.

[ABC] You have invited foreign journalists to visit the USSR in seven years' time. Do you believe that you will have an acceptable standard of prosperity by then?

[Abalkin] Such expressions as "living standard" or "acceptable prosperity" are relative in character. It all depends on your frame of reference. Compared to the living standards that exist now in the developed European countries, five or seven years is not long enough, from any viewpoint. Proceeding from the present living standard in the USSR, radical changes can be achieved in this period.

Plans for 7 Nov Parade, Demonstrations Outlined

PM3110152390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Oct 90 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Fedor Ivanov under the "Direct Line" rubric: "How Many Demonstrations Will There Be?"]

[Text] Moscow—Despite the call from G. Popov and A. Sobchak to refrain from holding rallies and demonstrations on 7 November, local bodies are continuing to receive applications to hold demonstrations from various public associations, movements, and parties.

As your IZVESTIYA correspondent was told at the Moscow Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee], as of the evening of 29 October, 10 such requests had been received: from the Moscow CPSU Gorkom [City Committee], the "Moscow" deputies' group, the Soviet Women's Committee and Veterans Council, the United Front of Working People, and the "Marxist Platform." In addition, there is a letter signed by a group of USSR people's deputies from Russia and Moscow, and also by the Moscow Voters' Association Coordination Council, about holding a rally under slogans of defending human rights on 7 November.

On the morning of 30 October a news conference was held at Moscow CPSU Gorkom in which members of the organizing committee for the preparation and holding of the 7 November demonstration in Moscow took part. Yuriy Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom, who addressed the press conference, stated that he believes it is necessary to mark the anniversary of the October Revolution because, first, it is the only state holiday for the whole country and, second, the revolution remains to this day a turning point in the development of the world community.

Yu. Prokofyev said that a ceremonial session in whose presidium the leaders of the USSR, Russia, and Moscow will be invited to sit will be held at 1700 hours 6 November in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.

On 7 November there will be a military parade on Red Square, followed by a demonstration.

By agreement with the Moscow Soviet, one and one-half hours after the end of the first demonstration, the columns of the alternative demonstration held by the Moscow Voters' Association and a number of deputies' groups will march out into Red Square. After this they will hold a rally in Manezh Square.

Asked about the cost of the November celebrations, Yu. Prokofyev noted that the demonstration itself costs

practically nothing, since this time all the placards will be home-made. After the leaders of the Moscow Soviet refused to meet the 500,000-ruble cost of holiday decorations for the city, the cost was assumed by the USSR Council of Ministers. The USSR Supreme Soviet will pay 29,000 rubles for rental of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.

Gorbachev Speech Expected 6 Nov

LD3010135190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1155 GMT 30 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, 30 Oct—Communists of Moscow regard 7 November "not as a festival of rejoicing and rest, but as a political festival" and intend to hold on Red Square a political rally "which will show the Muscovites' view of the political situation in our society." Yuriy Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow city committee of the CPSU, stated this today at a news conference devoted to the celebrations in connection with the 73d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Now that Communists are in opposition to the city soviet in Moscow (the majority of mandates in it belong to the Democratic Russia bloc), the city committee of the CPSU, with the participation of a number of other social organizations, has taken the initiative to hold the ceremonies.

"November 7 is the birthday of our state and no one has the right to forbid the people to hold their national festival even despite the present explosive situation in society," the leader of Moscow's Communists stated, having recalled that previously, similar events were prepared by the city soviet of people's deputies.

Yuriy Prokofyev reported that on 6 November the USSR Supreme Soviet will organize in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses a ceremonial gathering with the participation of the leaders of the Union and Russian legislatures and governments, people's deputies, and representatives of the working people of the capital. A speech by USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is expected.

On 7 November after the military parade on Red Square there will be a march organized by the city organizations of the CPSU and the Komsomol, the "Moskva" group of deputies, and the Moscow Council of Women, Committee for the Defense of Peace, and Committee of Veterans of War and Labor. Representatives of the Marxist and Democratic platforms of the CPSU will also take part in it. "Those to whom our socialist choice is dear will take part in the march," Yuriy Prokofyev stressed.

"I believe that one and a half hours after the end of our demonstration, that is to say at about 1430, there will be another demonstration there," Yuriy Prokofyev added, "one organized by the Moscow Voter's Association and the group of people's deputies of the USSR led by Telman Gdlyan, Nikolay Ivanov, Galina Starovoytova, and Oleg Kalugin under the slogan of defending human rights. They consider that 7 November is the date which saw the beginning of the genocide of the Soviet people." Yuriy Prokofyev said that the Moscow city committee of the CPSU, the Moscow City Soviet, or any of these groups "is not preparing to have a confrontation and has no interest in there being provocations of any kind."

Bogdanov Comments on Security

LD3110135190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Text] We are doing everything possible to ensure that Moscow is calm over the festive period, Bogdanov, deputy USSR minister of internal affairs and chief of the Moscow Executive Committee Main Directorate of Internal Affairs, stated in an interview to a TASS correspondent. The operational situation in the city on the eve of 7 November is tense. The meeting activity of grassroot associations and groups of citizens has increased. This year some 800 meetings have been held.

At different levels rumors are circulating about a possible military putsch and various incidents during the festive events. Passions and the media are being whipped up. In recent days many articles in a number of central and Moscow newspapers have been aggravating an already explosive situation that may lead to grave consequences

The chief of the Main Administration of Internal Affairs stated that the militia has sufficient forces and options to repulse extremists and those planning to spoil the festival. Even today all personnel have been transferred to reinforced service [usilennyy variant neseniya sluzhby], and the strength of patrol post units has been increased. The deployment of staffers on Red Square, on the approaches to it, and in other areas where people gather is being carefully prepared.

Particular attention is being paid to personnel training. Units are being instructed on exceptional restraint. But order depends to a large extent on those taking part in the events themselves. One hopes that city-dwellers and guests of the capital will show the necessary good sense and respect for each other.

Poll Shows Ryzhkov Government Rating Declining

LD3110102590 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Text] A poll by the Soviet public opinion center shows that the national government headed by Nikolay Ryzhkov is losing its rating among the population. Late last year 34 percent of the population expressed confidence in the Soviet cabinet while only 14 percent of the last poll's respondents did the same. Experts believe the government's inability to curb inflation and a price raise have influenced the outcome of the poll. Only last month the national cost of living went up another three percent. Everywhere, including Moscow, local authorities are about to ration the main food supplies.

Further on Ryzhkov's Talks With Builders

PM3010130590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Meeting with Construction Workers"]

[Text] Problems of the development of the country's construction complex under the conditions of the transition to the market economy were the focus of attention of the 29 October Kremlin meeting between N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and a group of construction workers who were delegates to the 19th congress of USSR Trade Unions.

Summing up the results of the meeting, N.I. Ryzhkov said that a country that is not concerned for the development of capital construction cannot count on success in the future in a virtually any sphere of life. The chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers stated that the government will take the necessary steps to introduce order in construction. Here the need was stressed for the most active participation of the trade union and labor collectives in the consolidation of organization and discipline. The USSR Council of Minsters will prepare a comprehensive resolution on the development of construction in the country. It is planned that construction workers themselves will also take part in work on this document.

At the conclusion of the meeting the delegate-construction workers expressed their support for the government and the course it is steering for the transition to the market.

Further on Talks

PM3110131190 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 31 Oct 90 p 2

[TASS report: "Meeting With Construction Workers"]

[Text] Problems of the development of the country's construction complex under the conditions of the transition to the market economy were the focus of attention at the 29 October Kremlin meeting between N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and a group of construction workers who were delegates to the 19th Congress of USSR Trade Unions.

During the frank discussion it was noted with concern that the situation in construction is complex. Lately there has been a marked decline in the prestige of the profession of construction worker, about 950,000 people have left the sector, and the average age of workers, which was once 20-25 years, is nearing 40-50 years at a number of most important projects. Among the reasons for these and other problems the participants in the meeting mentioned, in particular, the low level of mechanization of construction work and the production of construction materials, the poor conditions and remuneration, and housing and other social questions which sometimes are not resolved for years on end at local level.

Summing up the results of the meeting, N.I. Ryzhkov said that a country which is not concerned for the development of capital construction cannot count on success in the future in a virtually any sphere of life. The chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers stated that the government will take the necessary steps to introduce order in construction. Here the need was stressed for the most active participation of the trade union and labor collectives in the consolidation of organization and discipline. The USSR Council of Ministers will prepare a comprehensive resolution on the development of construction in the country. It is planned that construction workers themselves will also take part in work on this document.

Journalists Investigate Illegal Weapons Sales

LD3010234190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2055 GMT on 30 October, in its "Television News Service" program, carries a four-minute report on illegal weapons sales in Moscow.

The report opens with program announcer Yuriy Rostov standing outside the television center "a few minutes before going on air" accompanied by three men holding a rocket grenade [granata] which two of the men, staffers from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, had brought to him. The police would not allow him into the studio with this "gift" and three grenade launchers which the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA staffers had just purchased from secret arms dealers in Moscow. One of the journalists introduces himself as Dmitriy Muratov, head of the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA parliamentary service.

Rostov asks: "Tell us about your experiment."

Muratov: "We announced, based on the decision of the editorial office and together with Vladimir Filin, special correspondent of the military department of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, an operation to purchase weapons. We were interested in how, after the presidential decree on the disbandment of groups and the surrender of weapons—which was not fulfilled—this process would go if there was economic stimulus for it."

Filin: "Well, fairly easy, although of course only in relative terms."

Rostov: "How much does a grenade laucher cost, at market prices?"

Filin: "Well, at market prices—the thing is that market prices vary depending on the region. Say, in the Transcaucasus region, a grenade launcher may cost 5,000-8,000 rubles [R]."

Rostov: "And here, in Moscow?"

Filin: "Here in Moscow, in the order of R1,000-1,500."

Rostov: "Pretty cheap."

Filin: "Relatively."

Rostov then asks a third man, a KGB staffer invited to come along as an expert, to confirm whether the missile is a real one. He says: "I can state officially that this is a live weapon and may be fired at any moment." Video shows grenade approximately 75 centimeters long, with four protruding fins at its base. Muratov and Filin then show the grenade launchers.

Muratov then adds: "I just wanted to add two words. The fact that we have a KGB expert with us does not go against the fact that we have kept anonymous the people who are taking part in this operation. That is, the integrity of the newspaper is a guarantee of the fact that we—to put it crudely—will not hand them over. We want to continue this operation both to prepare materials and also to achieve a parliamentary decision on supplementing the presidential decree to ensure that we can put an end to weapons floating around the country, even if it is by this method, and for money. In this we are actually similar to our expert and with representatives of the Committee [for State Security]."

Filin then takes the opportunity of being on television to appeal for the participation of sponsors, and repeats his name and gives his telephone number at KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, saying he is ready to answer any questions or respond to business proposals.

Bakatin Comments on Crime, Social Tension

Rejects Coup Possibility

LD2810232690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0645 GMT 26 Oct 90

["Fragment" of remarks by Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs, on 17 October in response to "questions put by a number of Soviet and foreign journalists"; place not given; from the "Man and Law" program—recorded]

[Text] I am opposed to stirring up a rumpus or a panic over the question of crime in the USSR. Because of course, quite objectively, given the circumstances of our society, our economy, our politics, our morality, so to speak, and so on and so forth, crime will increase objectively in these circumstances. Incidentally, it is rising objectively throughout the world, as a matter of fact. If we claim to be heading to a market economy, to a certain democratization throughout our economy, if you like, then we might look and see what is happening in those countries where this sort of economy is already fairly well developed. There we find that the level of crime, specifically economic crime, is higher. As for violent crime, that is higher, too, if we take the United States, for example. If we compare, for example, the murder rate per 100,000 people in our capital Moscow with that in Washington, the capital of the United States, then we can see that there are roughtly 50 murders per 100,000 people annually there in the U.S. while we have 2.5—is that right?—2.7 per 100,000 annually. So, there you have it.

Yet, there is no panic there. There is no hysteria. What there is is confidence. Everything is all right, everything is quiet, even though some 25 times more Washingtonians are murdered than Muscovites. I realize, of course, that this sort of purely arithmetical approach may not be totally above board, perhaps not quite a moral approach, let us say. Because you cannot measure these things, more or fewer murders. Whenever someone is murdered, just one person, then that is bad. Just one person murdered and you ought to be concerned and start sounding the alarm bell. But I do not believe we ought to raise a panic over the crime rates. We should not.

Generally speaking, you should realize that we have been living under the sort of regime which has been, let us say, ultracentralized, overcentralized, with limited forms of democracy, and with a certain monopoly on ideology, if you like. There has also been a certain repressive machinery. You know for yourselves that dissidence has not been encouraged here, and that many of our citizens have been sent into exile beyond the borders of our motherland, have been stripped of their citizenship, etc. In other words, these were the ways of a totalitarian state, so to speak. Although, that said, you should not immediately make sweeping generalizations or slap labels on us all. There was a lot going on, different, complicated things.

But, now we have come to realize that we cannot live that way. We have come to realize that a new society must be built by following the road of democracy. Democracy here is, of course, the main highway. Democracy in the life of soceity, democracy in politics, democracy in the creation of the institutions of power, and democracy in the economy now that we are switching to a market economy. But unfortunately, we must realize that on such a scale all these processes of perestroyka are extremely complex. Extremely complex. We could not possibly have worked out, dovetailed, and calculated in advance exactly, with the precision of a computer, all the balanced actions we should have taken and all the possible side effects that could have arisen. Undoubtedly, in certain respects, we proceeded on the basis of trial and error. Experience throughout the world has shown that in conditions such as these, with imbalance and disproportionate development, crime does begin to rise.

So that we really might switch to a more effective economy, and an economy becomes more effective by not killing off private initiative. Thus, the powerful locomotive of the economy, such as the Western market model has... [changes thought] incidentally, nowadays many countries have introduced elements of planning into their systems, although I do not want to go into this topic, but at the same time they have held onto private initiative. They have retained individual initiative in order to allow people to prove themselves. This sort of

entrepreneurism is also a form of art, if you like. It is not just a question of anybody who wants to being able to do it. Some can and some cannot. It is a very serious business.

But here in our country all that is considered thoroughly criminal at the moment—speculation, buying up goods, or selling for profit. In other words, commerce, buying and selling, all those are criminal, felonious acts that merit criminal, administrative, or some other form of prosecution. During the switch to a market economy, with a normal development of the market economy, all of this must be decriminalized. It is not a crime, it is normal commercial activity.

But the actual timing of the transition, you see, with the chaos in which we find ourselves today, and with the upsurge in speculation which has quite simply overstepped all the boundaries, means that order must be restored to all of this right now. The goods we have must end up in the shops. At the moment they are bypassing the shops, and what we have is a genuine upsurge in speculation. So, the demand of the government, a perfectly legitimate demand which coincides, if you like, with public opinion, is that order must be restored in this sphere now. As for how long it will take, I do not know. It will take as long as it takes. But once the program takes effect—be it a program for 500 days or 1,500 days or some other program—but once the program that is settled on starts to take effect, then at some stage we will have to abolish those decisions which are taken today or tomorrow.

Basically, what we have to do is agree on the rules of the game, you see. The declaration by republics of their independence is a reality, a serious reality which must be recognized. But, in the same way, it must be recognized that these declarations have destroyed some of the legal points by which we have lived, our legal habitat, the integrity of our laws. It transpires, then, that we are starting to play according to different rules. As the head of a department which works 24 hours a day, every day, without days off, in the crucial, very important social sphere of defending the rights of citizens against criminals, I just want to say that this impedes us terribly. Terribly.

As it happens, we held a collegiate meeting today. We had all the internal affairs ministers meeting. Of course, there are certain purely political points, such as why the ministers are coming here when we have declared that, well, all the same even the leaders of these large republics, not large, any republics which speak of their sovereignty, even they realize that there must without fail be cooperation in the fight against crime. This cannot be decentralized. We cannot just destroy something now, and then start rebuilding it. If, in the final analysis, we manage to clear away this gulf between the various levels of power and achieve mutual understanding, then there will not be any problems whatsoever, and we will be able to work constructively in any situation. But, if we do not manage to do this, then sure enough there could be some very serious social tension. Perhaps, I don't know, we could be talking about famine, cold, or other very serious things. We could lose control of the situation. But as for any real possibility of a putsch, or a military coup here in the Soviet Union, then no! That is not a possibility.

Sees Situation as 'Strained'

AU2710200790 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 26 Oct 90 p 3

[Interview with USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Vadim Bakatin by Christian Schmidt-Haeuer; place and date not given: "The Situation Is Very Serious"]

[Text] [Schmidt-Haeuer] As interior minister you have had to settle many ethnic clashes in the country, and in doing so, you have already had to deal with local putschists, if I may say so. How do you judge the rumors that have come up time and again on a big putsch, a possible military putsch?

[Bakatin] I do not think the situation is stable. It is very strained. Our ministry has the task to protect stability. However, the situation is really very serious. Nevertheless, the widespread rumors of certain troop movements or a military putsch are indeed nothing but rumors. I cannot guarantee now—even though it is my task to guarantee this—that the situation will not get out of control. The most important thing is to bring about understanding between the different power levels. If this is the case, there will be no problem at all. If we do not succeed in doing so, there may also be social tensions. Such tensions could be touched off by hunger, cold, or similar things. Then the situation may get out of control. However, there is no real danger of a military putsch in the Soviet Union.

[Schmidt-Haeuer] Some people from government circles have been stressing more often recently that the tense situation and the decay of law and order are not least the result of the democratization of society and the general loss of authority. Can you confirm that on the basis of your practical work?

[Bakatin] I think such conclusions are incorrect, superficial, and primitive. Everything is much more complicated here. We lived under a regime where everything was supercentralized and very limited by one single ideology. Independent thinking was not encouraged; it was prevented by a large repressive apparatus. Many citizens were expelled from the country. These were methods of a totalitarian state. However, we must not lump everything together because things were very complicated and had different nuances. Now we have realized that we cannot continue to live like that. We have realized that we must build a new society with the goal of creating democracy. Democracy everywhere—in social life, in our policy, in our awareness. Now we are proceeding to democratize our economy.

However, these huge restructuring processes are complicated. We were unable to predict our actions and all

side-effects harmoniously with the precision of a computer. In not a few cases, we had to rely on spot checks. Under the conditions of such an imbalanced development, the crime rate has increased. This connection has been confirmed by practical experiences in the whole world. Just look at the material of the Interpol congress in Milan in the mid-eighties. It says in black and white that the crime rate has grown disproportionately. That is precisely true for our present situation. We have advanced considerably in some areas, while we lag far behind in others. For instance, the administrative structures are developing fast. However, the economy is lagging behind. We are short of virtually all goods, wages are rapidly increasing, and we have no material resources. We are also making our law enforcement system more humane. We have released 800,000 prisoners. I think we were right in doing so. However, our jurisdiction is not up to the present situation. There are so many things that contribute to the increase of the crime rate.

What would be the conclusion if we simply said that democracy must be blamed for it all? Do we then have to return to the past? Should we give up democracy? I do not agree with such assessments.

[Schmidt-Haeuer] In its recent appeal against the increasing crime rate, the government particularly stressed economic crimes—economic crimes "above all also under the conditions of transition to the market economy." It says that illegal trade and illegal profits must be punished more severely. The opposition says that the central organs only want to exploit the general legal uncertainty to criminalize private initiative. What guidelines does the Interior Ministry have for its assessments?

[Bakatin] That is a very difficult question. We have a contradictory situation in our country. Private initiative, which you just broached in your question, was considered a crime for 72 years. It was instilled in us. It is deeply rooted in our social awareness. In this respect, we were very "successful." However, now we are facing one of the most complicated problems of transition to the market economy. The problem is that private enterprise must be reassessed in our awareness. The idea that private initiative is a vice and does not bring society anything and contradicts the socialist idea is deeply rooted in our minds. Of course, we do not intend to abandon the socialist idea; however, we had the wrong attitude toward it. An effective economy promotes private initiative but does not strangulate it. In the Western market economy, private initiative is the strong driving force, even though there is also central planning in the West as well.

Private enterprise is a sort of art. Not everyone can deal with it and master it. However, in our country, everything is criminal for the time being. Profiteering and black market deals are punishable offenses. In the development of a normal market economy development, everything will be decriminalized. But now, in the period of transition to the market economy and in the chaos that we are currently in, and in view of the incredible extent of profiteering, we must above all restore order.

The goods that are being diverted away from the shops must get into these shops. Therefore, the orders given by the government are absolutely legitimate, and they are in line with the social awareness. Order must be restored in this area. How long will it take? I do not know. As long as necessary. However, these orders will be rescinded eventually, at some stage of the implementation of one of the programs—be it in 500 days or in 1,500 days.

[Schmidt-Haeuer] The Soviet Union joined Interpol recently. It will also take part in the struggle against international terrorism. Now we have seen in recent months that at least the former GDR, Hungary, and Bulgaria lodged and supported West German and other international fugitive terrorists. Has the problem been examined as to what stance the former Soviet leadership and the relevant organs maintained on supporting international terrorism? Do you have any new, special information in this respect?

[Bakatin] You know that quite a number of authorities form the structure of our legal organs. They are the state prosecutors, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the KGB. The struggle against terrorism and particularly against international terrorism belongs to the KGB's sphere. We have not dealt with it. But you are right: Being an Interpol member, we will actively deal with this problem. As far as my ministry is concerned, we have had no information about international terrorists having been lodged in the Soviet Union—at least not during the period of time I have been a minister. I do not know anything about it.

[Schmidt-Haeuer] Mr. Minister, you are one of the busiest and most harassed men in the present crisis. Previously, you were a party chief in Kemerovo, the capital of the Siberian Kuzbas coal center. What made you go to Moscow? What qualifications did you bring? What new things did you learn?

[Bakatin] Until 1973, I worked as a civil engineer. Since then I have been a party official, as we would say now. I held various party positions. I always tried to work honestly and responsibly. At the level I had reached, I followed a rule for party officials: When I was sent to the Kirov region I went there. The same holds true for Kemerovo. When I was told that they needed me here I came here, even though I never expected it. Nor did I have any experience. I was only told that what they needed was a politician and not a policeman. So I agreed.

In the beginning, it seemed to me that everything was very easy. The longer I work here the more I am aware what difficult problems both inside and outside the system must be resolved. If we still had the former state of affairs, when there were no ethnic conflicts, no political extremism, and no decay of the economy, it would be relatively easy to combat crime. However, now the militia has many additional problems. Our society is

being restructured, we are creating the rule of law, and our authorities are playing an important role. That is interesting and complicated work. Without relaxing our efforts in the struggle against crime, we must also change our system. I cannot boast of any great successes. However, I am depressed if people say that the militia is to blame for the increasing crime rate. That is childish talk.

Monument to Victims of Totalitarianism Unveiled

LD3010210290 Moscow TASS in English 1858 GMT 30 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Adnrey Panov and Ruben Shirinyan]

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—A monument to victims of Soviet totalitarianism was unveiled here today.

Thousands of people walked along Moscow streets in silence to a square near the notorius Lubiyanka Prison. A crude stone brought to Moscow from the Solovetskiy Islands in the White Sea, the site of one of the first large concentration camps, was placed near the building that has become a symbol of totalitarianism—the KGB headquarters on Dzerzhinskiy Square. The monument was set up on the initiative of the Memorial Historical and Enlightening Society.

Old people who survived the horrors of Stalinist torture chambers took part in the demonstration together with people of various ages and nationalities. Dozens of names of those who perished were heard from loudspeakers. There were literally millions of them.

The opening ceremony was held today as 16 years ago political prisoners from several camps marked the day with a hunger strike. Since then, the day of political prisoners has been celebrated every year.

Mournful music was heard in the square. Former political prisoners, prominent public figures, Union and Russian parliamentarians addressed the meeting. They said the monument should remind people of the black pages of Soviet history, which should never be repeated.

The monument was sanctified in accordance with the Christian tradition. Thousands of candles were lit as dusk fell and a church choir began to sing.

Group Gathers To Remember Victims

LD3010234390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 30 October carries on the "Vremya" newscast a three-minute report on the remembrance of the victims of Soviet totalitarianism in Moscow.

Correspondent K. Kharaidze conducts a video report from Dzerzhinskaya Square, Moscow, where a monument to the victims of Stalin's repressions has been erected. She says in an interview with one of the participants: "There is a rumor going around Moscow that the people are assembling in order to smash the KGB." But the unidentified participant tells her that people have come only in remembrance of the victims. Kharaidze says: "Participating in today's action are KGB officials, members of whose families suffered repression." She interviews M.S. Karapetyan, a KGB official. She asks him: "Are your colleagues taking part as private individuals or is there an official KGB delegation?" He replies "There are both private individuals and a delegation. Flowers will be laid, a basket of flowers." Kharaidze asks: "From the KGB?" Karapetyan answers: "Yes".

The monument is shown being unveiled. Kharaidze then interviews Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, who says: "I would call it genocide against the people and against the party; genocide which was headed by the leaders, and I consider it essential to mark it by such a symbol, perhaps even by something more, so that the past should never be repeated. I fully understand everything that has happened here and I have the same sympathy because I am a citizen of my country and its history is my history."

Weekly Publishes KGB Informant's Story

91UF0094A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 43, 24 Oct 90 p 13

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA columnist Igor Gamayunov: "Former KGB Agent: 'I Gave Information About Events, Very Rarely About People...'"]

[Text] "I was a KGB informant," declared Grigoriy Akhtyrko, a deputy of the Saratov Oblast Soviet.

His voice, amplified by a megaphone, could be heard not far from the huge statue of Lenin overlooking the central square, which, very likely, had not heard the likes of this in the last seven decades. He spoke about five minutes. Afterwards, he tossed some kind of leaflets into the crowd, but the wind carried them back, and they dropped at his feet. Someone bent over to pick them up. Someone went up to the deputy who was coming down. He was deathly pale. But the rally, which became frozen, was silent.

He is young, 31 years old. Tall, thin. He came to the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editorial office when a galley proof was lying on my desk about public prosecutor surveillance of the KGB. I learned from Saratov friends that he is a well-known radio journalist in Saratov Oblast. He became a deputy in June. And within a month he stunned everybody with his admission.

I had not planned to hear his confession. I asked him about something else—what the outcome was of the May 1 beating of deputies by militia cadets (and this did happen in Saratov). He talked about it easily, with energy, and, it is true, somewhat nervously.

He was getting ready to leave, but he dallied, looking at the galley proof. Nodding in its direction, he asked if I was seriously interested in the subject of surveillance of

the KGB. Then, still hesitating, he unfolded a newspaper of the Saratov informals on the desk that had the title on the first page "How I Was Recruited Into the KGB." I asked him to talk about it in greater detail.

"This happened in April of 1986. I was only 27 then. I am in my office. There is a telephone call—the clerk in the personnel department asks that I come by. I go up a floor, and I enter. She introduces a man to me who is about 40 years old—he called himself Vladimir Ivanovich—and she leaves. And when we were alone..."

...When they were alone, the host locked the door carefully with a key, came up to him and showed him the ID card of a KGB major. He was athletic looking and pleasantly polite, but at the same time he was firm. At first, he was complimentary—about the keen reporting and ability to talk to people. Then he began to tell him about his biography. Vladimir Ivanovich knew everything about Grigoriy Akhtyrko—about where Grigoriy studied and how once his participation in a student "spree" ended up in a fracas with the militia. And also about two—this time family—episodes. There is a somewhat creepy feeling: As if the person had the ability to see through the years and through walls.

No, he did not blackmail—it would be awkward, an everyday compromise would be too insignificant. Vladimir Ivanovich said only that his help was necessary. What kind? Inform on friends and colleagues? No, it is a question of serious information. He, Akhtyrko, travels a lot. In defense installation areas. Western journalists and other suspicious people are frequently near them. It is necessary to report on them—in defense, any small detail is needed. And more: Changes have started in the country. Not everyone looks at them favorably: The local bureaucracy is sabotaging them, cleverly inciting the leftists to extreme attacks. It would be good to know about such incidents beforehand. Vladimir Ivanovich emphasized: We, in our organization, are leftists by conviction, and we are for changes, but without tensions and bloody conflicts.

"...It is not that I would believe this completely," recalls Akhtyrko. "I accepted his concept as a working hypothesis: But, what if it is so? Moreover, I was euphoric after the 27th congress: It has started! And I even decided to join the party. And I joined—later. But I will not lie. The main reason for my "yes" was something else. I was frightened. I had a feeling that I was entirely in the power of this person. The fear is unaccountable. I wanted somehow to lessen it. And I agreed.

"Why were you specifically selected?"

"Why do you think it was only I who was selected?... Later, I learned that two of my coworkers also are seksot's; that is, secret collaborators. But I do not know how many! Indeed, I am confident you have them on your editorial staff. That is the kind of a system it is."

"Were you paid?"

"They tried to pay me, but I refused."

...The first request was to go to "Nth" city. A military installation near it was supposed to be dismantled, and general information was needed on the attitudes and behavior of the people. He went. At "zero" hour, he saw: The city folk, after pouring out onto the streets, watch how, on the steppe horizon, an obsolete design ballistic missile, without a warhead, rises slowly from a special silo, trailing a fiery plume, and afterwards disappears into the stratospheric heights in order, after falling into the predesignated quadrant, to die in the ocean depths. On his return, he called up. A meeting was arranged for 1230 in the hotel "Volga." He went up to the second floor, and he walked as advised "with a stone face" into the indicated room number, noticing on the way: Both the hall porter and floor orderly glanced at him as if through glass.

The door to the room was left ajar. It was locked immediately after he entered. He was queried in detail. He recounted, not understanding: Why?... Thousands of people knew about "zero" hour, and millions see the same thing on TV screens when something valuable is launched into outer space again. What happened in "Nth" city certainly was already submitted in professional reports. In the end, he understand: He was being coached. They put him behind a table and, under dictation, he wrote the first line of the report: "Source reports that in Nth city on such and such a date...." There was a hitch with the signature—a pseudonym was needed. He did not want to sign with just any name. He recalled a classmate—he was in love with her. She is now married. She no longer needs her maiden name. This is how an agent romantic with the alias of Litovchenko showed up in the Saratov state security system. In his conception, the pseudonym should be a talisman against dark passions that overcome those who lead a double life.

"I usually gave information about events. Very rarely about people, and never about friends—this was my condition."

"About what kind of people specifically?"

"About those who, in the opinion of my guardians, could be a 'potential enemy.' They prompted me on 'how to make contact.' They call me up, let us assume at work, there are people in the room, and I yell: 'Hello. Dryunya!' My regular guardian, Senior Lieutenant Rososhanskiy, was called Andrey, we were the same age, and we addressed each other with the 'informal you,' telephone 24-05-77. Then, the conversation went like this. 'Listen, do you have a bottle?... Good, because I did not take one. But I will be able to only after work, at 1830. There is enough for a couple of rounds....' What we are talking about is poker, which I played as a student, which everyone knows. This is the prelude. And then the information follows, let us assume, this kind. 'Well, you know, I saw this... But you remember, he studied in the same class... A bad situation... He and his wife are not getting on for some reason....'"

"But, what does this mean?"

"That the 'object of attention' does not show himself at all. We meet, of course, not after work, but at 1230. In a place there in the hotel. Or at a secret address."

...He understood quickly: They do not need his journeys to defense installations, it is all only preparation. For what? After coming to a meeting, he drew word pictures for a solid hour of those people he met on an official trip. Why? But the interlocutor (this time they "turned him over" to Major Sergey Kornilov—telephone 91-22-43) did not let him go—new questions were coming up: How are your Afgantsy [Afghan war veterans] there?... Akhtyrko, after reporting on the "Afghantsy Assistance Union"—such a movement emerged in Saratov, and he continued to visit their club. Also, afterwards his guardians casually became interested in informals with whom Akhtyrko came into contact as a result of his journalistic work and sociable nature. There already were well-known leaders among the informals, and at the next meeting it was proposed to Grigoriy that he give a "psychological portrait" of one of them, complimenting him beforehand: "You will manage it very well."

They did not notice that he, catching the direction of their interest, was diverting their imaginations from real "psychological portraits" and situations. He was pulling the wool over their eyes.

"Now I understood precisely what they wanted to make out of me. But because of my innate stubbornness and also a reporter's flippancy, I decided: I will be a 'mole.' I will pretend that I am 'learning,' but I myself will gather material."

At first, it seemed that it was not difficult to be "in the picture": The main thing at the meetings was to tell a lot of jokes and to rail against Jews—my interlocutors liked this very much—and at the same time, with the ingenuousness of a pioneer, to try to induce extreme left views in the consciences of the interlocutors. But what happened in the CPOK (Soviet of Representatives of Public Committees), and afterwards in the KSK (Club Seminar of Candidates for Deputy) and at city meetings, now fascinated him no longer as reporter. He became a personage there. He sensed that it was there, in community with others like him, "beginning politicians," that he began to acquire a real self, working out in himself methods of open struggle for a life that is worthy of man. And the meetings with the guardians began to depress him.

In addition, he succeeded—to the extent possible—to teach them. All of them—as he understood it—were successful people: apartments, special polyclinics, and provision of food. They do not know the word "get," but they simply go and "take," because all doors open up before them. When one of his guardians said in passing to another one that he "took" a new furniture suite, the other one, finding out exactly what kind, brightened up: He will also have "to take." Although Akhtyrko knew that not one furniture store had had any furniture like that for a long time. What Major Vladimir Ivanovich told him on the day of recruitment—about the antibureaucratic attitudes in their midst—could not be mentioned now without a grin: Akhtyrko knew now that the Saratov system of state security became fused long ago with the party and soviet apparatus, including with bonds of blood. His illusions about the renewal of the party also crumbled into dust.

Now, this is graphically demonstrated by K. Murenin, first secretary of the Saratov Oblast party committee. After becoming the chairman of the oblast soviet, he did not even try to change the office—he is sitting there in the oblast party committee behind a strong militia cordon. As far as possible from the people! Despite the decision of the Russian parliament about the impossibility of combining these two positions. Despite the protests of the Saratov residents.

"I started to avoid meetings with the guardians. But my former 'second life' was depressing me and impeding me. I already had become a candidate for deputy, I took part in the preelection campaign, and I saw how people were counting on me. They needed a battering ram against the partocracy. They responded animatedly to my main messages: about the rotation of managerial cadres in all structures and about the elimination of the monopolistic authority of one party."

...And he decided to confess publicly. To tell everyone what happened to him and how it happened. But the main thing was to proclaim his thoughts about the KGB. About what a danger for the country this organization, in his opinion, harbors for the country. Especially now at a time that is critical for us.

But first he left the party. Afterwards, he won in the elections, beating his six rivals by a lot. Later, gathering the leaders of the informal groups around his friend Sergey Ryzhenkov, he told them the story of his recruitment. And sensing that it was not possible to put everything off any longer, several days later he stunned the rally on Saratov's central square with the admission.

"The system of introducing 'secret collaborators' in public movements destroys individuality...," says Akhtyrko. "No, they did not inculcate me, but even this brief experience of a double life had an effect on me: I became suspicious and overly harsh. But the main thing lies elsewhere. I understood: The present system of state security guarantees the security only of the partocrats who do not intend to restructure our life."

"What follows from this?..."

"It is necessary to restructure the KGB by a presidential ukase. To separate the function of military intelligence, which, incidentally, is engaged in as it is by the GRU—the Main Intelligence Directorate under the General Staff. Why the duplication? Remove the Border Troops from under the KGB, which are not so much defending our borders from enemies, as from those who would like to get out. Cut the staff of the KGB in half and subordinate it not to the partocracy, but to the law. And, finally,

the main thing is: To eliminate the institution of "seksot's" who are corrupting people through money and secret power. Because, in my opinion, the most immoral power is the power of fear....

The Courage of Confession

I appeal to other secret agents—past and present—to continue the confession. I am writing this word specially with a capital letter: For decade after decade, the system of general informing has had too strong an effect on the course of our life, striking both those who became the victims of informants and those who by force of circumstance became secret agents either for pay or under the pressure of circumstances on a voluntary or forced basis.

I know, I know who will object to this and how! But if it is for the good of the cause? And if it is for the security of the country? And if... And so forth.

But I am convinced that, with hand over the heart, everyone of the secret agents can distinguish what is foul and what is moral, and what is useful and what is damaging.

Therefore, I appeal to you, to those who want to remove this stone from the soul, but who cannot: To say—it means to guard the future against a repetition of yesterday's and today's mistakes. Put the word "Confession" on the envelope.

[Signed] Yuriy Shchekochikhin, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA columnist

Comparison of Ryzhkov 24 Oct Trade Union Speech

PM2510154590

Moscow TRUD in Russian on 25 October 1990 carries on page 5 a report on USSR Council of Minister Chairman N.I. Ryzhkov's speech to the 19th USSR trade union congress. The TRUD item, entitled "For Joint Constructive Work: Speech by N.I. Ryzhkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers," has been compared with the translation of the Moscow Domestic Russian version published on pages 44-48 of the 25 October Soviet Union DAILY REPORT under the headline "Ryzhkov Addresses Congress" revealing the following variations:

Page 44, column one, last paragraph, last sentence TRUD reads: ...see that this has made it.... (omitting phrase)

Page 45, column one, penultimate paragraph, sentence one, TRUD reads: ...those who are "not yet" or "no longer" capable of working.... (supplying double quotation marks)

Same page, column two, paragraph five, sentence two, TRUD reads: ...to permit dismissals, including when the.... (omitting "in several")

Same paragraph, sentence four, TRUD reads: ...since there are millions of vacancies in the country. A fuller utilization of the existing production potential would permit production.... (retranslating)

Same column, paragraph eight, only sentence, TRUD reads: ...the social programs.

It is also.... (omitting phrase, picking up paragraph nine)

Page 46, column one, third complete paragraph, sentence four, TRUD reads: ...undertake this now, inflation will be.... (omitting phrase)

Same page, column two, paragraph one, sentence one, TRUD reads: ...to combat inflation, N.I. Ryzhkov stressed.

Protection of citizens'.... (adding "N.I. Ryzhkov stressed," omitting passage, picking up sentence six)

Same paragraph, last sentence, TRUD reads: ...indexing of incomes.

N.I. Ryzhkov then dwelt on questions of normalizing the population's food supply and developing the agro-industrial complex.

Comrade delegates: A... (picking up page 47, column one, second complete paragraph, sentence one, retranslating, omitting passage)

Page 47, column one, last paragraph, sentence one, TRUD reads: ...is vitally necessary. Taking into account the results of the work of individual congresses of trade unions, your congress, and meetings at the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, we must jointly discuss in the very near future possible additional proposals on this law and submit them to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

This is especially important because we are switching to market relations. The positions of the government and the trade unions are different. Forms of ownership are changing, freedom for all forms of economic management are opening up, and a new entity—the entrepreneur—is appearing. This is a new and real force in society. He is becoming a fully-fledged social partner. Both organs of state management and trade unions must form relations with him correctly.

The benefit will only come when neither the state, nor entrepreneurs, nor trade unions try to impose their will on others or dictate to them. That will be the true cooperation and real social partnership without which a market economy is impossible. It seems that everyone is beginning to understand this.

The question of concluding a general agreement between the government and a trade union center for the country was raised in the draft law, at the meeting between trade union leaders and government members, and at the congress. We support this. But it must be very thoroughly worked out. This must be a document in which each side assumes commitments and responsibility. I think that the agreement should emphasize joint actions

to implement social programs and elaborate draft legislative acts to protect working people's professional interests and improve and remedy their working conditions.

I would like to say a few words on that score. The trade unions' role in resolving these questions must increase now more than ever before. Look at what is happening. No sooner had enterprises received freedom to dispose of their resources than investments in improving working conditions fell by an average of 20 percent in the past two years and even by 40 percent at some enterprises. Industrial injuries and occupational illness have increased significantly. Labor protection inspectorates have failed to take a firm stand against these processes. Furthermore, trade union organizations often help the administration to buy off workers by introducing various supplements for working conditions and so forth.

We have a host of examples in which money intended for the solution of social programs is spent elsewhere. Including the upkeep of an inordinately large management apparatus, the acquisition of expensive vehicles, and other expenditure which could be avoided completely while the most serious social problems are making themselves apparent.

And finally, before ending my speech, I want to dwell on another most fundamental question.

There are very many anxieties and concerns about the nonmarket sector of the economy—culture, health care, education, and fundamental science. We share that concern. On no account must we overlook these spheres. They are society's present and future. The material pragmatism characteristic of the market must not influence the intellectual and physical well-being of the peoples of our great country. The government is finalizing the preparation of special decisions on social protection and the support of those sectors in conditions of the market economy.

Comrades!

In conclusion I would like to return to what I said at the very beginning: Your congress is a reflection, perhaps even an intensified reflection of the life of the state.

Of course, we.... (picking up page 48, column one, paragraph four, sentence two, supplying alternative passage)

Economic

Food Rationing in Moscow Said Possible

LD3010191490 Moscow World Service in English 0810 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Interview with Moscow City Council Deputy Irina Bugasova by reporter Nikolay Gorshkov; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] Moscow is gearing up for a difficult winter, both in terms of heating problems and food shortages. Muscovites were recently issued with special shopping ID cards to prevent some two million daily visitors to the city from emptying food shelves. But that does not appear to help, since the shelves have been pretty bare for quite some time now. Sugar has been rationed through monthly coupons for a year now, only to be joined recently by cigarettes, and according to Irina Bugasova, a deputy of the Moscow City Council, this fate will befall all other foodstuffs.

[Begin recording] [Bugasova] I think that all general food items, or maybe almost all, will be sold by those coupons, because it will provide prices on the government level. But we shall have such shops where you can buy the same food or other kinds of food by market, with market prices, and without any coupons. But the market prices, I think, are impossible for those retired people, for students, for those who have many children. [passage omitted]

[Gorshkov] And when do you expect those coupons to appear? How far are we from the day when we have to buy with (?central) coupons?

[Bugasova] I think that we need them today, but we can not organize all this system in a few days, so in Novemeber I think we will have a decision at the Moscow City Council session about these coupons, and the presidium of the council adopted such a decision already. And I think that maybe from 1 January we shall have such coupons. [passage omitted]

[Gorshkov] Well, okay, but issuing coupons is a sort of a crisis reaction; some other things must be done to increase the supply.

[Bugasova] No, this is not, this is not only the crisis reaction. You see, this is the way to the market relations. This is the only way to market relations for us in the conditions when we have millions of people who live, who live with very low incomes, with low living standards. So even if we had no crisis, we were to have such coupons to protect those people with low income. [end recording]

Banker Views Gorbachev Decrees' Effects

PM3010160190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Oct 90 Union Edition p 1

["Fact and Commentary" article by L. Nevzlin, member of the "Menatep" Interbank Association Board of Directors: "A Favorable Outlook: Falling Dollar, Rising Ruble"]

[Text] **This is how L. Nevzlin, member of the "Menatep" Interbank Association Board of Directors, perceives the economic consequences of the USSR presidential decrees "On Foreign Investments in the USSR," "On the Introduction of a Commercial Rate for the Ruble's Exchange Into Foreign Currencies and on Measures to Create an All-Union Foreign Currency Market," and "On**

Increasing Citizens' Interest in Keeping Their Savings in USSR Savings Bank Institutions," published by IZVESTIYA yesterday.

The three presidential decrees do not have the same economic importance. The more important ones are the two foreign economic decrees, constituting a single package of measures to stimulate the Soviet economy's integration in the world economy. At long last, restrictions on the development of a domestic foreign currency market are being lifted, a market without which the transition to a convertible ruble would have been impossible and unrealistic. Enterprises working exclusively for the domestic market and Soviet consumers are now being given an opportunity to purchase components and raw materials abroad. On the other hand, those who specialize in exports will be able to easily acquire rubles to pay for their workers' services. This "natural" specialization of enterprises guarantees the growing efficiency of our economy as a whole.

At the same time, foreign investors are being given practical opportunities to repatriate profits earned on USSR territory, which will provide a most powerful incentive for the West's private business to invest its money in our development: To create joint enterprises, to open its own production units, or simply to trade in its goods for rubles.

It is very important that all these opportunities are offered by a presidential decree rather than a USSR Council of Ministers resolution. Foreign investors (and Soviet investors alike) perceive the president's signature as guaranteeing the reliability of the line that has been taken. The attraction of foreign investments will make all of us richer because, if for no other reason, the value of the property we own—land and other real estate—will increase. There will be growing real (foreign currency!) demand for the rubles lying in our citizens' pockets or kept in enterprises' accounts, which we have—with perfect justification—dubbed dead money. This means that the ruble's purchasing power will be boosted. The freedom given to all enterprises and organizations to buy and sell foreign currency will relieve them of the need to seek roundabout alternatives or resort to outright dishonesty. There will be a corresponding curtailment of the opportunities available to shadow economy dealers to play on the buyers' and sellers' margins and this will, furthermore, reduce the price of dollars and increase the exchange rate for the ruble. And if this process is not affected by any inflationary measures taken by the Union government, if we manage to at least maintain money supply at its present volume, the ruble's market value in relation to the dollar will be raised from the present 1:20 to 1:8 already by the end of this year when, according to the decree, operations on the domestic foreign currency market will be permitted.

I would even be so bold as to assume that if the ruble's rate of exchange fails to rise to 1:8, the shortfall will be equivalent to the proportion represented by any additional emission of money.

The ruble's market exchange rate will be least affected by the increase in its official commercial exchange rate. This measure is certainly progressive, but it is geared more to the long term than to real incentives for the holders of foreign currency assets. This measure will have no serious effect on the situation in the foreign currency market for the time being. But no serious objections can be raised to it, either. Any sharper change in the exchange rate could have a painful effect on settlements with CEMA countries, which still remain our main trade partners. And it is beyond all doubt that it would affect the interests of holders of overdrawn [nebalansovyy] foreign currency accounts with the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity.

Let me reiterate that the economic importance of these two presidential decrees is really great. The economy's perestroyka should have begun with them back in the past. But it would have been unnatural if the drafters of the decrees had not added their traditional dose of water to dilute the honey in the pot. This is probably the only reason why the presidential decree "On Foreign Investments in the USSR" did not become a normative act with direct effect. "Enterprises funded by foreign investment can be created in any of the forms envisaged by the legislation of the USSR and of Union and autonomous republics," the decree says, but no such forms actually exist. Nobody knows when they will appear in the republics and what form they will take. One cannot rule out the probability that they will make the investment climate worse than even the one currently prevailing in the USSR. Of course, it would be better if all necessary clarifications and procedures were contained in the decree itself, or were at least published simultaneously with it.

The decrees also bypass the foreign investors' right to open ruble accounts with Soviet banks, which is an important feature of the investment climate. Major corporations will find it easy to overcome this problem by setting up enterprises or organizations enjoying the rights of legal persons on USSR territory. But it is rather disadvantageous for small or medium business to exist as a legal entity in the USSR. And yet, from the viewpoint of strategic interests, small or medium business is our main ally as regards modernizing the economy and attracting foreign currency investment. As for big business, it will blackmail its Soviet partners for a long time to come with its "mandatory conditions" and, taking advantage of our weakness, will gain undeserved privileges. Such diktat is beyond the capabilities of small and medium enterprises. This is why ruble accounts for them are one of the components of the most favored regime.

Against the background of these two presidential decrees, the decree "On Increasing Citizens' Interest in Keeping Their Savings in USSR Savings Bank Institutions" appears inert and somewhat conservative. Leaving aside its political element (and it seems to me capable of provoking a recurrence of the "banks' war" since Estonia and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated

Socialist Republic] have, as it is well known, nationalized the USSR Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development branches on their territory) and concentrating on the economic aspect, economic ideas which are correct in principle are being technologically implemented with inadequate consistency.

Thus, the actual idea of increasing interest rates is no doubt a market idea. After all, the USSR Savings Bank holds the bulk of the country's money resources, and once interest rates in the USSR Savings Bank rise, the interest payable on loans will also leap. Credit will become more expensive and, given the same volume of money supply, the credit finance of programs and projects will be more efficient than before. But the increase itself is of a purely administrative rather than a market nature. It has been prescribed that such-and-such rates will come into force as of 1 November—and that is all, regardless of what the real value of money will be on 1 November.

These measures could be given a market flexibility by introducing a "bracket" of percentages within which the rate could float freely depending on the situation in the money market.

The decree retains the USSR Savings Bank's status as a state bank and affirms that citizens' deposits are guaranteed by the state. This is acceptable: All market economies recognize the existence of state guarantees as an effective means for stabilization. It is, however, difficult to accept that the USSR Savings Bank retains a **monopoly** dominance in the market for citizens' money deposits. The population will thus be unable to enjoy the advantages of the competitive market mechanism used by banks in the struggle for their money. And the monopolist—the USSR Savings Bank—is, in its own turn, being deprived of incentives to introduce progressive bank service technologies—checks, credit cards, and other forms of noncash payments which are more convenient and advantageous for citizens than conventional paper money.

This is why, in my view, it would be sensible to add to this decree one more paragraph to allow **all banks**, instead of just the USSR Savings Bank, to attract the population's money resources but without state guarantees.

One must be pessimistic about the chances of using the new interest rates to attract additional money resources from the population. This section of the decree will not come into effect from the moment it is signed. With annual inflation of at least 18 percent, not a single sensible person will deposit his money for five years to get seven or nine percent annual interest. In order to divert citizens' money from the consumer market, the interest rates on long-term deposits should be at least comparable with the rate of inflation. In my view, today's threshold rate of interest which will make citizens strive to realize their commodity resources so as to invest the money in the bank is approximately 20 percent per annum.

Gorbachev Adviser Interviewed on Market Transition

AU3010143390 Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German 24 Oct 90 p 3

[Interview with Gorbachev adviser Vyacheslav Dashichev by Peter Stebner; place and date not given: "Radical Measures in Transition to Market Economy"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Professor Dashichev is one of the leading Soviet political scientists. At the same time he is also an adviser of President Gorbachev, particularly on issues concerning Soviet policy on Germany. Relatively early, he pointed out to the Soviet Government the emerging changes in the former GDR and was confronted with angry attacks from the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, particularly in 1988, when he advocated the thesis that the German question is still open.

[Stebner] How do you assess the current economic situation in the Soviet Union? Why is the crisis being exacerbated despite increased reform efforts by the country's leadership?

[Dashichev] I think the main reason is that the introduction of the market economy was delayed time and again in the past few years. This entailed tangible negative consequences on supplying the population. The old command system no longer works properly, and the introduction of market mechanisms has repeatedly been impeded by the power apparatus, such as in the case of freedom of trade. Even the cooperatives were discriminated against. At the same time there is a lack of competition in the Soviet market. Enterprises have often exploited this situation and made speculative profits, which embittered the population. The party and state apparatus did nothing to stop this but even promoted and encouraged this development to stir fears and panic among the population. Under the slogan "fight against the shadow economy," the apparatus even launched a campaign against market economy. If we want to change something, we should not modify the existing system but replace the old system by another one.

[Stebner] Is Gorbachev's "500 Days Program," which has been adopted, a guarantee that market economy will now finally be introduced?

[Dashichev] Yes, I think so. The new program will primarily guarantee freedom of trade in our country. Vigorous and radical measures are required when introducing the market economy. Otherwise, the Soviet Union will plunge into a chaos in the near future. Particularly since 1987 no serious efforts have been made to introduce market economy. Valuable time has been wasted.

[Stebner] How do you assess the transition toward market economy in the former GDR? As a Soviet scientist, do you see any experiences in East Germany on which the Soviet Union can build?

[Dashichev] The situation in the former GDR is different from the situation in the Soviet Union. Forty years of command economy did not change the minds of the people completely. The Soviet system, which has existed much longer and which was characterized by numerous experiments that failed, made people incapable of working conscientiously and of assuming responsibility. The faith and the trust in the leadership are gone. This has had an extraordinarily negative impact on people's motivation to work and to increase labor productivity.

In the GDR it will be much easier to motivate people again who were discouraged. East Germany's economy can rely on the FRG with its hard currency and its long-time experience with a well-working market economy. This will also lead to the solution of problems that still exist in East Germany, such as a high unemployment rate, over the medium term. I believe that things will normalize within three to five years, and that the gap in the living standards in East and West Germany will gradually be overcome.

I am firmly convinced that the East German economy will soon undergo an upswing. The needs that were not fulfilled during the past years will stimulate economic growth.

[Stebner] What can the united Germany and the West do to support the Soviet Union in a difficult period?

[Dashichev] We need help and support, but not on the same basis as in the seventies. We do not need loans so much as know-how in the form of direct investments. Guarantees and legal bases for Western investors must be created in the Soviet Union. Currently there are still too many impediments for foreign capital. However, there is the danger that foreign loans may stabilize the old system. For this reason, aid must be coupled with the call for the vigorous introduction of a market economy. If possible, such aid should not be given to ministries and state authorities but directly to interested enterprises.

However, a solution to all these problems must be found within our country and primarily by our own people. Foreign aid should accompany this process. Conditions must be created in our country that make efficient help possible. Currently they do not exist. If the required conditions are established, the situation of people in the USSR might improve tangibly in about two to three years' time with foreign help.

Ministries, Industries 'Temporizing' Agreements

914A0036B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 17 Oct 90 p 2

[Article from the Department of New Management Methods: "'The Country's National Economy is Threatened'"]

[Text] *Fifty leaders of heavy industry enterprises confirmed that the country's national economy is threatened and appealed to the newspaper for help.*

We recall that the leaders of the commercial services of enterprises of the Ministry of Heavy Machinery took a desperate step. They were compelled to make a public appeal directly to the government through RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA (letter entitled "Flat Refusal," 18 July): If the enterprises are not helped immediately, the sector will in fact come to a halt. Suppliers are repudiating their contractual obligations, and no one is able to force them to follow through. The editorial boards of the central newspapers are not the only ones receiving such appeals, letters, telegrams, and phone calls; many have gone to the most varied government organizations and to the president personally. One response to them was the presidential edict on stabilization of economic ties.

Edicts are fine, but it is also perfectly clear that there must be a mechanism for implementing them: That is, those same governmental organizations—the ministries and departments under the jurisdiction of the USSR Council of Ministers—are obligated to join the effort.

L. Selivanov, deputy minister of heavy machine building, sent a response to the editorial board for publication; however, his response does not evoke optimism. Instead of constructive proposals to improve work and search for a way out of the existing crisis, L. Selivanov limits himself to stating the difficulties of the transitional period: "Considering that few months are left before a new planning period starts, the enterprises of the sector are right to express alarm about providing a production plan for 1991. Given the various positions taken by the Union government and the governments of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and other republics on the question of the transition of the national economy to operations under a market economy, the ENTERPRISES OF ALL MINISTRIES, INCLUDING THE USSR MINISTRY OF HEAVY MACHINERY, acting in the role of suppliers, are temporizing and are not concluding agreements with consumers...." And that is it. Some are temporizing, and in response others are not hurrying to take obligations on themselves either.

The response of L. Selivanov speaks for itself. It is as though it was written by an indifferent clerk, not a state official.

Gas Pipelines 'Potential Source of Danger'

914E0004A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Oct 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA special correspondents A. Usoltsev and S. Shkayev: "Where Will a Gas Pipeline Blow Up?"]

[Text] This tragedy will forever remain a bleeding wound in the hearts of thousands of people. A terrifying explosion on a product pipeline in the vicinity of the main railway line Chelyabinsk-Ufa which roared in the dead of night on 4 June 1989 claimed the lives of hundreds of passengers on two trains that collided here. For many citizens of Chelyabinsk the tragedy is particularly horrifying because their school-age children were peacefully asleep in the cars. They were traveling south in order to work in a summer labor camp and renew their energy before a new school year, but fate decided otherwise.

Heat treater foreman of the Chelyabinsk tractor plant S. Abdulin is trying awkwardly to keep his hands from trembling: "Indeed, our fate turned out to be harsh. The disaster shattered and burned the lives of many families. Previously, I had two girls, and now I am left with one... However, is fate the only issue? Did some force from the other world really preordain the course of events? Were there no specific culprits in the emergency at the section track? Can the case itself not be called a crime?"

It is difficult to talk to a father afflicted with the horrible grief of losing a child. However, we cannot fail to agree with his words either. Indeed, every catastrophe in the string which has recently befallen us has had specific causes and culprits. Moreover, some of the emergencies were predicted, in essence prognosticated, by people in the know. All that had to be done was to listen to their views and take the necessary measures. This was not to be! The ministries that had usurped power were concerned only about their own well-being, and lethal explosions rumbled, claiming human lives throughout the Soviet Union—in Chernobyl, Arzamas, Sverdlovsk, and Bashkiria.

In the opinion of specialists the explosion in question was also bound to roar sooner or later. In this case, its causes were predicted as early as two years ago. To be sure, the time and place remained unknown for some time. At present both are known very precisely in Kurgan Oblast: 7 May 1990, the 1,435th kilometer of the gas pipeline Urengoy-Chelyabinsk-Uzhgorod.

Witnesses told us how this happened. Well after midnight, a fiery whirlwind suddenly appeared over Dolmatovskiye Swamps. It was so powerful that pieces of mangled pipes were strewn over almost half a kilometer. Enormously high temperatures caused metal and stones to melt; haying grounds and forests were on fire. Within mere seconds the explosion opened up a trench 280 meters long. Within just three hours this hellish fire-chamber devoured 9.5 million cubic meters of methane. In a fortunate turn of events there were no people at the accident site, and there were no victims.

There has never been an accident like this one in Kurgan Oblast. This is why an expert commission is conducting a thorough investigation. It is apportioning the blame between the plant manufacturing the pipes, and construction and operations personnel. A complicated notion is heard in the talk of the experts: "stress-corrosion of metal." Supposedly, it became the root cause of the explosion. However, the trouble is that once again an isolated case is being reviewed which, in our opinion, eclipses the main point. Yet again, it is not just the gas pipeline that detonated but rather our traditional mismanagement and a negligent attitude toward business.

V. Ponomarev, deputy chief of the Kurgan Oblast KGB Administration, said: "The last explosion taught the management of the Uraltransgaz, superior establishments, and the local organs of power nothing. Our employees have for years cautioned them and warned them about the serious accident conditions, all to no avail. We have been unable to overcome the ministries' lethargy with alarming messages, even from an organization such as ours. Every time, after yet another accident, the initiative of Uraltransgaz goes only as far as patching up yet another hole and reporting it to their 'top brass.' They do not go so far as undertaking serious work. I do not want to jinx it, but we may at this point predict the locations of forthcoming, still more dangerous, explosions to within a kilometer. Unless urgent measures are taken the consequences may be even more serious than in Bashkiria."

Employees of the Kurgan Oblast KGB Administration have warned dozens of times that gaseous product pipelines and compressor stations are a mess; accidents, casualties, and losses reaching into the millions are possible. The gas pipeline in Kurgan Oblast, which is about 200 kilometers long, is one big danger zone. Sad statistics are literally glaring. We have driven a great deal through the rayons and talked to specialists. The feeling of many of them is one of fatalistic doom. Really, how can these feelings fail to be enhanced when a pipeline can blow at any moment near the little rivers of Kanash, Mostovka, and Ichkinka and the settlements of Dolmatovo and Shatrovo, where gas compressor stations are operating with grave violations of technological requirements.

At present, the ill-fated gas pipeline reaches out to the railways leading to Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk like a blasting fuse. It has been flooded by... a lake between the 1,383d and 1,384th kilometers. Naturally, the ground is being washed away and subsiding at this location, and the insulation around the pipes is damaged. At Uraltransgaz they are fully aware of it, but they have not lifted a finger to put things in order. Could it be that they still have not drawn conclusions from the tragedy in Bashkiria?

Uraltransgaz Chief Engineer G. Shamruk could have answered this question. However, having found out the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondents' objective in visiting Sverdlovsk, he pleaded busy and turned down a meeting. In principle, we may understand the chief engineer: Actually, what is there to discuss with journalists if the fruits of his labors are visible, as they put it, to the naked eye? For example, how could he comment on the explosion at the 1,435th kilometer? Perhaps, only by summing up losses. Overall losses here came to almost 900,000 rubles; consumers failed to receive 323 million cubic meters of gas.

The infamous product pipeline of the West Siberia-Volga area remains a potential source of danger to the people, though it is temporarily not being used. Familiarization with the history of its construction, opinions of specialists, and statements by expert commissions enable us to arrive at the conclusion that such a monster of scientific-technical progress could have appeared only in the most stagnant times of the administrative command system. Judge for yourselves. The product line laid by 1985 through the territories of Tyumen, Kurgan, and Chelyabinsk Oblasts, Bashkiria, and Tataria was designed to carry the so-called wide fraction of light hydrocarbons to the Minibayevskiy Gas Processing Plant. This is a liquefied mixture of quite a number of other natural gases. Specialists know how dangerous it is. Throughout the entire world there has been no experience yet with pumping the mix through pipes with a diameter of more than 400 millimeters. However, this could hardly check the ambitious ways of our ministerial leaders with their megalomaniac leanings. The government demanded refinery products, and so the Giprotruboprovod Institute designed, and construction crews of the USSR Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises built at an unparalleled pace, a main pipeline with an unparalleled diameter of 720 millimeters. In the process, haste caused them to forget about such "trifles" as teleautomatics systems, automatic control, communications, and electrical and chemical protection. The cause of the tragic accident on the product line in the vicinity of Asha will become very understandable if we also take into account the fact that the pipes were laid with considerable deviations from construction norms and rules, and were physically damaged in many places. It is striking that this terrible accident was also predicted by operators: They knew full well that the dangerous facility was unreliable.

I. Pletukhin, chief of the Chelyabinsk Regional Administration of the Ural-Siberian Main Pipelines, testified: "When we took over the product pipeline in 1987 we checked out its condition and understood that it was unfit for operation. We drew up a reservations protocol, but nobody wanted to even hear us out—they ordered us to have it accepted."

So, just like that: The order was to accept it, and so it was; it began operating. They did not sound the alarm, seek access to the government, party, and soviet organs, and, finally, they did not go to the press either!

For now, the product pipeline is not operational. However, the residents of Ural oblasts and republics through whose territories it runs do not have a guarantee that it will not be used again to transport the explosive mixture. This would be tantamount to lethal mines being planted in many cities and settlements in the immediate vicinity of the pipeline. After all, the employees of the Administration of the Ural-Siberian Main Oil Pipelines determined that "35 inhabited localities, industrial and civilian facilities, seven intercepts with railways, 12 intercepts with highways, and 15 power line intercepts are within the dangerous proximity zone of the product pipeline." The cities of Zlatoust and Sim and the settlement of Kropachevo in the vicinity of Chelyabinsk, which lie below the pipeline running through the nearby mountains, are particularly unfortunate. In the event of an accident, the explosive mix will flow down to the lowlands built up with blocks of residential buildings, schools, and hospitals. One spark will be enough to cause a tragedy....

Elementary logic would suggest that the explosion-prone pipeline needs to have its operations changed or be dismantled altogether. Meanwhile, there are forces that nurture plans to again start up the pumping of the mix through the potentially dangerous main pipeline. Employees of the Giprotruboprovod Institute have already created a draft with an eloquent name "Technical Proposal for Improving the Reliability of the Product Pipeline West Siberia-Ural-Volga Area and Starting It Up." The quota of outlays for repairing the main line has also been determined—274.6 million rubles. This is exactly how much people's money has to go down the drain. Local organs of soviet power categorically object. For example, the Chelyabinsk Oblispolkom [Oblast Executive Committee] has stated its negative attitude toward the plans to start up the main line again. The Kurgan Oblispolkom came up with its own initiative.

V. Davydov, chairman of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the city of Sim, told us:

"We think that the product pipeline may be used to carry natural gas. In this case, the everyday threat to the lives of our fellow citizens will be eliminated. We insist that our opinion be taken into account."

Some people may ask: How is pumping gas better than pumping the liquefied mix? There is a difference, and a substantial one. Gas is lighter than air, and in the event the pipe bursts it evaporates upward rather than accumulating in low places. It is also important that lower pressure is used to transport gas for local needs. Hence the danger of the main line bursting is smaller. However, we are encroaching on a sphere which is not ours. Specialists should decide how to use a sophisticated technical facility, rather than us correspondents.

Military

Presidential Spokesman Defends Novaya Zemlya Test

LD3010152190 Moscow TASS in English 1423 GMT 30 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—The October 24 nuclear test on the Novaya Zemlya test site had been planned in advance, Soviet presidential spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko told a briefing here today.

He said the Soviet Union had not conducted nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site since October 18, 1989, and on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago since December 4, 1988.

"At the same time, the United States, France and China continued nuclear tests, and the Soviet moratorium began to affect the Soviet Union's security," he said.

"The Soviet Union has ever been an advocate of an early and complete ban on nuclear testing and does not intend to give up this policy. But this policy should be supported by other countries."

Asked whether or not President Mikhail Gorbachev knew about the planned nuclear test, Ignatenko said: "It does not matter whether or not someone knew. And I do not know whether or not there was need for a document signed personally by the president. In any case, there has been no decree on this score."

Fall Draft Prospects 'No Better' Than Spring

PM3110150590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 30 Oct 90 p 1

[Report by A. Khokhlov under the "Fall Draft" rubric: "By the Way"]

[Text] How will the fall draft end?

It will be no better than the spring draft, and so far this is the only "objective" forecast. Better than what, though? Draftees sent to serve in the Soviet Army in the spring accounted for 55.5 percent in Latvia, 40.7 percent in Lithuania, 42.1 percent in Estonia, 28 percent in Georgia, and 7.5 percent in Armenia. If the draft continues this way, our army will soon become professional even without any effort by the "democrats"—as soon as only officers and NCO's are left in it....

Rocket Unit Threatens Walkout Over Food Shortage

PM3010154990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Oct 90 p 1

["Own Information" report under general heading: "Hunger Strike Contrary to Regulations, or How Far Hungry Rocket Troops May Go"]

[Text] Servicemen of the Strategic Rocket Forces went hungry for over a week. The military report that the camp in the Urals has run out of foodstuffs. Bread and milk have been the only things to appear, and those only sporadically.

An action group organized something like a strike committee and prepared a draft document presenting an ultimatum to the troops command: Unless the military camp is supplied with food, the rocket troops will leave their posts!

This news shocked the supreme command of the country's Strategic Rocket Forces. Two aircraft full of top brass immediately flew out to the unit's position. The visitors managed to identify all the "ringleaders," but they were unable to supply the camp with sufficient food.

The rocket troops claim that they have been driven to extremes by the commanders' lack of concern and cupidity. Without beating around the bush, the servicemen are asking point-blank: "How far may hungry rocket troops go?"

Senior Officers Criticized on Personnel Cuts

PM3110093990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Oct 90 p 1

[Letter from Lieutenant Colonel G. Belostotskiy under the "Letters From the Army" rubric: "How Should We Paint the Fences To Ensure That the Enemy Does Not Penetrate"]

[Text] "I would like to see the person who devised our table of organization!"

Lieutenant Colonel S. Simonov, commander of an antiaircraft missile regiment, repeated this several times during our conversation—sometimes sorrowfully, sometimes indignantly. It is not combat training that is causing the commander a headache. He does not know how to get through the winter.

The regiment has two boiler houses—one in the military cantonment, one in the living quarters. Antediluvian coal-fired boilers. There are supposed to be 36 stokers on the staff—Soviet Army personnel. But who is going to agree to slog with shovel and crow bar for 120 rubles [R] a month? And where are 36 people to be found in this godforsaken place?

I saw that, apart from officers and ensigns, there were only two enlisted men on duty at the regiment building after dinner, while some people are on guard or on daily detail and others are preparing to take their place. The commander and the chief of staff were making the agonizing decision of which gap they should be sent to plug.

There are more than enough gaps. The hog farm needs immediate repairs, otherwise the animals will not see the winter. The heating system in one barracks has to be completely replaced—last winter the temperature there dropped (or rose?) to plus 12. The living quarters and

offices are in need of maintenance. Vegetables have to be procured. Coal has to be brought in....

But there is something else over and above these concerns. The pamphlet "Recommendations from the Air Defense Forces Commander in Chief for Restoring Military Cantonments to Exemplary Condition" sent down "from above" is looming over the commander like the sword of Damocles. It describes what has to be done, down to the smallest details.

For instance, parkland is to be created out of the fairly extensive territory allocated to the troop unit—that is, all bushes and trees that are no more than saplings have to be cut down. The document provides specific, clear indications that permit no interpretation of what should be enclosed and how, what should be painted and in what color, what should be faced with plastic and to what height, and so on and so forth.

"These recommendations have been elevated to the rank of a highly important order," Lt. Col. Simonov said. "I hinted at formation headquarters that it is impossible to carry them out and was sharply called to account. They said: If you cannot do it, we will send someone who can."

So, ensigns and officers are repairing barracks, re-equipping the guard facility, changing the old fence for a concrete enclosure and thinning out forest day in day out, armed with axes....

The country's antiaircraft defense cannot be said to be in a state of collapse. That is not the case. I am only talking about one unit, a kind of experimental unit. There are others nearby that are relatively normal. There is no question of the regiment not being able to perform its tasks now. But in the future the officers will inevitably lose their skills. As is well known, very costly modern combat hardware will become useless. Then there will be collapse.

What has happened with air defense? Most probably our bureaucratic machine, which can distort any sound idea—as has frequently been the case—has begun operating here. Everything indicates that, showing no concern to ensure that their proposals are scientifically well-founded and failing to predict their immediate and long-term consequences, high-ranking officials have "spread" the overall number of servicemen whose posts are to be cut back around branches of the Armed Forces and, possibly, around categories of troops.

Who will argue that cuts are necessary? But how are cuts to be made?

So what is being authorized is: The "thinning out" of the Air Defense zone. A cut in the number of antiaircraft missile regiments, for instance. And, simultaneously, the creation of all conditions for the remaining units to ensure that people can perform standby alert duty normally, engage in combat training, and rest.

There is also another path that seems quite acceptable at first glance: We could "pull out" a few specialists from each subunit, transferring their duties to those remaining. However, this would mean curtailing combat training in practice, which, as it is, even the best commanders cannot organize as they would like. This would mean the officers, above all, shouldering an excessive burden. After all, even previously many of them used to live effectively away from their family, only spending the night at home.

This is the path that we seem to be taking. Do those people who have been given the right to decide really not know how the troops live? I cannot believe that. They think that the Soviet officer will withstand everything. He will live at his post—that's an order! He will make a park out of a forest, build enclosures, guard his position as a sentry...—that's an order! But there is a limit to human capabilities; there is a line beyond which expediency is seen as an insult. Total indifference and apathy then set in. Reluctance to serve in the Army, a drastic reduction in the quality of combat hardware use, and a decline in discipline are the logical result of this.

...Am I not adding my voice to the choir of people "bad-mouthing" the Army? USSR People's Deputy Marshal of the Soviet Deputy V.G. Kulikov said recently at a sitting of the Committee for Questions of Glasnost and Citizens' Rights and Appeals that they are driving a "wedge between young officers who have only just embarked on the path of military service and the senior category of officers."

No, I do not think that the "bad-mouthers" are the ones driving the wedge but rather the "senior category of officers" themselves or, more accurately, the most senior! At any rate, that is what you conclude on acquaintance with the life of the antiaircraft missile regiment forsaken in the depths of the forest.

More on Establishment of Heroes', Veterans' Club

PM3110135390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by unidentified correspondent under "Direct Line" rubric: "Birth of Heroes' Club"]

[Text] Moscow—Today no one is surprised at the appearance of new political parties and various kinds of social movements. But the birth of a club for Moscow City and Moscow Oblast Heroes of the Soviet Union and holders of the three degrees of the Order of Glory, the founding conference of which took place 24 October, is a phenomenon of a special kind. For the first time people possessed of a high degree of distinction within the USSR and united by selfless service to the motherland, people who can in the full sense of the word be called the creators of our history, of our victories, met in one voluntary social organization.

The founders of the club are the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, the All-Union and Moscow Councils of War and Labor Veterans, the Soviet Committee of War Veterans, the Moscow Military District

Military Council, and the Moscow City and Oblast Military Commissariats. Participants in the founding conference examined the club's draft statutes, which were drawn up in full accordance with the Law "On Public Associations" recently adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The new association's principal task is energetic participation in the activity of the All-Union Organization of Veterans of War, Labor, and the Armed Forces, the Soviet Committee of War Veterans, and other military-patriotic organizations. Club members aim to conduct a resolute battle for truthful media coverage, based on facts and documents, of the Soviet people's heroic past, especially in the years of the Great Patriotic War, and of the contemporary life of the Soviet Armed Forces; to elucidate the sources of our victory in the war with fascism; and to conserve and augment the combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces. Propaganda of the Soviet peoples' friendship in arms in the years of the Great Patriotic War; educating servicemen in examples of steadfast fulfillment of military duty, patriotism, and internationalism; and aiding military commissariats in training youth for military service are important statutory duties of club members.

A speech was made to conference participants by Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, member of the USSR Presidential Council and USSR minister of defense. He stressed that today our country is going through a complex and critical phase in its development. Contradictory and, at times, painful processes are taking place in the military-political sphere also. In these circumstances there is a greater need than ever before for all patriotic forces to display unity, cohesion, endurance, and steadfastness—everything that helped us to withstand and endure all trials and to win through in the years of the Great Patriotic War.

Replying to veterans' questions, the minister of defense expressed confidence that members of the newly formed club would continue to give all their experience, knowledge, and powers to the task of strengthening the country and educating the rising generation in the great examples of the fulfillment of military duty, patriotism, and internationalism.

The leading organs of the new public organization were elected during the conference.

Gorbachev Promotes Mikhailov to Army General

PM3110101990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[Presidential decree issued by President Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow on 24 October]

[Text] The military rank of army general is conferred on Colonel General Vladlen Mikhailovich Mikhailov.

[Signed] President M.S. Gorbachev
Moscow, Kremlin, 24 October 1990

Instructions on Armed Forces' Party Activities

PM2510152590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Oct 90 First Edition pp 1, 2

["Instructions on the Work of CPSU Organizations in the USSR Armed Forces"—KRASNAYA ZVEZDA headline—first two paragraphs published in box]

[Text] **To our readers:**

The following draft instructions were prepared in compliance with the 28th CPSU Congress instructions. The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and the CPSU Central Control Commission Presidium ask Communists and all who are interested in this document to send their remarks and suggestions either directly to the CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Central Control Commission, or to any other party committee.

The present instructions define the main specific features of the work by party organizations in the USSR Armed Forces to fulfill the CPSU Statutes.

CPSU organizations in the Army and Navy are autonomous in their practical activity and perform party work by political methods, taking into account the specific nature of soldiers' and labor collectives and the tasks they resolve.

Party organizations operate within the framework of Soviet laws and other legal acts defining the main activities of the USSR Armed Forces. CPSU organizations and their organs cannot interfere in the work of officials and military command organs.

The All-Army Party Conference is the supreme leadership organ of the USSR Armed Forces' party organization. Party conferences are the leadership organs of party organizations in combined units, formations, [military] districts, groups of forces and fleets, categories of troops, and branches of the USSR Armed Forces. They consider the most important questions of party work, hear accountability reports, and elect executive organs (bureaus, committees) and control organs (control commissions).

I. Basic Guidelines for the Activity of Party Organizations in the Army and Navy

CPSU organizations in the USSR Armed Forces represent and protect the interests of Soviet Army and Navy servicemen, workers, employees, and members of their families who are committed to the socialist choice. Party organizations are concerned with rallying their ranks, building up the numbers of CPSU supporters in soldiers' and labor collectives, and consolidating the Army community's efforts on a healthy basis.

CPSU organizations in the Army and Navy conduct ideo-political work, implement the party's military policy, organize the fulfillment of party decisions in soldiers' and labor collectives and military units' stations, and influence the solution of tasks concerning

military reform, combat readiness and military discipline, and the strengthening of social protection and improvement of material and daily life conditions for Soviet Army and Navy servicemen, workers, employees, and members of their families.

Party organizations give special attention to ensuring Communists' active participation in the propaganda and explanation of the CPSU's positions on questions of the socialist fatherland's defense, the need to perform the soldiers' duty, the maintenance of an atmosphere of friendship and troop comradeship in soldiers' collectives, and the strengthening of interethnic relations. They assist to the utmost the strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces' standing and the enhancement of the prestige of military service.

Party organizations show constant concern for the development of Communists' interest in participation in party work and the strengthening of ties between the broad masses and servicemen, workers, and employees; they periodically brief Communists and nonparty people about their work and the fulfillment of party decisions and of critical remarks and suggestions made about CPSU organizations. They persistently seek ways and means for party influence on cadres policy in the Army and Navy, actively participate in the elaboration and implementation of the state's youth policy, and cooperate with public organizations standing on positions of democracy and social justice.

Party organizations in the Armed Forces actively participate in the struggle for the CPSU's political leadership [liderstvo] in society at elections for soviets of people's deputies and through other forms for the expression of Soviet citizens' will. Jointly with CPSU territorial organizations and organs of Soviet power, they engage in work on the population's patriotic education, the strengthening of the Army's ties with the public, and the training of young people for service in the USSR Armed Forces.

II. Primary Party Organizations

Primary party organizations are set up in regiments, on ships, in individual units, staffs, military scientific establishment faculties, scientific research institutions, and military enterprises and organizations with at least three party members and by a decision made at their meeting. Communists in the services belong to primary party organizations at their place of service.

The general party meeting is the primary party organization's leadership organ. Meetings of delegates may be held if service conditions and the nature of tasks performed by the Communists make it impossible to convene a general meeting of the party organization.

The primary party organization's secretary and bureau:

—organize the fulfillment of decisions made by their organization's meetings and by higher party organs;

—assist subunit party organizations and groups in their work;

—conduct individual work with Communists and show concern for their ideopolitical and moral development; persistently strive to ensure that all party members play an active part in the explanation of CPSU policy, set a personal example, and play a vanguard role in combat and political training, labor, service, sociopolitical life, discipline, and the observance of ethical norms;

—constantly study the opinion of Communists and build their practical activity with due consideration for their interests, needs, and requirements, and ensure political support for Communists and protection of their honor and dignity;

—hear Communists' accountability reports on their performance of regulation duties and party instructions and promptly respond to their critical remarks and suggestions;

—work on the recruitment of Army and Navy servicemen, workers, and employees in the CPSU and on the ideopolitical education of newly admitted party members;

—give Communists elected to Komsomol [Communist Youth League] organs practical assistance in the education of Komsomol members and young people, and ensure the CPSU members' vanguard role in training, service, labor, and discipline. They assist Communists working in other public organizations;

—actively encourage the service promotion of Communists and nonparty people with superior professional, moral, and political qualities and play a part in their certification or secondment for further training.

The primary party organization secretary is tasked with collecting party membership dues from Communists, the responsibility for promptly accounting for and remitting any sums received to party funds, keeping the records of Communists, and maintaining party property in order.

Primary party organizations in battalions, squadrons, companies, batteries, Air Force squadrons, ship command departments, staff and command organ departments, institutions, training [uchebnaya] groups, and other subdivisions with three or more party members can set up shop party organizations and party groups.

III. Party Committees

Party committees are autonomous in their activity and have the right to represent the corresponding party organization in relations with the command and military-political organs, as well as with local party and public organizations and institutions.

During their term of office, party committees create a subordinate working apparatus, maintained from party budget funds and constituted on recommendations from

primary party organizations, which performs mainly information analysis, sociological forecast, and consultation functions. The structure and numerical strength of the working party apparatus is determined by the appropriate party committees. Procedures for ensuring its material backup are coordinated with the command. Party committee plenums are convened as and when necessary.

1. Party Committees in Combined Units and Others with Equal Status

Party committees in combined units, military education establishments, scientific research institutions, the command of [military] districts, fleets, and branches of the Armed Forces, as well as in specialized units, district military construction organizations, oblast, kray, and republic military commissariats, and major military garrisons enjoy the rights of rayon CPSU committees. Following a decision by higher party committees, similar rights may be granted to party committees in city military commissariats and other USSR Ministry of Defense institutions. They directly unite primary party organizations in corresponding military units and are the main structural link of the CPSU in the Armed Forces. The aforementioned party committees are elected by party conference for a five-year term and are accountable to them for their work. The party conference determines the quantitative structure of the party committee and the procedure for electing its secretary and his deputies.

Party committees in combined units and others with equal status keep the records of Communists, register primary party organizations and coordinate their activity, organize jointly with them the work on implementation of party policy and decisions in soldiers' and labor collectives and at servicemen's, workers' and employees' places of residence, submit specific military-political, social, cultural, and other problems for consideration by the public and the military command organs, and assist in their implementation. They render assistance to primary party organizations in ideopolitical work with Communists and the personnel and collaborate directly with the command and military-political organs in solving the tasks of enhancing combat readiness and strengthening military discipline.

Party committees may express their opinion following the service transfer of Communists recommended for awards or promotion. They brief Communists and higher party organizations on the fulfillment of party decisions, and monitor the receipt of membership dues from Communists, the prompt transfer of such sums to party funds, and the proper utilization of party budget funds.

2. Party Committees in Armies, Flotillas, Military Districts, Groups of Forces and Fleets, Branches of the USSR Armed Forces, and Categories of Troops

Party committees in armies, flotillas, military districts and fleets, categories of troops, and branches of the USSR Armed Forces are elected for five-year terms by conferences of the corresponding party organizations. They elect a bureau and set up working organs from among their members to conduct current work. Enjoying the rights of oblast or kray party committees, the aforementioned party committees:

—elaborate recommendations to party organizations for the fulfillment of CPSU congress or conference resolutions and party Central Committee decisions, systematically analyze the state of party work, and submit proposals for its improvement;

—coordinate the work of party organizations and party committees on the most important questions of the implementation of military policy and the life and activity of soldiers' collectives, and organize the party aktiv's training;

—within the framework of democratic procedures, recommend Communists and nonparty people for specific work or public activity and assist their election or appointment;

—conduct certification of full-time party committee officials;

—actively assist in solving the tasks of social and daily life conditions for officers, NCO's, workers, employees, and members of their families;

—influence the state of party work in the staff and directorate apparatus and the work style of Communists in the forces;

—maintain ties with territorial party and other public organizations and assist them in the military-patriotic education of the population, especially of young people of predraft and draft age.

3. All-Army Party Committee

The All-Army Party Committee [AAPC] is elected by the All-Army Party Conference which is convened not more than once every five years. At the delegates' discretion, the AAPC secretary is elected either by the conference or by the party committee plenum. The plenum elects the bureau, deputy secretaries, and appropriate commissions and groups.

The AAPC is autonomous in its activity on the implementation of the Communist Party's policy in the Armed Forces. On the basis of the CPSU's fundamental program and statute principles, it elaborates the most important normative and methodological documents on questions concerning party work in the Army and Navy, resolves organizational, cadre, financial, and other questions, and maintains ties with the USSR Ministry of Defense leadership and the country's political, public, and state organizations.

The AAPC accounts for its work to the CPSU Central Committee and the All-Army Party Conference and systematically briefs Communists on the fulfillment of

party decisions. In its activity, the AAPC closely collaborates with the USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate.

The AAPC:

—elaborates the most important questions of ideopolitical work and party building in the USSR Armed Forces;

—studies the problems and elaborates proposals in the sphere of party work on the fulfillment of combat readiness tasks and the strengthening of military discipline;

—generalizes and disseminates the positive experience in party work;

—renders practical assistance to party committees and party organizations in the Ministry of Defense central apparatus and in staffs and command organs of [military] districts, groups of forces, and fleets to improve their work style and develop Communists' creative approach toward the elaboration of problems of military building, and constantly influences the education of Communists in command organs;

—organizes measures to explain and implement the CPSU's cadres policy. It actively collaborates on these matters with the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate;

—taking into account the primary party organizations'-opinion, it elaborates the structure and staffing of party organs and the procedures for material backup for their officials;

—systematically studies the state of work by party organizations on questions of party membership and organizes the maintenance of party statistics, the supply of blank party documents to party committees, and the accountability for such documents to the CPSU Central Committee;

—collaborates with corresponding organs of trade union and other public organizations in the Armed Forces;

—collaborates and cooperates with the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations and other young people's organizations.

On questions of party membership and observance of party, state, and military discipline and norms of public morality by Communists, it collaborates with party control commissions elected by the appropriate party conferences.

Questions concerning elections in party organizations, Communists' records, record keeping, party membership dues and financial and economic activity, participation in referendums and debates, the status of party organization secretaries, and the procedure for creating control commissions in the Army and Navy and their rights are contained in appropriate instructions by the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Control Commission.

Footnote

These instructions apply to CPSU organizations in the USSR KGB Troops, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops, and the Railroad Troops.

Baltic Republics

'Baltic Information Center' To Open in Copenhagen

LD3010194590 Moscow TASS in English 1658 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Tallinn October 30 TASS—Agreement to open a Baltic information centre in Copenhagen in December 1990 has been reached during a meeting between Estonian Foreign Minister Lennart Meri and a delegation from Denmark, led by Danish Foreign Ministry official Christian Hoppe.

The centre will have neither diplomatic status nor any privileges connected with the status. The agreement was signed today.

Lithuanian Council Regrets U.S. Aid Rejection

LD3010144390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1400 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] The Lithuanian Supreme Council Information Department has been instructed to state:

On 27-28 October 1990, the U.S. Congress examined a proposal to grant financial aid to Lithuania and all three Baltic states. Two laws to this effect adopted previously by the Senate have been examined by the Congress Conference Committee and rejected.

Thus, the U.S. Congress did not confirm the aid in the sum of $15 million to develop a free market in the three Baltic countries and did not grant humanitarian aid in the sum of $10 million to Lithuania.

This decision must be regarded with regret. A great state did not help a small state fighting for democracy and justice in Europe, which has suffered from aggression by another great state and an economic blockade, and which is still being tormented by that state's military and political pressure.

Lithuania hopes that the United States helped at least itself with this decision, and states its unshakable resolve in any circumstances, with or without foreign aid, to strive for freedom and independence.

Lithuanian Government Decides Economic Issues

LD3010183990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Ceslovas Jusenas reporting by telephone: I wish to tell you briefly about some decisions of the government of the Republic of Lithuania.

First of all, a decision on setting up an international fund for the development of industry in the Republic of Lithuania. In order to eliminate difficulties in Lithuania's economy, the government has decided to approve the initiative of the Ministry of Industry on setting up an international fund for the development of industry in the Republic of Lithuania. Minister Jasinavicius has been instructed to adopt, in agreement with the relevant ministries, a program for the international fund. The government also decided that this program is to be submitted to the government for confirmation not later than 25 December.

There is also an instruction of the government on fulfilling the resolution of the Supreme Council on aid to the trade unions which are now being formed and on the property of former state trade unions. A commission has been set up to deal with the claims to the property of the former trade unions. The chairman of this commission is Deputy Minister of Economy Sarka.

Another decision of the government was on fulfilling the resolution of the Supreme Council on introducing the law on state enterprises. The government decided that the founders of the state enterprises which will re-register in accordance with this resolution will be ministries, departments, and local municipalities.

And the last decision. The government has decided to allocate from the additional funds to the council of the town of Druskininkai 167,000 rubles for repairs to a house which has been affected by an overflow of mercury. The government also decided to allocate 2.9 million rubles for restoration of the plate glass workshop at the Panevezys glass factory.

Landsbergis Reads Statement on Army Service

LD3010163190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1107 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Statement read by Vytautis Landsbergis, president of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, at the Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] The USSR Army in Lithuania is a part of another state's militarist system and ideology which at present are undergoing a severe crisis. Compulsory military service is in operation there and attempts are being made to apply it illegally in Lithuania.

The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania has already stated in the past that citizens of the Republic of Lithuania are not obliged and not recommended to serve in the Armed Forces of another country. Therefore, the majority of Lithuanian youths refused service during the spring call up to the Soviet Army. We hope that they will not respond to the fall call up and will not be intimidated by threats.

The Republic of Lithuania does not forbid young people to voluntarily do such service, but invites [words indistinct] the duty of the Lithuanian citizen and not serve in the army of a foreign state.

The Soviet Union's Armed Forces have no right in Lithuania to use force against those who are being called up for military service. Of course, no physical violence, no intimidations or forced persuasion my by used.

The time is approaching when Lithaunia's men will be called up for service for the homeland and the Supreme Council has no doubt that they will respond and willingly discharge the duty of a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania.

Lithuania's Brazauakas Urges Talks With USSR

LD3010184890 Moscow World Service in Russian 1036 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Deputy Prime Minister of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauzkas has stated that Lithuania is an independent state under conditions of dependency. He spoke before his fellow countrymen in the town of Rokiskis. According to him, this dependence makes itself felt in the most important issues such as the border, the Armed Forces, all forms of transport and other communications, the majority of raw materials and energy resources, the currency, and the banking system. Consequently, Brazauskas said, it is essential for Lithuania to hasten the start of talks with the USSR.

Lithuanian-USSR Consultations Sitting Held

PM3010141590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Joint Sitting"]

[Text] A routine sitting of the joint working group of delegations of the Soviet Union and Lithuania headed by V.Kh. Doguzhiyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and R. Ozolas, deputy prime minister of Lithuania, was held 29 October. In accordance with the instruction given by the delegations at the 20 October consultative meeting, there was an examination of questions connected with the preparation of a draft protocol on the start of official talks. It was established that joint work on this draft will be continued.

Estonia's Sillari Cited on Food Shortages

LD3010185190

[Editorial report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1600 GMT on 30 October carries a two-minute report by correspondent Heymar Lenk on a Tallinn conference of economists and heads of enterprises and farms, organized by the Central Committee of the Independent Communist Party of Estonia, and opened by Enn-Arno Sillari, first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Estonia. In an interview, he says that we must gain information so as to explain to people what they must expect. "There will be no hunger or cold, but very difficult times lie ahead," he says.

"As was clear from the speeches made by members of the government of the republic," Lenk says, "they cannot promise the people anything good. The crisis is only just beginning, and in 1991-92 it is expected to be sharply compounded. If rates of production decline in the republic now amount to two to three percent a year, next year a reduction of 10 to 20 percent can be expected, and this is a great deal." He goes on to say that a fall in meat produciton is expected, that there is a shortage of feed, and that the gasoline situation is uncertain with Union oil production falling. "Shops are short of sugar, flour, and cereals, and a further rise in food prices is expected. It is clear to all that without attracting foreign capital there is no escape from the crisis, but Western firms are not keen on investing in light of the political instability in Estonia and the Soviet Union," Lenk says in conclusion.

Estonian Government Reviews Internal Issues

LD3110130190 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1000 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Excerpts] The Rural Workers' Trade Union this morning organized a picket on Toompea [seat of government] to support raising procurement prices of agricultural produce.

We heard of this in the Hommikukaja program, together with a hint that this may be discussed today at the government session.

Juhan Hindov, the government's press secretary, is on the telephone:

[Hindov] [passage omitted] With the police law adopted by the Supreme Soviet, it was considered opportune to set up an independent preliminary court investigation board, splitting in this way the functions of the police and preliminary investigation in the future.

Today's government session set up the Estonian Preliminary Investigation Board. The next point on the agenda was cadre issues, and (Endel Mauer) was confirmed in the post of chief director of the above-mentioned state institution. He has been head of an investigation directorate at the Internal Affairs Ministry.

At the same time the Estonian police acquired a new leader. (Juri Nurme) was appointed chief director of the State Police Board at the Internal Affairs Ministry. His name is evidently familiar to the republican public at large: (Nurme) is the head of Department No. 6 of the present Internal Affairs Ministry. By the way, when appointed to this post (Nurme) said that in the future police structure Department No. 6, a unit aimed to fight organized crime, will continue to exist. [passage omitted]

Estonian Communists Dispute Property Decree

LD3010182490 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 0700 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] RAHVA HAAL published a letter on 30 October sent to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Estonia by the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee. It says that the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee considers the activity of the Republic of Estonia over nationalization of Estonian Communist Party property unlawful. The decree of the

republic's government does not refer to any one legislative act which would have been infringed upon when property was handed over to the Estonian Communist Party. The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee has emphasized repeatedly that in all its activities—including the use of its property—it proceeds from Republic of Estonia laws. Proceeding from this fact, there is no need to set up a governmental commission in order to review the ownership status of the property which is under the ownership of the Estonian Communist Party.

The Central Committee views the government's activity as an attempt to cause moral damage to the Estonian Communist Party and divert public attention from increasing economic difficulties. The Central Committee announces that it is ready to discuss the government's property claims and to compensate for the expenses made out of the state budget for the buildings and structures which are on the books of the administrative affairs of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee. Court protection will be ensured to the Estonian Communist Party as owner of the property, says the letter.

Estonia Adopts Measure on Floating Gas Prices

LD3010212690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] The Estonian Government has adopted a decision to introduce floating prices, or regularly changing prices for gasoline. This is caused by the fact that, apart from gasoline from state stocks which the republic receives at a fixed price, some of the fuel has to be purchased at contractual prices.

Latvian Controversy Over 7 Nov Parades Continues

LD3010203890 Moscow TASS in English 1759 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Riga October 30 TASS—For the third time this month, the Latvian parliament today discussed events to mark the anniversary of the socialist revolution, scheduled for November 7.

First, the parliament omitted the date of the Soviet state's foundation from the list of republican holidays. Later, the parliament declared invalid in Latvia the Soviet president's decree on military parades on November 7.

Today, deputies focused on the permission by the Riga City Council to hold demonstrations on the embankment, where they had been traditionally held. The council of the Movement for National Independence, using its right to introduce legislative initiatives, suggested that the decision be cancelled and that the demonstrations be held somewhere else.

A deputy representing the movement refused to speculate on the possible consequences of cancelling the demonstration.

Riga Mayor Andris Teikmanis called on deputies to be tolerant to the views of others, who believe that the revolution anniversary should be a holiday.

Teikmanis said army officials promised not to use heavy caterpillar equipment, which could damage road coverings. Deputies were also informed that demonstration organisers promised to repay losses to transport services for possible interruption in tram and trolley-bus traffic. After this, debates ceased and the issue was removed from the agenda.

Later in the day, deputies passed the second reading of the bill on state pensions and discussed bills on taxation.

Italy Investigating Latvian Deputy's Death

LD3010190990 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0900 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] An hour ago, opening the regular plenary sitting of the Supreme Council of Latvia, Council Chairman Anatolijs Gorbunovs announced a message of mourning. Yesterday in Rome, Latvian legislature deputy Ita Kozakevica [prominent pro-independence activist, also active on behalf of the Polish minority] met her death. The Italian Government is investigating the circumstances of her death.

RSFSR

Coverage of RSFSR Supreme Soviet Proceedings

30 Oct Session Reported

LD3010225590

Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1956 GMT on 30 October, in its "At the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet" program, carries recorded highlights of a 30 October RSFSR Supreme Soviet session held in Moscow.

An announcer notes that Goryacheva is in the chair, and then deputies comment on television coverage of the sessions and the Council of Minister's reports on its activity.

At 2002 GMT Chelyabinsk deputy Baranenko calls for a discussion on the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test blast. Goryacheva says that a statement on the Novaya Zemlya test was adopted yesterday, confirming Russian priority on such matters.

Next, the law on deputies of local soviets was adopted. A draft law on forming the next year's budget is presented by the RSFSR first deputy minister of finances. The minister dwells on various articles of the draft and the way different local budgets are to be reconciled, principles of taxation, and foreign economic activity. A decision is adopted to instruct the Council of Ministers to work on the draft and submit it to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Deputies then air their views on the draft.

A debate now begins. Deputy Polenov takes the floor on behalf of the Commission for Culture and voices its grievances: additional financing is required. Vladimir Nikolayevich Silayev takes the floor to set out his objections to the draft, followed by Sergey Alekseyevich Polozkov who speaks in favor of decentralizing the procedure of budget formation.

Deputy Ayushiyev calls on the deputies to adopt the draft, which it is after a first reading.

A draft law on rehabilitating the victims of political repressions is now examined. It is presented by Deputy Kononov.

Other business is discussed before a deputy reads an article from a document compiled at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs dealing with combatting crime.

TASS Summarizes Session

LD3010190390 Moscow TASS in English 1804 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Report by TASS legislative correspondents Lev Aksenov, Yuriy Kozmin, and Pavel Ostrov]

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—A package of bills to lay the legal groundwork for the introduction of a market was tabled at the joint session of the two chambers of the Russian Parliament today.

The parliament considered the first reading of a bill on general principles of forming Russia's budgets for 1991. The key principles underlying the bill is the independence of all of the republic's budgets—the Russian budget, the budgets of the republics, autonomous regions and districts within the federation and local budgets.

Mindful of Russia's serious economic position and skyrocketing inflation, the bill sets the maximum deficit of the republican budget at five per cent of its projected revenue.

Deputies approved the bill, which will not be sent for discussion to the separate parliament chambers.

The Russian Council of Ministers presented to parliament bills regulating the application of union laws on taxation on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Deputies are also focusing on the bills on the central bank of Russia and on other banks and the banking system in the republic. The authors of the bills emphasised that in elaborating the documents, they did not count on Russia's secession from the union. They proceeded from the premise that it would be possible to preserve the rouble as a single monetary unit within the country.

At the same time, it was pointed out that the bill contained a defensive measures in case other republics introduced their own currencies.

The bills will now be submitted for consideration to committees and commissions.

The bill on rehabilitating the victims of political repressions sparked the most heated debates. Without voicing the slightest doubts about the need to adopt it, deputies criticised the human rights committee which presented this bill. They described the bill as ill-prepared and sent it for further study.

Deputies today completed the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill on the status of the people's deputy of a local soviet and voted overwhelmingly to adopt it.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Publishes Resolutions

Enabling Law On Economic Ties

PM3110120590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

["RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolution 'On the Procedure for the Enactment of the RSFSR Law "On Economic Ties in 1991" '"—SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA headline]

[Text] The RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolves that:

1. The RSFSR Law "On Economic Ties in 1991" is to come into force the moment it is adopted.

2. The RSFSR Council of Ministers is to:

draw up and approve within 10 days the procedure for applying Article 2 of the said law;

to complete during October-November 1990 the conclusion of economic agreements on cooperation with all Union republics for 1991, making provision in them for the preservation of traditional ties in the supply of products (goods) in the volumes which have taken shape not lower than the 1990 level and for the mechanism of their legal backup.

3. The RSFSR Foreign Trade Bank is to define within 10 days the procedure for applying Article 4 of the said law.

4. The RSFSR State Board of Arbitration is to be recommended to ensure the priority examination of disputes connected with the conclusion of economic contracts for 1991.

[Signed] R.I. Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet
RSFSR House of Soviets, Moscow, 23 October 1990

Enabling Law on USSR Enactments

PM3110115990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

["RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolution 'On the Procedure for Enactment of the RSFSR Law "On the Operation of USSR Bodies' Enactments on RSFSR Territory" '"—SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA headline]

[Text] The RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolves that:

1. The RSFSR Law "On the Operation of USSR Bodies' Enactments on RSFSR Territory" is to come into force the moment it is adopted. The law is to be submitted for approval to an extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies.

2. The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, commissions of the chambers and committees of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and the RSFSR Council of Ministers are to draw up and submit to the Supreme Soviet within 10 days a draft resolution on the procedure for examining questions of suspending, ratifying, and confirming USSR bodies' enactments.

3. The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the RSFSR Council of Ministers are to draw up and submit to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet before 20 November 1990 proposals for establishing the accountability provided for in Article 6 of the law and the procedure for instituting proceedings.

4. The RSFSR Council of Ministers is to bring RSFSR Government decisions into line with the Law "On the Operation of USSR Bodies' Enactments on RSFSR Territory" and also to submit a list of USSR bodies' enactments issued prior to the adoption of the said law for examination of the question of their suspension.

[Signed] R.I. Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet
RSFSR House of Soviets, 24 October 1990

Conference Discusses RSFSR Interethnic Issues

LD3010210790 Moscow TASS in English 1907 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—A national scientific conference on the subject "The Nation State and Inter-Ethnic Relations in the Russian Federation: State and Prospects" opened near Moscow today.

The conference was co-organised by the Council of Nationalities of the Russian parliament and the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Sociology Institute.

Representatives of all autonomous entities of the Russian Federation, USSR and Russian people's deputies, eminent scientists and cultural personalities are in attendence.

The conference was opened by Russian parliament First Deputy Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov. In plenary meetings and in working groups, participants will discuss pressing issues of inter-ethnic relations, ways to harmonise them and joint approaches to a federation treaty.

Chariman of the Soviet parliament Council of Nationalities Rafik Nishanov and his conterpart in the Russian parliament Ramazan Abdulatipov spoke at the conference today.

Polozkov Consults With Bashkiria Communists

PM3110123390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[Dispatch by M. Merzabekov: "Seeking Joint Paths"]

[Text] Ufa—I.K. Polozkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee, arrived in Ufa 25 October. Answering a question about the aim of his trip to the Bashkir SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], the leader of the Russian Communist Party said: "The newly created Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party is seeking paths for constant contacts with Communists and party organizations of various regions. Bashkortostan is one of Russia's most important economic regions, and there is a large party organization here. It has its own national problems, and the environmental situation has deteriorated. I came here to familiarize myself more closely with the republic's life and with its party organization. Particularly since I received an invitation from my Bashkir comrades."

In the afternoon I.K. Polozkov met with the republic party aktiv in the CPSU Obkom [oblast committee] and participated as well as gave an address at an Ufa CPSU Gorkom [city committee] plenum. A news conference was then held for journalists.

A certain set of questions often put to I.K. Polozkov is evidently due to the mass conditioning of public opinion by opponents of the organized building of a Russian Communist Party as well as by attacks from certain mass media on the first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee. In this sense, every meeting with the various audiences dispersed the negative stereotype that has been imposed on us, judging by the atmosphere in the hall as well as the numerous comments that we heard from the participants in the meetings. The third conclusive phase of the 40th oblast party conference was in session in Ufa 26 October, discussing the question "On the Oblast Party Organization's Action Program To Fulfill the Decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress and the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party." I.A. Gorbunov, first secretary of the CPSU Obkom, presented the report. Speaking at the conference, I.K. Polozkov dwelt on certain tasks that face the Russian Federation's Communists today. He stressed in part that Russian Communists are advocating a Union treaty that would enable our state to be renewed on a new basis, as a union of socialist states with equal rights closely linked to each other by economic, political, and spiritual ties.

The delegates to the conference voted to rename the Bashkir Oblast Party Organization as the RSFSR Communist Party Bashkir Republic Party Organization.

In the evening of 26 October I.K. Polozkov left for Transural Bashkiria—the most distant areas of the

republic. He has ahead of him meetings with Communists and working people from the cities of Beloretsk and Sibay and neighboring regions.

Further on Dzasokhov's Vladikavkaz Meeting

PM3110121590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Meeting with Young Voters"]

[Text] Vladikavkaz, 27 Oct—USSR People's Deputy A.S. Dzasokhov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has had a meeting in the hall of the House of Soviets in the capital of the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic with young voters—students of higher educational institutions and technical colleges in Vladikavkaz.

Dzasokhov told the gathering about the results of the CPSU Central Committee October (1990) Plenum. He emphasized in particular that under conditions of the transition to new economic forms and market relations, the CPSU advocates active measures for the social protection of badly-off sections of society, including students.

However, social protection is just a part of youth problems. It is still more important and indispensable for students themselves to acquire the necessary volume of knowledge and to mold high professional qualities.

It was emphasized at the meeting that the CPSU still adheres firmly to positions of the socialist choice, which presuppose freedom of the individual. What was striking at the last Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee plenum? The excessive passion of certain Komsomol workers for financial and economic activity and the total absence of the theme of the continuity of generations and spiritual education.

The meeting devoted much attention to questions of improving interethnic relations and preparing the new Union treaty aimed at the USSR's renewal.

Soviet society, Dzasokhov pointed out, is the most politicized. Profound political processes are under way in all parts of the country, and new social structures are being sought. Under these conditions, helping young people to find their place in life means ensuring the future of the whole country. Concern was voiced that certain destructive forces are trying to push students and young people toward rejecting our spiritual values and everything that has been achieved through constructive and martial labor by many generations of Soviet people.

Dzasokhov told the young people about the CPSU's measures to cooperate with the Komsomol, bearing in mind the intention to hold a joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the Komsomol Central Committee on youth problems. He reported that the current USSR Supreme Soviet session will adopt a package of documents with a bearing on the rising generation. Dzasokhov answered numerous questions from the meeting participants.

Russian Communist Party Schedules 15 Nov Plenum

LD3010205590 Moscow TASS in English 2024 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 30 TASS—The Politburo of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee held a meeting in Moscow on Monday.

It decided to convene a joint plenary meeting of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee and the Central Control Committee on November 15 to endorse, as instructed by the party's founding congress, guidelines for the party activity.

The draft guidelines have been published and are being discussed by party organisations across the Russian Federation. Results and proposals voiced at these discussions will be taken into account when identifying tasks prompted by the political situation in the republic. Party leader Ivan Polozkov will report to the plenary meeting on this item.

The Plenary meeting is expected to form standing commissions and consider the structure and personnel affairs in keeping with the demand made at the founding congress for ensuring dependable links between the Party's elective bodies and local party organisations at minimum cost to the party.

A wide range of party activists, including primary organisation secretaries, Russian people's deputies, intellectuals, young people, women and party workers operating in the Soviet Armed Forces will be invited to attend the plenary meeting.

Taking into consideration the present social and political situation in the republic, the politburo defined a range of questions to be considered before the end of this year. These include forecasts of the developnment of the Russian Federation economy in 1991 and its possible social and political consequences and plans for Communist Party activity within a multiparty system.

The 1992 [as received] Russian Communist Party budget is also due to be discussed.

The politburo defined the procedure for considering staff appointments within the competence of the Russian Communist Party. It was decided to democratise the procedure, taking into consideration view voiced by party organisations.

Leningrad Party Can Engage in Commercial Activity

PM3110131390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 31 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by unidentified TASS correspondent: "Taking Realities of Life Into Account"]

[Text] Leningrad, 30 Oct—In view of the upcoming transition to the market, Leningrad Oblast party organizations can now take part in commercial activity. That decision was adopted today by a plenum of the CPSU Obkom [Oblast Committee].

Its participants also adopted a Provisional Statute on Financial and Economic Activity in the Leningrad Oblast Party Organization. It was decided that primary organizations can form their budget through commercial activity: the purchase of shares, the creation of small enterprises and cooperatives, and publishing activity. At the same time it was stressed that commercial activity must not run counter to CPSU program documents and statutes.

Arkhangelsk Leadership Protests Nuclear Tests

LD3110102490 Moscow TASS in English 1007 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Vladimir Anufriyev]

[Text] Arkhangelsk October 31 TASS—The leadership of Arkhangelsk region protested against nuclear tests on the Novaya Zemlya arctic archipelago. A statement to this effect and telegrams addressed to President Mikhail Gorbachev and Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov were read out at a news conference organised here by the executive committee of the regional council.

The archipelago—an area of northern test sites—is part of the Arkhangelsk region. However, there are no civilian institutions of power there and the military have complete control on Novoya Zemlya. It is difficult for representatives of the local authorities to visit the islands. It may so happen that they would not be allowed to visit.

The underground nuclear explosion carried out on the Archipelago on October 4 stirred up the public of the Russian north and prompted the regional leadership's resolute action.

Chelyabinsk Shortages Threaten 'Social Explosion'

LD3010222190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Our correspondent reports: Should food coupons be introduced in Chelyabinsk? The members of the presidium and executive committee of the town soviet of people's deputies have been discussing this all day. The decision that was adopted was announced on local television by (Potkin), chairman of the executive committee. Therefore, from as early as 1 November shops will sell food products only against coupons and passports with a Chelyabinsk residence registration, strictly within the limits of the set norms. Each Chelyabinsk inhabitant is guaranteed every month 1.5 kg of meat, 12 eggs, 100 gm of vegetable oil, 380 gm of groats, 600 gm of flour, 1.40 rubles worth of tobacco goods, five bottles of vodka or wine, and so forth.

The list will be published. Also, in another month's time, from 1 December, all inhabitants will have to show their identity card when entering a shop to make a purchase. The town's leaders presented this decision as the sole honest decision capable of suppressing the population's clamorous demand for food products and other goods. But the majority of Chelyabinsk inhabitants think that food products are unlikely to appear in the long-empty shops in the next few months. The vouchers for meat, sugar, and butter which existed before have been unredeemable for several months.

The situation in the town today is fraught with the danger of a social explosion and unforeseeable consequences, our correspondent reports.

Western Republics

Coverage of Crisis Situation in Gagauz Region

Militia Arrests TV Correspondent

LD3010224990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2055 GMT 30 Oct 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Our special correspondent Eduard Dzhafarov and his colleagues have just been arrested by the Moldovan [Moldavian] militia. Later they were let go, but they are still being prevented from working. The television correspondent's office in Kishinev is also not working. Eduard Dzhafarov has just managed to send us his report in an almost underground manner.

[Begin recording] [Dzhafarov] Please tell us, is there something going on that we are not supposed to see? All the central media are here.

[Unidentified volunteer] Well, please move on and do not interfere with our work. That is all.

[Dzhafarov] That is how it is. Having reached the town of Chimishliya today, our group from Central Television was not allowed through. What was the pretext for this? What were the grounds for it? We do not know yet. Evidently this will have to be found out, but the so-called chief of the Chimishliya headquarters has prohibited filming and passage to all correspondents, from Central Television as well as from foreign television who are here. That is why we cannot say what is now happening on the territory of Chimishliya, but there are suggestions that there is something that cannot be seen either by the central, or even more so by the foreign press. [end recording]

We hope that the situation in Moldova will gradually get back to normal. The republic has been on the verge of tragedy—I am convinced of it—mainly because of the leadership's incompetent actions. Take for example the calls for forming the so-called volunteer groupings.

Correspondent Recants Arrest Report

LD3110143490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1230 GMT 31 Oct 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Moldova remains a hot spot on our tormented map.

Yesterday, the late night news made a mistake which our correspondent Dzhafarov himself corrected, phoning us from Odessa.

He reported that the militia did not arrest him but that he and his cameramen and several other correspondents from Moscow were detained by Moldovan volunteers. They were not allowed into the conflict areas where the Gagauz live, and yet here is some information that we have received from our correspondent:

A congress of soviets of all levels is taking place in Komrat. Stepan Topal was elected leader of the Gagauz republic. New columns of volunteers have begun to gather to head south.

'Fresh Tension' Reported

LD3110093290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Text] Under conditions of the state of emergency introduced in the region heavily populated by the Gagauz, a congress of deputies of all levels went on until late yesterday night in the town of Komrat. This gave rise to a fresh upsurge of tension. What is the current situation in Moldova? Our correspondent Ivan Petkov will tell us.

[Petkov] The very fact that a congress of deputies has been convened under conditions of a state of emergency has given rise to fresh tension. It has also been aggravated by the fact that an act has taken place in Kishinev that is indeed significant. The creation of the first battalion of a national army has been announced and shown to the whole republic on television. The volunteers are being withdrawn from the borders of the Gagauz region slowly, as is the case on the other side.

The confrontation remains, and it encompasses all of the republic's regions. Last night, for example, the Bendery town workers committee introduced a special situation regime. They began to set up a reserve of volunteer militiamen, that is to step up forces, as they say here, for self-defense. It would appear that some kind of competition is in evidence in escalating and complicating the situation. The Moldovan Government only had to dispatch thousand-strong units of volunteers to the borders of the Gagauz region, even before the declaration of a state of emergency in the south, and similar units were immediately sent to help the Gagauz by the regions on the other side of the Dnestr. Now as I have already said, they are returning very slowly. Or take this: They made a decision and they are constantly announcing on national television and radio that funds are needed for the maintenance of volunteer units and the creation of a national army. An account has been announced where people can pay in whatever they like. Immediately, excited by the decision and the publicity, councils of labor collectives in Bendery made their own decision and began to collect funds for maintaining their own volunteer units.

Although this is being done quickly, it is also being done quite thoroughly, especially in the towns the other side of the Dnestr. This is no coincidence because the same fate awaits them as the Gagauz, as they say here. In the rayons and towns of the Dnestr basin, the election of deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the Dnestr Repubic has also been announced for the end of November. That is the situation at present.

Gagauz 'Republic' Elects Chairman

LD3110100790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0938 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent]

[Text] Kishinev, 31 Oct (TASS)—Journalistic circles in the town of Komrat, the capital of the Gagauz republic, which the Moldovan legislature has declared anti-constitutional, have reported that the first session of the supreme soviet of that republic was held yesterday afternoon. Stepan Topal, aged 52, was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Gagauz republic. He is a building engineer by profession and a graduate of Kiev Road Transport Institute.

The official authorities of the Republic of Moldova have not yet confirmed this.

Militants Storm Checkpoints

LD3110115990 Moscow TASS in English 1148 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Fedor Angeliy]

[Text] Kishinev October 31 TASS—More than 3,000 Moldavian militants blocked two checkpoints on the Soviet-Romanian border early today, demanding the withdrawal of Soviet interior troops from southern Moldavia.

The militants threatened to kill the border guards and their families and destroy the checkpoints. They also threatened to cross into Romania to get help there, Soviet border officials told TASS.

The militants pelted the Stoyanovka checkpoint with stones and then set the fence around it alight.

First Deputy Moldavian Prime Minister Konstantin Oborok, deputy parliament Chairman Dimitru Puntya and Popular Front Co-chairman Mikahi Gimpu, whisked by helicopter to the area, began talks with the attackers at dawn today. Prime Minister Mircea Druc talked with their leaders on phone.

Despite these efforts, the attackers refused to lift the blockade, threatening to go to Kishinev to "restore order there." However, after several hours of talks, they agreed to lift the blockade.

Soviet and foreign reporters have been barred from the troubled areas since the imposition of a state of emergency in southern Moldavia.

Local journalists reported from the city of Komrat that the Gagauz parliament held its first session in the breakaway republic on Tuesday.

Building engineer Stepan Topal has been elected chairman of the Gagauz parliament, the report said.

Moldavian Communists React

LD3110132590 Moscow TASS in English 1309 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Fedor Angeliy]

[Text] Kishinev October 31 TASS—The leadership of the Moldavian Communist party has voiced serious concern over the worsening social-political situation in the republic following inter-ethnic clashes in the area with predominantly Turkish-speaking Gagauz population.

The party Central Committee stressed in a statement today that it "is against using power methods to solve national, political and other conflicts by stirring up passions, mass psychosis. It regards them as unacceptable, leading into a blind alley, taking the republic further away from the main road of civilisation and progress."

The statement expresses concern over mounting anti-communist feelings: "Under the slogan of depolitisation, intimidation of people for their convictions is permitted. Buildings and offices of party committees have been seized. Such events occurred in Kakhul, Ungen, Streshen and other regions."

The secretariat and bureau of the Control and Auditing Commission of the Moldavian Communist Party "express resolute protest and condemn any unlawful actions aimed at libelling Communists, infringing on their rights and freedoms."

The statement expresses conviction that deputies of the Moldavian parliament will take necessary measures "to normalise the situation and get out of the current crisis." In particular, the Central Committee sees it necessary to return volunteer detachments, made up of Moldavians, from the south of the republic.

"We declare again that civil peace and accord is an essential prerequisite for national revival and a guarantee for solving Moldavia's burning problems," the statement says.

Moldavians, Gagauz To Meet 30 Oct

LD3110142690 Moscow TASS in English 1357 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Report by MOLDOVA PRESS-TASS correspondents Anatoliy Goliya and Aleksandr Tanas]

[Text] Kishinev October 31 TASS—The situation in the south of Moldavia remains complex. Measures are being taken to enable the interim committee of the Moldavian parliament to exercise the state emergency and special form of government declared by the republican government in Vulcanesti, Comrat and Chadi Lunga districts.

On Tuesday [30 Oct] members of the Moldavian parliament's interim committee visited Komrat where they met representatives of the Gagauz interim committee. Colonel-General Yuriy Shatalin, commander of Soviet Interior Ministry troops, was also present.

An understanding about the start of a dialogue to normalise the situation was reached. A bilateral conciliatory commission was set up and is to ensure conditions for the conduct of the dialogue.

The paramount condition is to withdraw all volunteer brigades. The withdrawal began on Tuesday. This morning Andrey Sangeli, chairman of the Comrat District Council of People's Deputies, flew over the volunteers' checkpoints to monitor their removal. Most volunteers have returned to the places of their permanent residence.

Ukraine Presidium Issues Message on Unification

PM3110103590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent M. Odinets under the rubric "Official": "Unity Is Our Strength"]

[Text] Kiev—October 27 marked the 51st anniversary of an important event in the history of the Ukrainian people when the people's assembly of the West Ukraine, expressing the will of its people, adopted the declaration on the establishment of Soviet power in the West Ukraine and on its reunification with the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. In this connection a Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium appeal and greetings to the Ukrainian people has been published in the republic's capital. It states, in particular:

"The age-old desire of the long-suffering Ukrainian people—to live and create freely in a unified state, to augment their material and spiritual achievements, and to increase their contribution to the panhuman treasure house—was realized. A decisive step was taken on the path of uniting and consolidating the entire Ukrainian nation.

"The reunification of the Ukrainian lands was an act of supreme historic justice. It really opened up broad prospects for national rebirth, social progress, economic upsurge, and the spiritual development of the entire

Ukrainian nation. Any attempts to belittle the significance of reunification are groundless, as they contradict the historical truth."

The reunification festival, it states in conclusion, is a festival of the republic's entire people, a festival of their national rebirth which is today acquiring new significance in the light of the Ukraine's Declaration of State Sovereignty. Unity is our strength and a guarantee of the building of a sovereign Ukrainian socialist state.

Yalta Suspends Land Allocation to Tatars

PM3110095990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent V. Vasilets: "No Peace Under the Cypresses"]

[Text] Crimean Oblast— More and more Tatar families are arriving in the land of their forebears—the Crimea—from which they were illegally expelled in Stalinist times. The "newcomers" are setting up tent cities and demanding the allocation of housing or plots of land on which to build their own private dwellings and run individual farms.

The local authorities tried to ignore what was going on for a long time. Then their resistance seemed to end. The Yalta City Soviet adopted a decision to immediately allocate 150 plots of land for new Tatar settlers.

There and then came a new report: "The ispolkom [executive committee] has suspended the implementation of its own resolution. This step backward is being taken in view of the fact that Tatars have seized a tobacco field on the 'Livadiya' Sovkhoz [state farm] and started building there without authorization, which has caused discontent among the local inhabitants and provoked a conflict which nearly resulted in bloodshed."

Who is right and who guilty here? The city soviet's inconsistency does nothing to enhance the authority of the organ of people's power. But the disregard of the law by the "seizers" of sovkhoz land is not going to lead to concord either.

Honoring Ukraine 'Insurgents' Questioned

PM3110105590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy under "Direct Line" rubric: "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists: 'They Did Well To Kill'"]

[Text] Ternopol—Repeated instances of the consecration of the graves and "memorial places" of Sech riflemen, members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, and fighters of the so-called Ukrainian Insurgent Army have occurred recently in western Ukraine. The other day an event of this kind took place in Ternopol. Not far from the site of the monument in honor of Soviet airmen, a tall burial mound has appeared. This is the manner in which it has been decided to immortalize the memory of the fallen "insurgents."

There were especially many enthusiastic speeches pronounced in honor of the "glorious heroes of the Ukraine." Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] People's Deputy B. Boyko forthrightly stated, among other things: "The national rebirth of Ukraine today is only possible thanks to the heroic struggle of members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and warriors of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the past." P. Mamalyga, a member of the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party, speaking of the activity of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, stated unambiguously: "They did well to kill."

It is humane to respect the memory of the fallen, especially in view of the fact that there were many unjustified victims. But are they all worthy of rehabilitation? Until quite recently the followers of Bandera were called cutthroats, and indeed thousands of totally innocent people died at their hands. However, some people revere these same supporters of Bandera as national heroes today. Who and why—that is the question.

Belorussian Supreme Soviet Discusses Export Ban

PM3110143790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Oct 90 Union Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Mikhail Shimanskiy under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Belorussia: Ban on Export of Goods"]

[Text] Minsk—A session of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet considered the draft law "On Temporary Measures To Protect the Republic's Consumer Market" out of turn.

Priority measures were designated, including a ban on the autonomous export from the republic of any consumer goods, output designated for technical-industrial use, raw and other materials, and also currency. All enterprises located in Belorussia are banned from exporting documentation on discoveries and inventions and progressive technology.

The draft law proposes to make sanctions in the sphere of trade considerably more severe for speculation and violations. The Belorussian SSR is granted the right to declare a state monopoly on the sale in the republic of certain goods at stable prices.

The draft law also specifies many other measures to protect Belorussia's consumer market and certain, bluntly speaking, emergency measures. But what would happen if the unorganized export of the most diverse goods from the republic were to reach huge volumes? Things with which not so long ago Belorussian stores were chock-full, household items for instance, have already "slipped away" into various parts of the country.

Lately a very large amount of foodstuffs, especially butter, have been exported from the republic by inhabitants from the Baltic region. The draft law bans or limits the export by private people of certain types of food and industrial goods.

The Belorussian legislature has decided that finalization of this draft law must take into account the criticisms expressed. The deputies will discuss it again in the next few days. Nobody doubts that such a draconian law will be adopted. But will it protect the republic's consumer market completely? It is hard to say.

Caucasus

Gamsakhurdia To Declare Georgian Independence

LD3010223190 Moscow TASS in English 2111 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Tbilisi October 31 GRUZINFORM-TASS—Zviad Gamsakhurdia, leader of the Round-Table-Free Georgia bloc of opposition parties, said at a news conference here on Tuesday that the bloc's victory at last Sunday's elections of the new parliament was an important step towards implementing the bloc's platform.

The political parties, which are grouped in the bloc, gained the largest number of votes among 11 parties and blocs which participated in the elections.

Gamsakhurdiya said that "a strenous work to reorganise drastically the state structures and institutes is ahead. Proclaiming a declaration of Georgia's independence should be an initial stage in this work after the first session of the newly-elected parliament."

Armenian Legislature Resumes Proceedings

LD3010215290 Moscow TASS in English 2044 GMT 30 Oct 90

[By ARMENPRESS-TASS correspondents Garriy Galustian and Gagik Melkumian]

[Text] Yerevan October 30 TASS—The Armenian Parliament resumed work today to discuss the property bill, which has accumulated all the best from the earlier proposed drafts.

A special commission was set up today to investigate into the tragic events in the Gorissa district in southeast Armenia, where armed atackers from Azerbaijan had killed four shepherds and driven 800 sheep from a farm in the Khndzorersk village towards the Kubatlinsk district in Azerbaijan.

The parliament also considered Armenian Prime Minister Vazgen Manukian's proposal to change the government structure. The prime minister asked the parliament to endorse the creation of a new Ministry of Enlightenment and a state committee for higher education, science and new technologies and to cancel the Ministry of Education. He also nominated new members of the presidium of the Armenian Council of Ministers to be approved by the parliament.

Armenian Communist Party Congress Issues Appeal

91US0034A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian 3 Oct 90 p 1

["Appeal" by the 29th Armenian Communist Party Congress to "Communists of the Republic"; place and date not given]

[Text] Comrades!

We, delegates of the 29th Congress of the Armenian Communist Party, fully realize the destiny-bearing significance of this forum in the life of Communists of the republic.

The congress is taking place in an extraordinarily complicated environment under conditions of prolonged political and spiritual crisis, which has become exacerbated as a result of the events around Nagorno-Karabakh, problems related to the consequences of a destructive earthquake, and interethnic conflicts.

We are faced with problems on a grand scale connected with the radical renewal and democratization of the party. Thanks to this process, the Armenian Communist Party must become a political organization that sets first and foremost the national interests of the Armenian people and the well-being of the workers of the republic.

The congress approved, by an absolute majority of votes, drafts of the main provisions of the program and statutes of the Armenian Communist Party with the intention of ratifying these documents of fundamental significance to the party during the second stage of its work. This is why their universal discussion in the party and among the people is of exceptional significance and requires that party organizations and every Communist undertake not only an energetic but also a well thought-out approach.

We are obliged to develop and adopt a program and set of statutes whose special-purpose aims truly make them documents that express national interests. At the same time our renewed, genuinely democratic party must express the vital interests of the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia. Repudiating the principle of democratic centralism, the Congress believes that the Armenian Communist Party must be an independent Communist Party and must be guided in its activity from this point forward by its own program and statutes.

The congress has presented a proposal to the CPSU Central Committee that it review the status of the Communist Party and restructure it into a union of Communist Parties of sovereign republics in which interparty relations will be built on principles of an equal-rights partnership. Of determinative significance for the party is the decision of the Congress to conduct a general party referendum. Communists are being

afforded the right to determine the status and decide the issue of the name of the Armenian Communist Party. This measure is without precedent in imposing upon party members the greatest responsibility for the destiny of the Armenian Communist Party.

Yes, the Armenian Communist Party is becoming independent, but we cannot ignore the reality that the Armenian legislature, adopting the historic declaration on independence, declared that this is the beginning of a process, that the Republic of Armenia in the present stage remains in the USSR without any severance of ties with it.

Armenia is tied by many threads with the Soviet republics, and in its present, exceptionally difficult state a breach in economic and political ties could turn out to be fateful. Self-isolation will not lead to progress, but rather to impoverishment and a cessation of development.

In determining the status of the party, we must take into account the historical choice of the Armenian people, the geopolitical situation of the republic, the interests of the internal diaspora and of Artsakh, and the priority of national interests. We cannot help but take into account the fact of a Union of independent states being formed on the basis of a new Union treaty. We, supporters of complete independence for the Armenian Communist Party in a union of Communist Parties of sovereign republics, are creating a party with full rights—having its own program and statutes—a party that must use new principles to build its relations with the renewed CPSU and the Communist Parties of the other Union republics, liberating itself from a coerced, command subordination, and asserting free and equal cooperation.

The congress calls upon all party members to treat the referendum with the greatest degree of responsibility, to display a united will, to refuse to tolerate a split in the party, and to deliver the Armenian Communist Party to new heights in the struggle to achieve the aims and interests of its people.

Shenin Addresses Congress

91US0034B Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian 3 Oct 90 pp 1-2

[Address by O.S. Shenin, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the 29th Armenian Communist Party Congress; place and date not given: "Discussion on the Report"]

[Text] Comrades!

We are meeting at a difficult time for our country and for our party.

The events of recent days confirm with utter clarity that the times we are presently living through are without question extraordinarily complex—perhaps the most critical period we have seen throughout all the years of perestroyka. Our society is undergoing major changes. With the adoption of a number of fundamental laws at the current session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, social transformations will acquire a still deeper, still more all-encompassing nature.

We must state quite frankly that the attitude people have towards these transformations is far from unequivocal, far from voicing general approval. It is by no means coincidental under such circumstances that we see strained discussions of the path to be chosen, pointed assessments of what has been done and where we are now, a tense search for the way out of the difficult economic and social situation that has taken shape in our country.

Unfortunately, the processes of perestroyka are proceeding slower than we would like. All the same, structures of civil society are being formed during the course of these processes and our economy is undergoing ever more radical reform.

Crisis, as we know, opens up the way for recovery. This applies equally well with respect to the individual and to society as a whole. We believe that the 28th congress of our party has imparted a noticeable impulse to precisely such a propitious development of events.

In no way am I going to use worn-out propagandistic cliches in discoursing broadly on its role in destiny, on its tremendous historical significance. But it would also be completely impossible to agree with a wholesale negation of any positive contribution whatsoever on the part of the congress towards effecting renewal of the party and fundamental reform in society. We cannot dismiss assertions of the variety that "what happened at the congress amounts to nothing," including journalistically scathing reports appearing in the mass media. But these are in striking contradiction to the facts.

A great deal of precisely that which will have far-reaching consequences for the destiny of the party and the country took place at the 28th congress. The moods predominating there and the fluctuations of these moods constitute a copy of the moods that predominate in society as a whole, a reflection of the real contradictions and problems in the work of perestroyka.

True, on the threshold of the congress and following its conclusion, a concept of it as a congress of "apparatchiks" was fairly energetically implanted in public opinion. Assertions of this type clearly reveal their political bias.

What can be said on this subject? First of all, to declare elected party functionaries as apparatchiks is patently far-fetched. In fact, they are the elective professional aktiv of the party. There is nothing criminal in their election by congress delegates. It is all quite natural. One-fourth of the party officials elected to the congress were secretaries of primary party organizations. As far as pure party apparatus functionaries are concerned, there was literally just one here and there among the congressional delegates.

In refuting those who continue trying to cast a shadow on the 28th congress, calling it a congress of "apparatchiks," we can recall the role played by the participation of 350 Communists from among the workers and peasants in the functioning of the party forum with the right of deliberative vote. These people were in no way extras—on the contrary they made a significant, constructive contribution to the discussion of issues raised at the congress.

Also in stark contradiction with assertions that the 28th congress was supposedly a congress of apparatchiks at which nothing took place is the fact that here, for the first time in many decades, various ideological platforms were represented. As we know there was the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU," "Marxist Platform in the CPSU," participants in the "Initiative Congress of Russian Communists," and the "Young Communists" group. The characterization of party apparatchiks is an interesting one, incidentally—CPSU opponents making every effort to depict them in the image of an enemy before public opinion.

What took place at the congress was not a competition of words within the framework of the obedient unanimity of thought of bygone days. There was open, pointed, ideological-political debate; and consistent adherence to perestroyka and the new political thinking, equally necessary to the success of internal and external CPSU policy, emerged as the victor. The principal lines of this policy were secured in decisions of the congress in all spheres of life of Soviet society. In so doing, the congress provided the opportunity and created the necessary preconditions for transition to a fundamentally new stage of activity, made way for decisive renewal and the broad interaction of social forces in the name of perestroyka.

We may state with assurance that the congress constituted one more step towards self-actualization of the CPSU, towards the comprehension of actuality, towards intensification of the theory and perfection of the practice of perestroyka. The congress pushed us significantly forward in our efforts to purify the socialist ideal—on which more than one generation of Communists has existed—from accumulated deformations.

The declaration of the congress may well be termed, without any reservations or risk of error, a document signifying a lifting of the burden of theoretical prejudices, an intellectual search for new answers to pressing problems of modern social development.

After all, it is no secret that over the course of many decades we tried unsuccessfully to find answers to questions posed by vital actuality not out in society itself, and not in the storeroom of constantly developing theoretical concepts—including Marxist concepts—but rather in the quotations of the founders of our doctrine. We cut off even the mildest attempts at a new, modern reading of classical Marxist works.

An event of principled significance took place in this important sphere of party activity, the realm of theory. Rejecting the concept of developed socialism as untenable in the theoretical framework, a concept that illuminated the stagnation of our society, the 28th congress directed that a new party program be prepared on the basis of the program declaration it adopted. This will be a program of the revolutionary restructuring of our society, the essence of which will consist, as the congress declared, "of a transition from authoritarian-bureaucratic structure to a society of humane, democratic socialism."

It should be emphasized that the 28th congress did not limit itself in the program document it adopted to proclamation of the most important, strategic goals of a long-term policy of perestroyka. Congressional participants discussed the most critical problems in an extremely exacting, candid, and self-critical fashion, problems that are disturbing the people and the party and that require immediate resolution.

You will remember the discussion that took place at the congress on ways to overcome social tension and measures to rehabilitate the consumer market, to consolidate the Soviet ruble. Congressional delegates spoke with alarm about the sharp decline in state and labor discipline; the increase in crime and violence accompanied by people's deaths; the appearance of refugees; the dangerous scale of corruption, profiteering, drunkenness and drug use; and the decline in morality. Communists spoke as well about the great danger presented to the present and future of our country by the impoverished state of science, education, culture, and health care. You know as well as I do that this is far from a complete listing of the burning problems in our lives.

Analyzing both the objective and subjective causes of what has taken place, the congress ratified in the documents it adopted an extensive and specific program of action directed towards accelerating and deepening perestroyka.

The congress devoted a great deal of attention to party renewal, questions of intraparty life, and interpretation of the party's role in a changing society.

The party has honestly and uncompromisingly revealed the errors of its past, resolutely and irrevocably condemned crimes committed under the flag of socialism. At the same time, the congress flatly rejected attempts to repudiate everything positive that has been done for the country by several generations of Communists. Therefore, as was stated at the congress, we must get rid of our complexes and really get down to work.

Under perestroyka, the CPSU is becoming a political organization that will, on the basis of its theoretical and practical activity, and its ability to propose constructive solutions to problems of the development of society, fight for the right of political leadership in free competition with other sociopolitical forces.

The 28th congress elaborated the functions of the CPSU in this regard. The program declaration of the congress noted that the party is today fulfilling theoretical, ideological, political, and organizational functions in its activity.

Of principled significance in all our work for today and tomorrow are the basic features of the renewed party, formulated at the congress in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee. The party must be:

—a party of the socialist option and communist perspective, a voluntary alliance of like-minded thinkers expressing in its policy the interests of the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia;

—a party devoted to general human values, humanistic ideals, sensitive to ethnic traditions and aspirations while not compromising itself to chauvinism, nationalism, or racism, to any manifestations of reactionary ideology and obscurantism;

—a party unfettered with ideological blinders and dogmatism, playing an active role in political and ideological processes, operating through the use of conviction, conducting constant constructive dialogue with the masses, developing relations of partnership and cooperation with all progressive forces and movements;

—a party that builds mutual relationships among its members exclusively on the basis of party comradeship, respect for the view of each individual, recognition of the right of the minority to its own position, complete freedom of discussion, and the binding nature upon all of decisions made by the majority;

—a party whose internal activity confirms principles of self-rule, freedom of action, and autonomy of its organizations united not by force of directives issued from above but by the unity of program goals, unified statutory norms, and provisions;

—a party open to contacts, dialogue, and cooperation with Communists, social democrats, socialists of various countries and diverse orientation, with representatives of other progressive, democratic forces and streams of political and scientific thought.

The concept of a renewed party is embedded in the new CPSU Statutes, adoption of which was an extremely important result of the work of the 28th congress.

I recall how the draft of this document was prepared in great detail and over a fairly long period of time. It was discussed with great interest in the press, and at all reports and election meetings and conferences preceding the congress. Over 200,000 proposals regarding it arrived at the CPSU Central Committee alone—and more than 50 sets of alternative draft statutes as well. These included drafts from the Democratic Platform and Marxist Platform in the CPSU. During the functioning of the congress, thousands of new comments in oral and written form were issued from the delegates. Almost one out of every four congressional delegates expressed his thoughts and considerations regarding the draft statutes.

All of this enabled us to produce these basic laws of CPSU life to meet as closely as possible the demands of our time, to open up opportunities for renewing the forms and methods of party work.

What should be noted from the new material appearing in the CPSU Statutes?

First, we see an enhancement of the role of the Communist in party life and functioning, and inseparably linked to this a radical change in the state of primary party organizations which are in fact becoming the basic entity of party policy. The statutes eliminate petty interference in the activity of primary party organizations on the part of higher organs and their apparatus. They guarantee the "primaries" the opportunity to independently and responsibly decide matters related to the determination of programs and forms of their activity, their structure, frequency of meetings and procedure for their conduct, various kinds of political activity.

Second, retaining the basic territorial-production principle of party structuring, the new statutes relegate an important role to the work of primary party organizations established by place of residence. We are convinced that without this it would be simply impossible to provide full-fledged, energetic party participation in the preelection campaign and gain a solid majority in the soviets.

Third, the idea of enhancing the role of Communists and primary party organizations permeates the democratic elective mechanism of the party that has been embedded in the Statutes. It provides for the participation of the entire party mass in the election process. It consolidates, as a rule, procedure for direct and competitive elections using secret ballot by party committee secretaries and delegates to party forums, the accountability of all members of party committees, provision for their recall, and procedure for dissolution of a party committee upon expiration of its authority.

Fourth, the new statutes introduce a principled renewal of the organs of party control; procedure for party control is democratized.

Fifth, the new statutes are aimed at preserving CPSU integrity while at the same time providing for the independence of the Communist Parties of the Union republics, which will themselves draw up their program and normative documents and use their own discretion to resolve political, organizational, personnel, publishing, and finance-management matters. They establish and maintain ties with other parties including foreign parties, social movements, and organizations. The leaders of Union republic Communist Parties are now included in the composition of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. It is established that, in the event of disagreement with a decision of leading CPSU organs, the central

committee of a Union republic Communist Party has the right to demand discussion of the issue at a CPSU Central Committee plenum or a combined plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission.

Finally, the substance of the principle of democratic centralism has undergone a principled renewal in the statutes adopted at the congress. Preserving the obligatory nature of party decisions and excluding factions having their own special internal discipline, the statutes guarantee the right of the minority to freely discuss and propagate their own special position, and they ensure Communists have the opportunity to unite around platforms during the course of discussion.

With respect to matters of significance of the 28th congress, we cannot fail to mention that the party's leading organs, formed in accordance with decisions of this congress, have a new look in a great many respects.

Thus, the composition of the Central Committee elected by the congress has been renewed in radical fashion and now consists of 412 members.

This is the first time nine out of every ten members of the Central Committee have been elected. More than a fourth of the new composition—106 individuals—are workers and ordinary kolkhoz [collective farm] personnel.

The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee is almost all new, with the exception of the CPSU Central Committee general secretary and his deputy. Fifteen of its 24 members are first secretaries of Union republic Communist Parties. Elected to the Secretariat of the Central Committee, in addition to 13 Central Committee secretaries are five representatives of major primary party organizations of the country. All of this is designed to breathe new life into the functioning of the Central Committee, and make it responsive to the new situation in society and the new missions of the party.

Congress directives refined the functions and work methods of the leading organs of the Central Committee. Elaboration of large-scale issues and decisions on implementation of the strategic orientation of party policy has been relegated to the prerogative of the Politburo. The Secretariat has been tasked to ensure effective everyday operation of the Central Committee's organizational-political activity. In other words, it must deal with matters of current policy, operational activity with republic and local party organizations, and communication and coordination of activities with the soviets and other state organs, with party and social organizations. In this regard our work methods must fully conform to the new role of the CPSU in society—i.e., be only political.

I would like to note that, immediately following their election, members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee became actively engaged in their work. Practically all of them made repeated visits to the party organizations and out to the localities, striving to better comprehend their problems and render them assistance.

Today we see a renewal of the practice of conducting regular sessions of the Central Committee Secretariat, at which major questions of party activity are examined, related first and foremost to execution of the decisions of the 28th congress. Therefore confirmation was first made of the plan for high-priority propaganda and organizational measures in connection with the results of the 28th party congress as well as the basic work orientation for August to October—i.e., the period prior to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

We are striving to the full extent of our capabilities to react in timely fashion to problems that come up, to provide reference points for local party committees and mobilize existing capabilities to assist them, frankly trying to compensate in some way for what was neglected before.

Reports on sessions of the Secretariat and matters under its consideration are now published regularly in the press, and you are aware of these. I would just like to recall a few of them.

For example, a determination was made at one Secretariat session concerning treatment of the actions and initiatives of various sociopolitical organizations and movements. Tension in this sphere, we must state quite directly, is increasing throughout the country. Opposition forces are willing to use any and all means to discredit the CPSU as the leading party. They are making demands calculated towards forcing it out of the political life of the country.

It is very important that we overcome a certain dismay on the part of some Communists and party organizations that has been elicited by this massive attack. The resolution adopted stresses that we must work more energetically to do this, use greater initiative, broaden the front of support for party policies, more actively seek the joint action of all forces, all people who advocate the democratic development of society and continued forward movement along the socialist path, and repulse destructive forces.

A decision was also made on another matter of great importance today, the work of Communists in the soviets. This question is under examination both in the Secretariat and the Politburo. If we wish to actually implement our policies and attain concrete results, we must ensure unity of action of Communists in the soviets, coordination of their activity by party committees. We recommend that party groups (factions of Communists) be established in soviets of all levels, and that party policy be promoted through them in the organs of people's sovereignty, and of course at congresses of people's deputies as well as in the Supreme Soviets of republics and that of the Union.

We also examined the question of party cadre policy in modern times. This will of course have to undergo changes.

In accordance with decisions of the 28th congress on cadre work, the party repudiates formalism and the nomenklatura approach. Procedural change has been effected with respect to the examination of cadre issues in the CPSU Central Committee. The CPSU Central Committee is eliminating the cadre nomenklatura that used to exist. The sphere of cadre decisions falling within the competence of the CPSU Central Committee is being radically reduced. Whereas before, over 15,000 positions came under the Central Committee, now there are only about 2,000. These will include only a cadre of party functionaries, party press organ leaders, and heads of scientific and educational institutions subordinate to the CPSU Central Committee.

At the same time, the party does not reject the practice within the framework of democratic procedures of exercising party influence on the selection of cadre outside the immediate jurisdiction of party organs. All party organizations have some very serious work in front of them here, so as to acquire the necessary "data bank," as they say these days, on promising Communists and nonparty members, so as to be able to see their face, to support and promote the most worthy of them.

Generally speaking, the circle of problems of intraparty life discussed in the Secretariat over this short period of time has been fairly broad. In addition to those I have already mentioned, I would like to cite: preparation of the new CPSU program; 1991 organization and terms of subscription for newspapers and magazines of party publishing houses; the basic orientation of course work for party cadre retraining for academic year 1990-1991; the organization of citizen reception by members of the CPSU Central Committee in the information/reception office of the CPSU Central Committee General Department; and a number of others.

I would now like to speak in greater detail concerning new developments in cadre retraining. In the extremely dynamic situation we see at present, this has acquired primary significance. Today the level of cadre training determines to a great extent the effectiveness of our work, our ability to properly select its forms and methods, indeed its very content.

The party has a diversified network of courses for enhancing the qualifications of its cadre. This encompasses an institute of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, 13 faculties of higher party schools, and 133 permanent course-work facilities under party committees. The number of functionaries studying there annually over the past five years has increased from 65,000 to 240,000 individuals.

It was considered advisable this academic year to orient the system of courses for party cadre retraining on studying the decisions and materials of the 28th CPSU Congress. In this regard, the primary task has become that of mastering the issues of transition to a market economy.

In order to organize this effort in the proper manner, it was decided this year to conduct three or four sections of special instruction, based on the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee, with the chairpersons of the economic departments of party higher educational institutions [VUZ's], prominent lecturers, and course directors and functionaries of party committees engaged in cadre training matters. Similar instruction is to be conducted based on the faculties of the higher party schools so that we may competently proceed towards the mass training of cadres on the problems of effecting transition to a market economy in 1991 immediately following ratification of the appropriate state acts.

It must be said that interest has intensified in recent times with respect to utilizing VUZ's and party courses to train deputies of the soviets and functionaries in the state apparatus. Proposals are issuing from both local and central organs in this regard. We see the possibility of actively linking the party's course-work system with the additional training of these cadres on a contractual basis. Here we must take into account the fact that, beginning in 1991, full compensation by the soviets and departments is envisaged for expenses in training the cadres they send to party educational institutions.

We all know what a significant place was occupied at the congress by problems in ethnic relations. Therefore, questions of the structuring of a renewed Union of sovereign republics and participation by party organizations in drawing up the draft of a new Union treaty have constituted the focus of attention of the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee.

Efforts have now gotten underway in preparing for the CPSU Central Committee Plenum at which it is proposed to provide a detailed, thorough analysis of the sociopolitical situation in the country and examine key issues in the organization of the work of the CPSU Central Committee.

Measures have already been taken in prompt and energetic fashion directed towards the soonest possible implementation of provisions of the new CPSU Statutes, intensifying the work of the primary party organizations, and increasing the activity of members of elective party organs and the entire party aktiv. Normative and procedural methods documents envisaged in the appendix to the new CPSU Statutes will be brought up for confirmation by the Central Committee Plenum.

It must also be stated that proposals on the structural reorganization of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus and its reduction in accordance with decisions of the congress have been readied for confirmation. The composition, structure, and functions of departments are being refined; the numerical strength of the apparatus is being significantly reduced—by 40 percent. We

see the sense of steps being taken here in an effort to sharply enhance the competence of the party apparatus and the effectiveness of its work, and at the same time abandon once and for all the petty guardianship of party organizations and party committees in the localities. We believe this will be a real and practical contribution to the democratization of intraparty life.

It also is intended to examine questions concerning the organizational work of the CPSU Central Committee. It is proposed that each of its members work in one of the commissions of the Central Committee to be formed at the plenum. Two types of commissions are envisaged—commissions on the basic orientation of CPSU Central Committee activity, provided by the CPSU Statutes, and commissions of the CPSU Central Committee established in accordance with resolutions adopted at the congress.

In principle these should encompass the entire spectrum of party activity, all avenues being pursued in its theoretical and practical work. It is these commissions that should develop and present the policy and tactics that will be put into effect by the party.

Also to be discussed at the plenum, of course, is the socioeconomic situation in the country, the transition to regulated market relations.

The course of preparation for the CPSU Central Committee Plenum falls under the constant supervision of the Secretariat and Central Committee Politburo, and is discussed at every session.

What do we see on our agenda for the near-term? First of all, analysis of the work accomplished in implementing resolutions of the 28th congress on party policy in the conduct of economic reform and the transition to market relations, on the state of the peasantry and the course of party agrarian policy, on the basic orientation of military policy, and on the budget and assets of the CPSU. There is a need to examine political aspects of the food products market that has taken shape in the country as well as various aspects of the activity and work record of a number of party organizations of Rostov and Nizhegorod Oblasts, Altay Kray, the Moldova SSR, and others.

I think that as a result we will be able to provide reference points for these party organizations, so necessary to them in this difficult time. For in spite of all the diversity we see in the specific situations, there is something common in the processes party organizations are having to deal with, in the conditions of their activity. And of course they have to know how other localities are dealing with similar circumstances, what measures are succeeding or not succeeding, and why. Otherwise we are all doomed to proceeding blindly in the dark, to reinventing the wheel each time.

But this is an unaffordable luxury right now for the party. We must act and act energetically. We have to resolve our intraparty matters as well, of course, but if we wish to be the true vanguard of society we have to reach out to people, to constantly be in the thick of the masses, as V.I. Lenin said. First of all we must work in the labor collectives for that is where the basic processes are taking place.

We must resolutely shake off the chains of technocratic approaches that are still around. We must get rid of the usual stereotypes of command, corroded work forms, and methods. Otherwise we will not find the road to the hearts and minds of people. We will not be able to entice them with our appeals or be able to become the organizational center. Without this it will be difficult to expect that the policies we develop will be echoed in the people, will secure their support.

Esteemed Comrades!

An acute, critical discussion of principle is taking place at your congress on the work of the party under today's conditions, on the crisis, and on ways to surmount it. The political report acknowledged frankly that the Communist Party Central Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat have begun losing one position right after another in society. A significant percentage of Communists, primary party organizations, and party committees have lost their combat fighting spirit, their initiative, and their ability to influence the situation. Loss of the political confidence of the people has become a reality for the Communist Party of the republic. The course of the congress convinces us that the delegates are clearly aware of this—there are no divergences of principle in assessments of the situation. It is another matter with respect to how, what means, and what methods to utilize to bring the party out of its crisis.

Therefore, the significance of such forums as our congress is great. The chief mission of our congress is to develop and present to Communists and workers a policy that responds to their aspirations and that they understand.

Our common political responsibility **as Communists** consists in doing everything necessary to conclude a new Union treaty in the very near future. The party organizations and communists of Armenia are faced with carrying on this effort under difficult circumstances. The situation that has taken shape around Nagorno-Karabakh is exerting the strongest influence on processes taking place in the republic regarding the growth of national self-consciousness and the democratic assimilation of sovereign rights. As a result "departmental" sentiment has been disseminated, illusions that our pressing political and socioeconomic problems can be resolved only through isolation. Centrifugal tendencies are being reflected in proposals that the republic Communist Party leave the composition of the CPSU, expressed in a number of legislative acts including the "Declaration on Armenian Independence."

Under these conditions the Central Committee must ensure intensified efforts on the part of communist deputies in the republic Supreme Soviet. It must get

involved in their organizational formation and effect close contact between the Central Committee and the party group in the parliament. It must provide them every possible kind of assistance, including legal-judicial. The right of legislative initiative of the Central Committee itself should also be used to the full extent. It is very important that the provisions of the declaration, transformed into articles of a new republic constitution, and the laws of the republic create a sound political and legal basis for concluding the Union treaty. Communist deputies must introduce clear and principled policy in the legislature—everything that responds to the interests of the people must find party support.

These forms and methods of operating, new to us, must be fully utilized to resolve the crisis situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. The policy of the CPSU Central Committee has consisted, and continues to consist, of finding a way out of the situation using political means through seeking forms of reconciliation and compromise within the framework of the USSR Constitution.

People may say to me: we have already heard this many times. Well that might be, but no party has desired—or been able—to follow this path. **Thus, a way out of the crisis through political means constitutes, essentially, a new problem for us in the sense of practical activity.** We have grown accustomed to the center deciding everything for everyone, dividing things up and being the source of favor. This was possible when the administrative command system was functioning, when the CPSU was invested by the Constitution with the right to settle anything and everything. But we all have come out in opposition to such a state of affairs, and are quite correct in having done so. Yet we are trying to operate the old way, using methods of force, and these never yield results. The history of the Armenian people over many centuries confirms this quite convincingly. Is it possible genocide and oppression, threats, and even physical destruction could change something in the spiritual realm, in the intentions and aspirations of the Armenian people? I am deeply convinced that with respect to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue as well, force and threats from either side will yield nothing.

Whatever the center might undertake to find a way out of the situation will be impossible if Armenia and Azerbaijan cannot come to agreement. The path to normalization lies not in ultimatums and mutual accusations, but only in mutual understanding and constructive dialogue on the part of the leadership of both republics, their Supreme Soviets, party organizations, and workers.

The present situation makes it urgently necessary to raise the work level of city and rayon party committees. Many of these have "thrown up their hands," so to speak, have lost control of the state of affairs. Moreover, certain party committee secretaries may, through their extremist judgments and declarations of ultimatum, push ordinary Communists towards adopting decisions not completely thought out, not well reasoned, during the course of the planned referendum.

The referendum must be conducted in organized fashion as an extremely important political action, one which will determine in the final analysis the fate of the Armenian Communist Party.

The primary party organizations require specific practical assistance from the Central Committee, city party committees, and rayon party committees. Operating primarily through Communists and working with people, they must strive using political methods to see to it that each collective exercises its democratic rights and accomplishes, to the fullest extent, the functions entrusted to it.

The critical state of affairs in the economy demands this.

It is entirely understandable that the consequences of the earthquake and blockade have been felt in economic indices.

The most difficult state of affairs has come about in the calamity zone. Plans for the construction of housing and civil facilities have been ruined. A special degree of alarm is elicited by the mass egress of workers from Union republics participating in the restoration effort. But today we require housing for about half a million people. Thousands of people continue to live in tents and temporary shelters without elementary conveniences.

Can it be that such problems must pass outside the view of Communists? I think the most serious calamity lies in the fact that recently we have torn ourselves away from the problems of simple people—we have become swamped with "grand" politics highly intraparty in nature, far-fetched problems in a number of instances.

One of these seems to me to be the idea of isolating the Armenian Communist Party proposed by several of our comrades. I am deeply convinced that this would deprive such a vital organism as the party of many nutritive roots linking Armenian Communists with various organizations of the CPSU. It would dry up the party and weaken it severely, if not cut it down altogether.

Under such adverse conditions, when the influence of the Armenian Communist Party on development of the political situation in the republic is decreasing, when it has become practically an opposition party subject to open attacks, Communists and the entire party aktiv must function purposefully, energetically, and harmoniously **while keeping their spirits up**, and engage in painstaking efforts with people.

There is no other path to reviving the Armenian Communist Party other than a turn towards human problems, towards the further democratic development of society. Allow me to wish Armenian Communists success in this truly noble effort and to wish all of you health and happiness.

Azerbaijan-Armenia Border Security Examined

PM2810134890 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin: "The Dead Zone; Report From the Azerbaijani-Armenian Border"]

[Text] In the morning Lieutenant General V. Savvin, chief of the internal troops territorial directorate, changed the route of flight around the security detachments located in Azerbaijani villages bordering Armenia.

"First we are flying to the village of Kyukyu."

It emerges that today, that is on the night of 18-19 October, an internal troops detail came under fire on the outskirts of this village.

Through the window of the helicopter piloted by Major V. Tsibizov there are mountain ridges, resembling dunes from this height, with occasional islets of settlements in ravines. Here and there small herds graze on slopes bleached white during the summer. Being a herdsman in these parts is a high-risk occupation. There are frequent instances of these herdsmen becoming easy prey for bandits. In Nakhichevan a relative of a herdsman from the settlement of Kechili in Shakhbuzskiy Rayon who went missing a month ago approached me on learning that I am a journalist from Moscow. Alamdar Fatullayev was due to return home 18 September. He disappeared without trace with his flock of 600 sheep, leaving a wife and nine children. Is the man still alive, what happened to him? Nobody can give Fatullayev's despairing relatives the answer to these questions. Search activities carried out jointly by republic Ministry of Internal Affairs subunits and internal troops bore no results. Without the active involvement of Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] law and order organs in the search for the missing herdsman there is no question of counting on success in the matter. But as they told me at the Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Prosecutor's Office, working contact with the Armenian side has been lost. Wherever estrangement between law and order organs occurs, all sorts of crimes can be expected. Moreover, what is now in operation is not politics at all but elementary criminal activity.

The border area between the Nakhichevan ASSR and Armenia became a dead zone some time ago. Not only whole flocks of livestock but also people can disappear without trace here. Here, on remote paths, a man can be beaten up and robbed with impunity. The windows of a peaceful settlement can be slashed with a burst of automatic fire. It seems that the law does not reach this dead zone, at best i. operates somewhere nearby, either falling short of the target or going over it. The strength of the local militia is such that it is difficult to maintain one militia post of two or three militiamen to cover several villages.

In Shakhbuzskiy Rayon where we are headed—I am jumping ahead—we encountered some posts where the man on duty was the one and only militiaman for dozens of kilometers around. Certainly were it not for the stationing of an internal troops security detachment nearby, his presence there could be considered purely symbolic, although of course there is no denying the enthusiasm of these guardians of law and order who as a rule donned their uniform only recently.

The helicopter lands on a soccer field and a short, fair-haired senior lieutenant rushes to report to the general. Seizing the moment, we get acquainted: Igor Tukhkanen, chief of the security detachment. A Leningrader in his third week here. He has nine subordinates. Not a very powerful force to cover a village with a population of 1,500. Sparing the details, the officer tells of a night attack. The commander is joined by Senior Sergeant Pavel Yevdokimov and Private Mikhail Solovyev. It was they who found themselves in the raiders' sights.

They were firing from the pass, from the Armenian side, presumably from five automatic weapons. A minute before this Yevdokimov and Solovyev were checking a tarrying vehicle that had entered the sleeping village. Just as they had gone back toward the post, shots thundered out. The bullets fell all around. The soldiers returned fire. The alert group headed by the security detachment chief arrived quickly to support them. The firefight lasted around half an hour. Fortunately there were no casualties among the servicemen. As for the attackers, they were well hidden by the night darkness.

Yevdokimov and Solovyev are both from Karelia. Both finish their service this fall, and their parents and Mikhail's wife and two-year-old son are tired of waiting. Yevdokimov has been recommended for the next rank of NCO and Solovyev has been awarded the badge "For Excellent Service." Over two years these guys have repeatedly risked their lives in firefights resulting from interethnic hostility. Such was the service that fell to their lot. Such service also fell to the lot of their combat comrades in the security detachment—Junior Sergeant Konstantin Yemashov from Novosibirsk and Privates Sadirdyn Ergashev from Namangan, Yuriy Rybakov from the Mari ASSR, Dmitriy Mansurov from Chelyabinsk, Rostislav Tson from Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, and Rishat Khusainov from the Bashkir ASSR. I understand how difficult it is to agree with this, above all for the parents, but these guys' service here is necessary at the moment as the villagers anxiously told us, surrounding us in one of the little streets. They asked us why their lives should be protected by these beardless boys from Russia and Uzbekistan, risking their necks every day, every hour. Does our state really not have the strength to come to a decision that does not have to be paid for in its citizens' blood? Why, finally, has the second stage of fulfilling the USSR president's decree on surrendering weapons again turned into a nonfulfillment stage? After

all, the bullets directed at the soldiers that night came from the Armenian side. When and where will these guns next speak?

We were also asked these questions in other villages we visited. Questions born of pain and despair. Lt. Gen. V. Savvin's subordinates are doing everything that lies in their power. Some posts that have gained a toehold in mountain passes are suffering incredible hardship but remain on duty. For the umpteenth time in the people's hour of need the soldier has shouldered the burden. But is it really in his power to answer all the agonizing questions of the Azerbaijan-Armenian border area?

As we were returning to Nakhichevan Vasiliy Nestorovich said:

"The night attack, as well as a number of other factors, is evidence of the fact that tension persists at the junction of the two republics and silence in these parts is deceptive. This situation will persist until the USSR president's decree on disarmament is fulfilled completely and unconditionally. Above all this means that those who do not intend to part with their weapons and who continue to provoke conflicts must be isolated from society."

This sticks in my memory: An elderly peasant told how he meets with his old friend, a herdsman from an Armenian village, and far away from strangers' eyes they reminisce about old times, curse to the high heavens bandits who have become impudent through escaping punishment, and rack their brains over how to bring back trust in one another.

Baku, Singapore Firms Conclude Barter Agreement

LD3010184190 Moscow TASS in English 1457 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] Baku October 30 TASS—The Singapore Sibersing firm will participate in retooling the largest oil refinery in Baku, capital of Azerbaijan. This is provided for by a contract concluded here between firm President Mohtarur Rahman and refinery director Abdul Guseinov.

The contract is based on barter exchange, Guseinov said. The enterprise, having a licence to export fuel, will supply its Singapore partners with petroproducts and receive equipment in return, which will boost labour productivity.

A large batch of consumer goods will be purchased for refinery workers. Some of the hard currency revenues will be used to develop the refinery's social infrastructure.

The deal is worth 34 million rubles, Guseinov noted. The contract will not affect state interests in any way. Export petroproducts make up only 2.5 per cent of the refinery's total volume of production.

Arms Captured in Nagorno-Karabakh Put On Display

PM3110104990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Oct 90

[Report by M. Mamedov; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] An unusual exhibition has opened in Stepanakert, the oblast center of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] of Azerbaijan.

[Mamedov] The exhibits are weapons confiscated during operations carried out by MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] internal troops servicemen in recent days. As you can see there are the most diverse weapons, from rockets and home-made grenades to automatic weapons, explosive devices, and all kind of ammunition.

Three months ago more awesome weapons—mortars and grenade launchers and various firearms—were captured in NKAO.

The only thing that remains secret is how these weapons are getting past the border troop subunits on the borders of Azerbaijan and Armenia to arrive here. [passage omitted]

Central Asia

Kazakh Supreme Soviet Adopts Various Laws

LD3010222290 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 1500 GMT 30 Oct 90

[Text] At today's morning session of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, an in-depth discussion of the Kazakh SSR laws on ownership ended, and the laws were adopted. Deputies then examined the draft law on the status of the people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR. It was finalized by the committee for questions on the work of the Council of People's Deputies in the development of governing and self-government of the SSR. Of 41 articles of the law, seven were adopted.

At the evening session, the administrative and territorial structure of the republic was examined. Laws for the establishment of Mangystau Oblast and the restoration of Turgay Oblast, on the introduction of amendments to Article 77 of the Constitution of the Kazakh SSR and on confirmation of the decrees of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, were adopted. A decree on restoring previously abolished rayons and making other changes to the administrative and territorial division of the Kazakh SSR was approved. A law was adopted on changing the title of honorary award of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR to the honorary award of the Kazakh SSR.

The Supreme Soviet will meet again on 13 November.

Kirghiz President Cited on 'Main Problems'

LD3010214190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 30 Oct 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The second extraordinary session of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet finished today in Frunze.

Questions concerning the tragic inter-ethnic conflict in the Osh Oblast and the measures stabilizing the situation were examined during the last days of the session. The deputies agreed in principle with the assessment of the events as given by the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities. This was the result of the big miscalculations of the republic's leadership in the most important directions of their work, it was noted. In this connection the deputies emphasized the responsibility of the Bureau of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee and of its first secretary, Masaliyev.

The final action was adoption of the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic which remains within the framework of the renewed Union of the Sovereign Republic.

What will become a red letter day in Kirghiz history was the election of the first president of the republic. Following several election rounds on the alternative basis, 46-year-old Askar Akayev, doctor of technical sciences and president of the republican Academy of Sciences, became president.

[Begin Akayev recording] The main problems facing our people and our republic today are stabilization of the social and political situation, and improving inter-ethnic relations. My first concern was exactly this: To make my contribution toward consolidation of all the social and political forces in the republic, and to achieve civilian harmony in the republic. Without civilian harmony, without consolidation of all the social and political forces, without healthier inter-ethnic relations, we will not solve the major problems facing the republic, in particular the realization of the program of transition to a market economy. [end recording]

Coverage of Uzbek Supreme Soviet Proceedings

Session's Agenda Approved

PM3110104590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by K. Adilbekov: "Agenda Approved"]

[Text] Tashkent—The mood of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputies who gathered in Tashkent 29 October for their third session can be called satisfactory. The day before all questions submitted on the agenda were examined in the Supreme Soviet committees and commissions. The state order for raw cotton, which is still a determining factor for the republic's economy and also a very important source of currency revenue and the main commodity in intra-Union exchange, has been rapidly fulfilled. Today above-plan cotton is coming in.

This was said by I.A. Karimov, president of the Uzbek SSR and first secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee, addressing deputies at the very start of the session's work. He proposed increasing the money maintenance for people's deputies to 150 rubles a month, which was supported by a majority of votes.

After a brief discussion the deputies approved the session's agenda. It has over 20 questions. I shall cite only what are in my view the most important—the republic's plan and budget for 1991, changes and additions to the Uzbek SSR Constitution, draft laws on ownership and entrepreneurship, and the provision on the republic's military commissariat. The deputies have to elect the vice president of the Uzbek SSR.

The morning sitting heard a report from Sh.R. Mirsayidov, chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, on the main avenues for the stabilization of Uzbekistan's national economy and the principles for entering a market economy.

Budget, Accounts Examined

LD3110103390 Tashkent Domestic Service in Uzbek 0100 GMT 31 Oct 90

[Text] The session of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet continued its work. The people's deputies of Uzbekistan began the examination of the main directions in the economic and social development of the republic in the year 1991, similarly the main directions of the state budgets for the year 1991 and an account of the process of implementation of the state budget for 1989. Khamidov, deputy chairman of Uzbek Council of Ministers and chairman of the Gosplan [State Planning Committee] of the republic, spoke on the first question, and Uzbek Finance Minister Mamatisayev spoke on the second question. Examination of the speeches followed. The appropriate decisions were adopted on the examined questions.

The people's deputies of Uzbekistan then began to examine a series of draft laws. Khodzhayev, deputy chairman of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet committee for economic reforms and local self-rule, talked on the second examination of the draft law on property and it implementation in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. Discussions also took place on these questions. The deputies decided to forward the draft laws to the Uzbek Supreme Soviet committees for a third and more detailed examination.

Bugrov, deputy chairman of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet talked on the draft law on the status of the people's deputies of the Uzbek SSR. Rzayev, who chaired the session of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet, talked on the followup to queries by deputies. Discussions took place on the speeches concerning the draft law on the status of people's deputies of the Uzbek SSR. The draft law was adopted [word indistinct] and forwarded to the Uzbek Supreme Soviet committees for more detailed examination.

The Supreme Soviet confirmed the decrees passed by the president of Uzbekistan between the sessions of the Supreme Soviet.

Karimov, president of Uzbekistan and first secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, participated in the work of the session.

The session continues its work today.

Trial Newspaper Launched

PM3110112590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Oct 90 First Edition p 6

[Report by correspondent A. Kaipbergenov: "Subscriber, Choose!"]

[Text] The trial issue of KHALK SUZI ("People's Word")—the newspaper of the Uzbekistan people's deputies and the republic's Supreme Soviet—saw the light yesterday.

In accordance with the decision of the supreme legislative organ's session, as of 1 January it will be published in the Uzbek and Russian languages. To judge by the content of the eight-page issue, the traditional republican newspapers SOVET UZBEKISTONI and PRAVDA VOSTOKA, which in the new year acquire a "purely" party status, have a serious rival in the present hard struggle for the subscriber. The first page of the new publication prints a message of good luck from I.A. Karimov, president of the Uzbek SSR, and greetings from PRAVDA chief editor I.T. Frolov and the editorial collegiums of other publications. The issue is devoted mainly to the very complex problems which are being put on the agenda of the third session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet which opens 29 October.